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ABSTRACT
The thesis examines the adaptive responses of North and South Korea to change in the 
international system and analyzes the effects on their international standing. The 
framework of analysis is constructed from a selective review of the literature on hegemony 
and its relationship to international order and change. Special attention is given to the 
position of peripheral states, and how they are conditioned by and respond to the 
international order.
The framework of analysis includes concepts such as the structure of opportunities, 
emulation of forms, imposition of forms, and regime rigidities. It is posited that to the 
degree to which a regime achieves congruence between domestic and foreign policies and 
the main trends in the international system, it will be more successful in enhancing its 
standing. In order to do so, a regime must manage its own adjustment to overcome regime 
rigidities and exploit opportunities for ascendance in the international system.
The thesis examines the competition for international support between North and South 
Korea between 1948 and 1994. It analyzes the fluctuations in the level of international 
support for each regime, with reference to key changes in the international system. It 
produces an explanation for the pattern of international support for each regime, according 
to the policies they pursued during each distinct period of recent international history. It is 
shown that North Korea did comparatively well in the first two decades after the Korean 
War, and that South Korea did comparatively better in the subsequent two decades. This 
was due to the nature of changes in the international system and the divergent adaptive 
responses by the two Koreas. Regime rigidities increased in North Korea, while South 
Korea demonstrated pragmatic flexibility, accompanying its economic diplomacy.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis explores the theme of how states acquire the quality of statehood and how they 
compete among themselves to acquire international support to that end. This study is 
undertaken by first considering this subject through the literature on international political 
economy and hegemony, in terms of the general problem, and then more substantially, I 
address the particular experiences of the two Koreas. The substantive analysis examines 
how their respective responses to change in the international system, in terms of both 
domestic and foreign policy, affect their international standing and, in turn, their 
international status.
International status is defined as the quality of being a state. International standing is 
related to status or has bearing on status, and is largely a product of the degree of 
international support. To that end the thesis seeks to explain the changes in the level of 
international support for the rival regimes of divided Korea during the post Second World 
war era, and systematically analyze the effects of this changing level of support on the 
attempt to change their respective international status.
There are two theories of the status of statehood and its acquisition. A) a state becomes a 
state because it establishes control over territory and people. B) A state becomes a state 
because it is recognised as such by other states. (1)
In the case of Korea, both claimants had fulfilled the criteria of the first theory, i.e. control 
over territory and people. However, the international community failed to arrive at a 
sufficient consensus concerning recognition. Both Korean governments claimed to be the 
sole legitimate representative of the entire Korean nation, though neither controlled the 
entire territory of pre-liberation Korea, nor had jurisdiction over the entire Korean nation. 
International support for the rival Korean governments tended initially to mirror Cold 
War alliance patterns, and the same dichotomy prevented admission of either Korea into 
the United Nations.
The structure of the thesis is determined by the central research goals, as above. Therefore, 
the thesis includes a substantial discussion of international political economy and 
hegemony, in order to first establish a clear analytical framework encompassing both 
international system change and the opportunities for manoeuvrability by peripheral states 
such as Korea. A brief account is given of the historical background, but sufficient to 
explain key elements of the Korean Question, e.g. colonisation, liberation, and the character 
of the Korean War.
Subsequent chapters analyze the political economy of diplomacy, alternatively discussing
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North and South Korean policies. This analysis is embellished with material on their 
domestic political economy. These chapters focus heavily on relations with diplomatic 
partners in the Third World. This is because the Cold War division on the Korean Question 
among major powers was quite rigid. Therefore, the primary sphere for increasing the level 
of international support was in the Third World, among the emerging nations. The political 
activity surrounding the UN and its annual debate on the Korean Question is another 
major topic, since it was central to the competition over status. The thesis concludes with 
observations on adaptability, international change, and international standing and status.
The central hypothesis bearing on the differential outcomes of North and South Korean 
policies is that "regime rigidities" are a key determining factor, which over the long run 
decides the success or failure of domestic and foreign policies. By regime rigidities, I mean 
factors that prevent a state from taking advantage of opportunities in the structure of the 
international system - through successful adaptation, or that cause a failure to modernise 
and develop by adjusting appropriately to the changing domestic and external 
environment. The fluctuations in the level of international support for the rival regimes in 
Korea cannot be properly understood except by analysis of the larger context of 
international change.
The level of international support for each regime is the primary measure of its 
international standing, and thus a measure of its status. The fluctuations in the level of 
international support for the rival regimes of Korea since 1948 are a product of the 
interplay of domestic and foreign policies on the one hand, with the main trends of change 
in the international system on the other. This thesis systematically explores this long term 
relationship between internal and external variables, and on this basis analyses the 
outcomes of the competition for international status.
The fluctuating level of international support for the rival regimes is partly a function of 
the degree of correspondence or "fit" between domestic and foreign policies and the main 
trends of change in the international system. When the correspondence between domestic 
and foreign policies and the main trends of change in the international system is good, the 
level of international support can be expected to increase. When the correspondence is 
poor, the level of international support should be expected to decline.
Thus, it is the capacity of each regime to adapt to the main current of change in the 
international system that should be the decisive factor in determining the outcome of the 
competition for international standing and status. The ability to adapt successfully is in 
turn dependent on the degree of regime rigidity and upon positive action to reduce such 
rigidities.
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North Korea's domestic and foreign policies have been remarkably consistent since the 
mid-1950s. Its adaptability to change in the international system has, however, been 
relatively poor since the mid-1970s. To understand first the impressive gains of North 
Korea in the international system during the 1950s and the 1960s it is necessary to examine 
the correspondence between North Korea's domestic and foreign policies and key currents 
of international change from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, such as the systemic trends 
toward decolonisation, universality in the membership criteria of the United Nations, 
national liberation and socialist revolution in the Third World, and the growth of Third 
World solidarity as a significant force in world politics. This correspondence resulted in a 
dramatic increase in the level of international support for North Korea, thus enhancing 
North Korea's international standing.
The equally dramatic decline in the level of international support for North Korea during 
the period from the late 1970s to the present can be explained by the failure of North Korea 
to adapt successfully to new dominant trends in the international system, such as 
liberalisation, marketisation, privatisation, and the decline of national liberation, socialist 
revolution, and Third World solidarity. This poor correspondence between North Korea's 
domestic and foreign policies and the main trends of change in the international system is 
largely the result of its increasing regime rigidities. This increasing level of regime rigidity 
can, in turn, partly be explained as a consequence of the requirements of reproducing the 
Kim II Sung regime.
South Korea, in contrast, has been less consistent over the long term in the formulation of 
its domestic and foreign policies. Nevertheless, South Korea has been much more capable 
than the North of adapting successfully to main currents of change in the international 
system since the mid-1970s. South Korea had significant initial political and diplomatic 
advantages in the competition for international support, largely a result of US hegemonic 
influence in the international system and the supportive role played by the United Nations, 
i.e. the tendency to give greater support to South Korea and exclude North Korea from UN 
participation.
Despite these favourable factors, South Korea did not fully exploit its initial advantages and 
subsequently suffered a relative decline in its level of international support, as North Korea 
significantly increased its level of international support in the 1960s and 1970s. The relative 
decline in the level of support for South Korea during the 1960s-1970s can be explained by 
the rather poor political and diplomatic adaptability o f the ROK during this period, in 
contrast to its economic adaptability. This slowness to adapt during this period was largely 
a consequence of South Korea's commitment to anti-communist ideology and to its special
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relationship with the US. This ideological and political rigidity by South Korea reduced the 
correspondence between its domestic and foreign policies and main trends in the 
international system. Particularly during the era of the Vietnam War (approximately from 
1964-1975), South Korea's anti-communist ideology damaged its international standing.
The high levels of international support for South Korea in the 1980s and 1990s can be 
explained as a consequence of the progressive elimination of anti-communist ideological 
elements in foreign policy. This facilitated the adoption of a pragmatic trade-oriented 
foreign policy to accompany the strategy of export-led industrialisation. The significant 
reduction of regime rigidities by South Korea after 1979, and the consequently good 
correspondence between its domestic and foreign policies and the main trends of change in 
the international system (i.e. liberalisation, marketisation, privatisation, and the decline of 
liberation, socialist and Third World solidarity movements), combined to produce 
increased international support and eventually enhancement of international status, i.e. 
membership in the United Nations.
II. Methodology
International support can be measured by both quantitative and qualitative methods. The 
key quantitative index of international support is the number of full diplomatic partners. 
Secondly, the number of votes received on draft resolutions in the United Nations on the 
Korean Question is a key index of the level of international support. The number of high 
level diplomatic missions despatched and received is another useful measure. International 
support can be qualitatively assessed by interpreting the pattern and content of diplomatic 
relations over time, in substantive terms, i.e to assess the quality and nature of support as 
opposed to mere quantity of partnerships.
International standing can be quantitatively measured by such indices as the number of 
memberships in international or inter-governmental organisations, and attendance at 
important international conferences or meetings. It can be qualitatively assessed by 
interpreting the pattern and content of participation in the institutions of the international 
system. The central forum for claims to international status in this case is the United 
Nations, particularly the General Assembly, representing the community of states. Full 
membership in the UN, since it is based on the principle o f universality, is a key indicator of 
international status. This explains why so much of the two Koreas' competition for 
international standing and status focused on political processes in the UN.
To gather the data to make this assessment of the level of international support and the 
affects on international status, I have consulted a very broad range of source material. 
Wherever possible I have relied first on primary sources in preference to secondary
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sources. These primary sources take a variety of forms, including official diplomatic 
documents and records in the Korean language, and a large number of interviews at high 
level in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, conducted in 1986 and 
1990.1 have supplemented this material with a wide variety of secondary sources.
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Chapter One: Hegemony, International Order, and the Adaptive Responses of States in the
Periphery
I. Introduction
The subject of the two Koreas' adaptations to change in the international system will first 
be addressed through an exploration of the literature in terms of the general problem, i.e. 
how peripheral states adapt to changing circumstances in the international system. This 
will be attempted through a selective review of literature on hegemony, as it relates to the 
problem of how non-hegemonic peripheral states adapt to international change.
At the heart of International Relations is an enquiry into the nature of international order. 
Thus, the subject is embedded in international history. Indeed, there can be no 
international relations theory without international history. There is an extensive literature 
on hegemony, mostly pre-occupied with the attributes and character of the great powers 
and hegemonic state(s). This thesis addresses a gap in the study of hegemony and 
international order and change by focusing on how the less powerful states adapt to 
changing hegemonic orders.
In addressing the question of how peripheral states adapt to international change, two main 
elements are explored: 1) how hegemony conditions international order; and 2) how non- 
hegemonic states respond to changes in international order, as conditioned by hegemonic 
influences.
It is therefore necessary to first establish the nature of hegemonic order; i.e., the 
constitution of each distinctive hegemonic order, and the transition from one hegemonic 
order to another. The argument will then proceed to the next set of questions; i.e., what are 
the effects of shifts in hegemony on non-hegemonic states? How do such states adapt to the 
changing norms, economic, political, strategic, and ideological pressures and influences that 
arise through participation in the international system? What factors account for successful 
adaptation or unsuccessful adaptation?
The framework of analysis that emerges from the literature review is deployed throughout 
the remainder of the thesis, and re-examined in the conclusions. In this manner, the 
structure of the thesis moves from the general, to the particular, and back to the general.
H. Hegemony and International Order
The concept of hegemonic order has been gaining increasing centrality in International 
Relations literature. The notion of hegemony has perhaps become the most debated term in 
International Relations literature in recent years (1). The word itself is derived from the
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Greek "hegemon", which simply means "leader". Some scholars use the term in a very 
general sense to mean the domination exercised by great powers over weaker states. 
However, hegemony has recently been developed into a special concept, with a variety of 
meanings. A number of scholars now refer to a hegemonic cycle, usually based on the 
notion that one state ascends to a pre-eminent position in the inter-state hierarchy, holds 
this pre-eminent position for a time, and eventually declines and is succeeded by another 
power.
Two notions seem to predominate in the literature on hegemony. First, hegemony is 
increasingly regarded as being as much about economic power as it is about military power, 
while also involving leadership exercised in terms of guiding norms or values. Secondly, it is 
usually held that hegemony passes from one power to another in a succession from "like to 
like" in so far as the attributes of each hegemonic power are held to be very similar - if not 
identical. The same usually applies to the functions in the international system the hegemon 
is held to perform.
The concept of hegemony was perhaps first suggested as a central organising principle by 
Martin Wight, who collaborated with Arnold Toynbee on A Study of History through 
volume VH (2). Wight drew upon Toynbee's comparative analysis of "Universal States" in 
Volume VI of A Study of History, developing an interest in the comparative study of 
historical hegemonic sequences in actual historical states-systems. Unlike realists such as 
Hans Morgenthau, Wight does not seek to present "a systematic theory of the goals of all 
states" in the abstract. Rather, he analyzes the "system of states", a concept Wight 
borrowed from Pufendorfs De Svstematibus Civitatum. Wight concluded that "most 
states-systems have ended in a universal empire, which has swallowed all the states of the 
system." (3)
Hedley Bull, following Wight, stresses the historical process whereby "the expansion of the 
European states system all over the globe, and its transformation into a states system of 
global dimension" dominates modern international history. (4) Bull and Watson 
characterise this same process as the "expansion of international society" whereby the 
norms and the state-forms of the European states-system became universal. (5)
An international society, according to Bull and Watson, rests upon a sense of culturally 
defined sets of shared "common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations." 
(6)
This process implies that the nature of international society, conceived of as a cultural 
nexus of norms and state-forms, is inextricably related to Wight's "succession of 
hegemonies". This is so in the sense that what determines the dominant culture of the
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international system is the character of the dominant state(s) (7).
According to Bull and Watson, what was most distinctive about the European regional 
states-system was that it "came to repudiate any hegemonial principle and regard itself as a 
society of states that were sovereign or independent." Yet, at the global level, the European 
states established "a number of empires which, while they were rival and competing, taken 
together amounted to a European hegemony over the rest of the world, which in the 
nineteenth century became an immense periphery looking to a European centre." (8) As the 
centre of the new global states-system, Europe affirmed its hegemony vis a vis the non- 
European periphery. (9) Bull and Watson contend that this historical process "united the 
whole world into a single economic, strategic, and political system for the first time", i.e. 
Europe exercised the first "world hegemony." (10)
An even more realist view of hegemony is represented in the work of Modelski and 
Thompson, who operationalize "world leadership" through indices of military power. 
Though they do incorporate economic and technological factors in their analysis, their 
primary criterion is naval power, used for "global reach" (11), which are the keys to 
achieving control over and benefit from world trade. In Modelski's analysis there is a 
"strong association between the world power and the lead economy." (12)
Modelski rejects the idea that international relations are "anarchic", and suggests that 
order has been embodied in the "succession of orders of leadership".
Modelski insists that his concept of world leadership should be kept clearly distinct from 
any definition of hegemony as mere domination. He regards such dominationist hegemony 
as a deviant form, at either regional or global level. More importantly, he argues that the 
succession of states holding the world leadership position shapes the character of world 
order. (13) In Modelski's view, modern world order has been characterised by the rise of 
the nation-state to dominance in the inter-state system. Furthermore, each particular world 
power has special characteristics that become defining elements in successive world orders. 
A world power is defined as one which virtually monopolizes, by virtue of extreme power 
concentration, the function of keeping order at world scale.
Paul Kennedy's study of the process of the rise and decline of great powers likewise 
acknowledges a direct link between economic and military-political power over the past five 
centuries. In Kennedy's formulation, military-imperial power is ultimately unsustainable 
without a sufficient base of economic power. When a great power's military-imperial 
project grows too much larger than its economic base can sustain, it suffers historical 
decline from such imperial over-stretch. (14)
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Robert O. Keohane also defines hegemony at global scale using a combination of economic 
and power criteria. According to Keohane, a hegemon "must have control over raw 
materials, control over sources of capital, control over markets, and competitive advantages 
in the production of highly valued goods." (15) Keohane's criticisms of hegemonic stability 
theory sparked off an important debate on the decline of the United States as a global 
hegemonic power and its relation to weakening the liberal or open international trading 
regime. (16)
Hegemonic stability theory posits a positive relationship between hegemony and world 
economic stability, with benefits for all members of the international system. This 
perspective is derived from earlier work by Charles Kindleberger. (17) Kindleberger 
explained the cause of the Great Depression as the lack of a global hegemon. When a 
hegemonic state provides leadership, however, it stamps its authority upon the states 
system. In order to do so, it must be willing to bear system-maintaining costs. This gives 
rise to the notion of hegemony as a benign institution providing a "public good" to the 
system.
In Kindleberger's view, the hegemonic power must be voluntarily willing to assume the 
burdens of world leadership. Merely to have a potentially hegemonic structure of 
international resources does not automatically produce hegemonic stability, since the 
potential hegemonic power may choose to pursue self-interested or free-rider policies, for 
example the United States' international economic policies in the 1920s and 1930s.
Kindleberger, Krasner, and Gilpin (18) are associated with an interpretation of hegemony 
whereby "open international economic structures are causally associated with hegemonic 
distribution of state power. Hegemonic powers, in other words, give rise to strong 
international regimes." (19) Krasner defines hegemony as a system "in which there is a 
single state that is much larger and relatively more advanced than its trading partners." 
(20) He contends that a hegemonic distribution of potential economic power "is likely to 
result in an open trading structure." (21)
Robert Gilpin is particularly concerned with the burdens on the hegemon of providing 
public goods, and the problem of the free rider(s) in the system. Gilpin has developed an 
elegant and persuasive analysis of the role of "uneven development" in generating change 
in the international system. Competition is the underlying force that animates the historical 
process of uneven development. Established industrial centres are eventually challenged by 
the ascendance of new industrial areas. This economic competition directly affects the 
relative power of states and their position in the international system.
Gilpin's formulation of the process of international change is central to our concerns here
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about peripheral adaptability.
According to Gilpin, "...more than anything else it is the nature of the society and its 
policies that determine its position in the international division of labour." Furthermore, 
"Economic nationalism reflects the desire of the periphery to possess and control an 
independent industrial core... to transform the international division of labour through 
industrialization..." (22)
This is an explicit formulation of a strategy of "upward mobility" within the international 
system. Moreover, the opportunity for the periphery to ascend within the international 
system may vary according to the phase of international order. For instance, the cyclical 
expansion and contraction in the world economy should be taken into account. According 
to Gilpin:
"periods of extraordinary growth coincided with the eras of British and American 
economic and political hegemony and ... periods of slower but still good growth paralleled 
the decline of these hegemonies. The period of terrible growth was the interregnum between 
these two eras of hegemonic leadership. Whatever the causal relationships, a strong 
association certainly exists between relative rates of economic growth and the global 
political structure...these erratic economic shifts have been global phenomena. Originating 
in the core economies, their effects have been transmitted through the market mechanism... 
The periods of expansion and contraction have also been associated with profound shifts in 
the structure of the international economic and political system."
(Gilpin 1987:104-105)
Central to these international changes is the process Gilpin refers to as "catching-up", 
whereby technologies and industries in leading sectors, pioneered by a more advanced 
centre, are adopted by ascending economies. For example, continental Europe, the US, and 
Japan, ascended in the international hierarchy during the period of rapid growth 1853-1873 
by emulating British industrialization. Similarly, under post-war American hegemony and 
rapid growth, Europe, Japan, and the NICs ascended by adopting technologies pioneered 
by the United States in the preceding inter-war period.
Most importantly, "...the completion of the catching-up process and the slowing of the 
global rate of economic growth stimulate forces of economic nationalism”, giving rise to 
increasing economic protectionism, the decline of hegemony and of free trade. (23) There is 
a "traumatic experience" approximately every fifty years. Following Schumpeter, Gilpin 
argues that innovation is central to understanding the long waves in the international 
political economy:
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"The clustering of technological innovation in time and space helps explain both the uneven 
growth among nations and the rise and decline of hegemonic powers. The innovative 
hegemon becomes the core of the international economy and, as the most efficient and 
competitive economy, has a powerful incentive to encourage and maintain the rules of a 
liberal open world economy. As it loses its inventiveness, the declining hegemon is unable to 
maintain an open world and may even retreat into trade protectionism. For a time, the 
declining centre (or centres) of growth is unable to sustain the momentum of the world 
economy and the rising centre is unable or reluctant to assume this responsibility. Periods 
of slowing rates of growth appear to be associated with the shift from one set of leading 
industrial sectors and centres of economic growth to another and with the transition from 
one hegemonic leader to the next."
(Gilpin 1987:109)
Furthermore, "Structural crises...appear to be an inherent feature of the modern world 
political economy." Such structural crises entail "transitions from one global industrial 
structure to another" and are "characterized by intensive commercial conflict." (24) Gilpin 
cites the late nineteenth century, the 1920s, and the 1980s as such periods of intense 
competition and structural crisis.
Therefore, given that peripheral states must adapt to these cyclical conditions in the 
international political economy, we may hypothesise that rapid ascendance may be more 
likely in periods of "catching-up", when technologies are being diffused, the world economy 
grows at a fairly rapid rate, and the hegemon sustains a liberal international trade regime. 
It is precisely these conditions that generally characterise the period of the rapid 
ascendance of Korea from the periphery, through state-led industrialisation, from the late 
1950s to the early 1970s. Restructuring or regime change, on the other hand, are more 
likely, or necessary, during the intensely competitive structural crises. Again, the late 19th 
century, the 1920s, and the 1980s were each periods in which Korea experienced profound 
restructuring or regime adjustments.
Gilpin argues that international order has been characterised by "successive rises of 
powerful states that have governed the system and determined the patterns of international 
interaction and established the rules of the system. Thus the essence of systems change 
involves the replacement of a declining dominant power by a rising dominant power." (25)
Gilpin follows Toynbee (26) in identifying the fundamental "tendency of the locus of power 
to shift from the centre to the periphery of an international system" and "the tendency for 
technology and inventiveness to diffuse from dominant power to peripheral states (which in 
turn become dominant powers of an enlarged international system)." (27) This leads to
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historically grounded theory of international change based on "the occurrence of 
fundamental shifts in the locus of political and economic power." (28) Gilpin looks not only 
to changes in the production structure, infrastructural and logistical development, but also 
to changes in "social formation" to explain long term, large scale transformations in world 
politics. Following Samir Amin (29), Gilpin puts emphasis on the special characteristics of 
different social formations, which "influences the distribution of wealth and power within 
societies as well as the mechanism for the distribution of wealth and power among 
societies." (Gilpin 1981:108).
By extension, we may assume that the specific characteristics of the hegemon's social 
formation directly affect the character of the hegemonic order it constructs. Moreover, we 
can assume that as a peripheral state makes the transition from an agrarian to an industrial 
social formation, its political organisation will also change, toward the modern nation-state 
form. Likewise, its position in the international system may undergo significant change in 
this process.
Critics of hegemonic stability theory challenge the notion that the world economy requires 
a hegemon to function well. Keohane explored the hypothesis that there could be 
cooperation "after hegemony", on the basis of well entrenched international norms and 
institutions, as well as over-riding mutual interests in sustaining the system. (30) Susan 
Strange developed the concept "structural power", based on security, production, finance, 
and knowledge structures, in response to the prevailing notions of relative power. (31) 
Strange deploys this framework to bolster her argument that "the United States 
government and the corporations dependent upon it have not in fact lost structural power 
in and over the system." (32) Both Keohane and Strange "disaggregate" hegemony into 
components.
This debate hinges on the perceived economic capabilities of the hegemon. Some define 
hegemony by incorporating very specific economic criteria. For instance, in Immanuel 
Wallerstein's view (33), a single core power achieves supremacy, sequentially, in the spheres 
of production, commerce, and finally finance. In the historical moment when a single core 
power is supreme in all three economic spheres, it holds the hegemonic position in the 
world-system. Wallerstein contends that as "soon as a state becomes truly hegemonic, it 
begins to decline", but he ascribes this decline as due more to the relative gains of other 
states than to absolute, internally generated decline.
Wallerstein considers hegemony to be a rare condition and a temporary historical moment: 
"...there is only a short moment in time when a given core power can manifest 
simultaneously productive, commercial, and financial superiority over all other core
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powers. This momentary summit is what we call hegemony." (emphasis added) (34)
The emergence of each hegemony is followed by a "major restructuring of the interstate 
system...in a form consonant with the need for relative stability of the now hegemonic 
power." (35) For Wallerstein, hegemony exists when "one power can largely impose its 
rules and its wishes (at the very least by effective veto power) in the economic, political, 
military, diplomatic, and even cultural arenas." (36)
Wallerstein emphasises similarities in the attributes of successive hegemonic states, 
including being economically strong enough to champion free trade. From the world-system 
perspective, economic processes are ultimately determining of the hegemonic sequence. The 
world-economy is structurally differentiated into a hierarchy of strong core-states and 
weak peripheral states. Between them is a zone called the semi-periphery, a zone combining 
elements of core and periphery simultaneously. Like Gilpin, Wallerstein offers a concept of 
upward mobility by the semi-periphery. Industrialisation is implicitly the key to successful 
ascendance from (semi) periphery to core status.
A.G. Frank, a co-founder of the world-systems approach, developed a distinctive view of 
the process of "world accumulation," accompanied by a characteristic pattern of economic 
expansion and contraction at world scale. (37) This approach has recently been further 
developed by Gills and Frank. (38) They take the whole world economic system as the unit 
of analysis and focus on the locus of capital accumulation as the key to shifts in hegemonic 
power. Gills and Frank define hegemony as:
"...a hierarchical structure of accumulation between classes and states, mediated by force. 
A hierarchy of centres of accumulation and polities is established that apportions a 
privileged share of surplus, and the political economic power to this end, to the hegemonic 
centre/state and its ruling/propertied classes."
(Gills and Frank 1990:321, Gills and Frank 1991:94).
From this perspective the primary object and principal economic incentive of a bid for 
hegemony is the attempt to restructure the regional, if not the over-arching global, system 
of accumulation, in a way that privileges the hegemonic state and its elite for capital 
accumulation. The economic and military-political processes involved in hegemonic cycles 
are "so integral as to constitute a single process rather than two separate ones." (39)
According to Gills and Frank, hegemony is more than just a hierarchy of power among 
states. It is a complex pyramid of actors and social forces operating at many levels of social 
organisation. This interpretation owes something to the conception of social power
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developed by Michael Mann (40) which shies away even from the notion of a single 
"society", in favour of complex over-lapping networks of social organisation. It also shares 
affinities to the neo-Gramscian perspective. (41)
In Gills and Frank's formulation, the apex of a hegemonic order is not occupied simply by 
"a state", but by the elite, organised in a ruling coalition. The classes in this ruling coalition 
are dispersed both in the centre, or core state(s), and in the periphery. Inter-elite relations 
within a hegemonic pyramid always combine elements of cooperation and subordination, 
competition and harmony, among contending interests. Therefore a hegemonic coalition is 
not necessarily stable over the long term. This instability in the hegemonic coalition is a 
source of dynamic change in the international system.
Much of the existing literature on hegemony defends a single-hegemon model, assuming 
hegemony can only be exercised by a single state over an entire international system. 
However, this single hegemon model is too much an "ideal type" and not a very accurate 
description of the normal situation, which is "non-hegemonic." This situation can be called 
"inter-linking hegemonies", i.e. where several hegemonic networks inter-act, over-lap, or 
inter-penetrate.
Only on rather rare historic occasions do we find that, among the inter-linked hegemonies, 
there is one single global hegemonic power. Such an exceptional case can be described as a 
"super-hegemon", which engages in "super-accumulation" in the world economy.
Therefore, though a state can be said to be hegemonic, it does not control the entire
international system, but rather only exercises influence, primus inter pares, vis a vis the 
other, inter-linked, hegemonic powers. The concept of inter-linking hegemonies stresses the 
limitations on hegemonic influence.
A general summary of long cycle theories (including Gilpin's) would include the idea that 
the international system is characterised by an incessant competitive struggle for capital 
accumulation/wealth creation and its concentration via a hierarchy of state power. As the 
locus of capital accumulation and wealth shifts, so does the locus of hegemonic power. 
Established hegemonic/centre states are challenged by ascending centres and would-be
hegemons, seeking wealth and power. Periods of consolidated hegemonies normally
correspond with periods of economic expansion and flourishing international exchange. 
Periods of the (simultaneous) decline of established hegemons and increasing inter-state 
rivalry are associated with economic contraction and dislocation, or at least slower growth. 
Peripheral and semi-peripheral states are very directly affected by these systemic rhythms. 
Industrialisation is the key to ascendance within the international hierarchy of wealth 
creation and power.
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Gills and Frank, Modelski, Gilpin, and Wallerstein all share the view that "position" in the 
international division of labour and within the world accumulation process is the key to 
"position" within the hierarchy of states. For peripheral states and "late industrialisers", 
the role of the sate in initiating or organising the industrialisation process is often of central 
importance.
Neo-realist interpretations of the hierarchy of power, when based on unequal distribution 
of power capabilities among states (42) employ a paradigm that treats states as if each were 
a completely separate, discrete entity, even in the economic sphere. But, as the literature on 
interdependence argues, no contemporary state is impermeable or discrete, as all 
participate increasingly in global processes of production, exchange, and global governance. 
(43) This is the case even for a hegemonic state, where, for instance, the relation of the 
United States to other states is one of "asymmetrical interdependence." (44)
All of the approaches above discuss the economic processes of power. Robert Cox, however, 
places less emphasis on the capital accumulation/wealth process and more on ideological, 
cultural and political factors in his innovative analysis of hegemony. Cox grounds his 
conception of hegemony, as opposed to domination, in the works of Antonio Gramsci. 
According to Cox, "To the extent that the consensual aspect of power is in the forefront, 
hegemony prevails. Coercion is always latent but is only applied in marginal, deviant 
cases." (45)
Following Gramsci, the key to understanding hegemony is through the concept of the 
"historic bloc" (BIocco storico), which in Cox's view "cannot exist without a hegemonic 
social class." Moreover, "Where the hegemonic class is the dominant class in a country or 
social formation, the state (in Gramsci's enlarged concept) maintains cohesion and identity 
within the bloc through the propagation of a common culture." (46) Within the historic 
bloc there is a "complex contradictory and discordant ensemble of the superstructures...the 
reflection of the ensemble of the social relations of production." (47)
In the Gramscian formulation, hegemony is not exercised by a single state or group of core 
states, but by a class or group of class fractions (48). "Capitalist hegemony" of the type 
Gramsci discussed on the national level, is most stable in the core states, and less so in the 
peripheral states, where more use of coercion is the norm. (49)
Hegemonic consciousness "brings the interests of the leading class into harmony with those 
of subordinate classes and incorporates these other interests into an ideology expressed in 
universal terms." (50) When applied at the international level, this concept provides an
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interesting analytical tool for distinguishing forms of international order from one another, 
based on the role of coercion versus consensus, universal norms, and international 
organisations.
Following Cox, Gill and Law argue that effective hegemonic power consolidation requires a 
long-term strategy and a vision of "self-reproducing structural power, both economic and 
ideological." (51) Over time, the necessity for the use of coercion declines "as consensus 
builds up on the basis of shared values, ideas and material interests on the part of both 
ruling and subordinate classes." (52) The full consolidation of hegemony does not occur 
until "such ideas and institutions come to be seen as natural and legitimate...embedded in 
the frameworks of thought of the politically and economically significant parts of the 
population", to the extent that even conceiving of an alternative order becomes rather 
difficult. (53)
Gilpin's work on hegemony, discussed above, becomes all the more interesting when set 
alongside that of Cox. In Cox's analysis, "...those states which are powerful are precisely 
those which have undergone a profound social and economic revolution and have most fully 
worked out the consequences of this revolution in the form of the state and of social 
relations." (54) Cox notes that great powers "have relative freedom to determine their 
foreign policies in response to domestic interests", but that "the economic life of 
subordinate nations is penetrated by and intertwined with that of powerful nations." (Cox 
1993:59)
Therefore, peripheral states experience domestic transformation quite differently than 
stronger states. Change in the peripheral states is less generated by endogenous factors, and 
more "a reflection of international developments which transmit their ideological currents 
to the periphery." (55) "World-time" and especially industrial sequencing, whereby some 
states are early industrialisers and others "late”, plays an important role in determining 
the character of industrialisation and the role of the state in economic development. (56) It 
also brings about far-reaching change in the hierarchy in the international system.
Viewed via this approach, states that have undergone a prior industrialisation and 
concomitant development of the modern state have a distinct power advantage over those 
that have not yet undergone such a transformation. Different streams of socio-historical 
time exist among the different states. (57) These different streams of socio-historical time 
correspond to different national development trajectories and social formations. When the 
streams merge there is usually an important transformation.
Historically, once some states had undergone the fundamental transformation to industrial
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modernity their presence in the international order transformed that order and impinged 
upon the "structure of opportunities" for other states. As William H. McNeill has shown
(58), industrialisation enabled states to expand their capacities for war-making and thus 
had a profound effect on the conduct of international relations.
All states in the international system must adapt to the global currents of industrialisation 
or pay the penalties of relative backwardness. As Gautam Sen argues, in terms of military 
competition and security, industrialisation has penetrated the arena of economic policy and 
produced a special pattern of national economic development in certain industrial sectors.
(59) Because industrialism is the ultimate basis for modern national independence and 
military power, it generates a desire on the part of states to promote industrialisation, even 
if based on importation of foreign technology. Thus, as explained by Gilpin, "The less 
developed economy attempts to acquire the most advanced technology from the hegemonic 
power and from other highly developed economies...The follower has the great advantage, 
moreover, of being able to skip economic stages and to overtake the industrial leader." (60)
However, this pattern gives rise to "highly homogeneous industrial structures” that may 
cause conflict in sectors with global over-capacity. According to Gilpin, "generation of 
surplus capacity in the world economy is intimately related to the process of the relative 
decline of the hegemon, intensified trade competition, and the onset of a global economic 
crisis." (61) The more rapid the rise of industrial challengers, in terms of the rate of 
capturing market share and thus surplus, the greater the potential dislocation and 
disruption in the established hegemonic order. For example, the rapid industrialisation of 
South Korea can be analyzed as part of the broader rise of the East Asian NICs and Japan 
in the world economy. According to Gilpin, this contributed to a disequilibrium that 
threatened to undermine the liberal trading system, accompanied by intensifying economic 
competition.
The potential for disruptive change is a problem for the relatively "backward" regimes as 
well. For example, Theda Skocpol has analyzed the relationship between international and 
domestic determinants of change. She focuses on the "relatively backward" or late 
developers and argues that those states which fail to adapt successfully to external military 
threats, international economic competition, and the adjustments needed in domestic 
class/political relations are most likely to experience a social revolution. (62) She explains 
both the modern Russian and Chinese revolutions in these terms. Peter Gourevitch likewise 
concentrates on analyzing how international competitive pressures affect domestic regime 
change. Failure to adapt successfully to these external pressures may result in social 
revolution or authoritarianisation of the state. (63)
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From the discussion above, firstly we may conclude that each distinctive hegemonic order 
has a character and structure historically specific to it. This historical specificity extends to 
the prevailing forms of production, exchange, class relations, ideology, state formation, and 
importantly, to the forms, norms, and discourse of diplomacy and inter-state relations.
Hegemonic order is not merely a hierarchy among states, but implies much more. 
Hegemonic order affects the states and societies within it in profound ways, reaching even 
to the organisation of everyday life, and to the ethical and practical world-view of all its 
participants. As argued by the Gramscians, the ultimate source of the prevailing forms in a 
hegemonic order is the ruling class or dominant/hegemonic class of the hegemonic state. 
(64)
Secondly, the processes of international order can be understood as a succession of 
hegemonies and/or hegemonic phases of order. (65) I argue that this whole world-historical 
process of change can be understood as "hegemonic transition". (66) The hegemonic 
transition reflects the underlying rhythm of competition in the international system, which 
encompasses economic, political, military, and ideological/cultural dimensions. Therefore, 
this concept is broader than the usual observations on the rise and fall o f great powers or 
empires. (67) Change in the international system, over the "longue duree", and at the scale 
of the whole system, is essentially about hegemonic transitions.
This follows from the idea that hegemonic transitions are not merely positional, but entail 
profound socio-economic restructuring, not only for the hegemon(s) but for all the 
participants in the international system. Hegemonic transition is a historical process 
wherein the centres of power and the centres of (capital) accumulation/wealth shift location, 
bringing adjustments in the inter-state system, re-arrangement of centre-periphery 
structures, and concomitant transformations of domestic structures, both economic and 
socio-political.
Hegemonic transition entails a perpetual process of penetration and transformation among 
states and social formations. I argue that "This constant process o f societal restructuring 
should be recognised as the real subject matter of the discipline of international relations." 
(68) This paradigm shift away from realism toward sociological perspectives in 
international political economy focuses on the processes of transformation themselves, 
rather than upon questions of relative power.
When these ideas are accepted, this generates a structural framework of international 
order which moves us away from the single centre-periphery hierarchy, or a single 
hegemonic centre state. This is a new model of a multi-centric or multi-core global
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structure, with a complex map of over-lapping centre-periphery relationships and multiple 
"hegemonic" states.
Janet Abu-Lughod supports this position, that the world system is not always dominated by 
a single hegemon, but can be characterised by co-existing core powers (or inter-linked 
hegemonies). (69) Therefore, hegemonic transition should not be interpreted as a process of 
absolute rise and fall. Rather, over the course of change some nations, or groups of nations, 
gain relative power vis-a-vis others. They occasionally succeed in "setting the terms of their 
interactions with subordinates." This is a "rise". Conversely, the loss of such a (temporary) 
advantageous position is a "decline." (70)
Therefore, hegemonic transitions are not simply a repetitive cycle in the sense that the 
single hegemon succession models imply. Each distinct historical period has certain 
conditions and characteristics that make it different from preceding periods, despite other 
continuities. Hegemonic power is attained, consolidated, and exercised in different ways in 
different periods, with different kinds of effects on those incorporated into the hegemony.
Hegemony certainly implies more than a mere hierarchy among "power containers". 
Hegemonic order exists "within a world economy with a dominant mode o f production 
which penetrates into all countries and links into other subordinate social relationships 
which connect the social classes of the different countries." (71) Furthermore, hegemony 
encompasses "a social structure, an economic structure, and a political structure..." (72)
Finally, hegemony is expressed in universal norms and institutions which "lay down 
general rules of behaviour for states and for those forces of civil society that act across 
national boundaries..." (73) To be universal in conception, it must not merely exploit other 
states or transparently express only a national interest. The states incorporated into the 
hegemonic order must find some aspect of it compatible with their own interests. (74)
Cox's periodisation of modern hegemonic phases (75) is very similar to Robert Gilpin's. 
(76) These schema associate British hegemony with the period of rapid growth from 1853 to 
1873 and the expansion of free trade; followed by growing economic nationalism and 
protectionism, and finally war, depression, and war again. American hegemony coincided 
with rapid economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s, followed by a period of increasing 
competition and protectionism.
Most models imply that hegemonic order is "normal" and that non-hegemonic order is 
therefore a deviation from the norm. (77) Indeed, Hedley Bull argued that "Min the broad 
sweep of human history, indeed, the form of the states-system has been the exception rather
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than the rule." (78) However, in reality there have been just as many periods of non- 
hegemonic order as of hegemonic. (79) The history of the past 150 years seems to bear this 
out, since the "fully" hegemonic periods are a mere four decades out of some fifteen 
decades. (1850s-1870s; and 1950s-1960s).
III. Hegemonic Order and Responses by Peripheral States
The point above has a bearing on how we view the opportunities of peripheral states to 
adapt to, and even to ascend in, the international hierarchy. Even hegemonic periods are 
marked by fluidity, and potential for change, innovation, emulation, and adaptation. 
During non-hegemonic periods, the international "structure of opportunities" may allow 
greater room for manoeuvre for more states than during hegemonic periods. However, even 
when relations are more assymetrical, as in a hegemonic period, certain states will benefit 
disproportionately from the opportunities - particularly ascending industrial states.
As Cox argues, world orders are grounded in social relations, so that "A significant 
structural change in world order is accordingly, likely to be traceable to some fundamental 
change in social relations and in the national political orders which correspond to national 
structures of social relations." (80) States, both as local power containers and as the 
framework for development in its broadest sense, can be conceptualised as standing like a 
Janus-faced gate-keeper between the realms of the domestic socio-political order and the 
realms of transnational and international relations. (81)
States must manoeuvre for advantage, and even for survival, in relation to other states. It is 
this dialectic which gives rise to perpetual mutual penetration and transformative dynamics 
among states. As states are domestically transformed by participating in the transnational 
processes of world development, these changes in turn contribute to change in the character 
of the international order itself. In this way the seemingly opposed interpretations of 
international and domestic change represented by Cox and Skocpol could be reconciled.
Following Peter Taylor, we can posit a "double-Janus" model of the state, whereby it 
simultaneously looks inward to the domestic sphere and outward to the international 
sphere, looks backward to historical consciousness of the nation and forward to the future. 
In this sense, focus on any single "state-society" is inappropriate, since "We cannot 
understand social change by focusing on the dynamics of any one state-society, because 
such change can be adequately comprehended only as part of the larger whole." (82)
In world-system theory there are multiple states, but they exist as a superstructure resting 
on one single world-economy. Therefore, each national-state presides over only an 
"economy-fragment" of the world-economy. This should be modified to take account o f  the
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drives for nationalistic development in states.
Thus, "Each economy-fragment is different from others, which results in different 
opportunities and constraints for state manoeuvrability over time that relate to the 
different state trajectories we observe in the world-system... The policies pursued by states 
are integral to the periodic restructuring of the world-economy." (83)
In pursuing their nationalistic goals, states reproduce similar industrial structures, and this 
contributes to global industrial restructuring. For example, the NIC first pursues 
"nationalist policies in order to protect its infant industries and overcome the advantages 
possessed by the earlier industrializes." Thereafter, "...it must attempt to break into 
world markets to achieve efficient economies of scale and to obtain foreign currency to 
finance imports of required resources and capital goods." As a consequence, "To the extent 
that this industrialization is successful, the developing economy... undercuts the industrial 
position of the more advanced economies." The result is global industrial over-capacity, 
intensifying economic competition, and global structural crisis. (84)
Periodic restructuring in the world economy can be conceptualised through two mutually 
co-determining cycles. These are: A) the expansion/contraction cycles of the world 
economy, (sometimes referred to as Kondratieff long waves, or alternatively as 
Schumpeterian clusters of innovations); and B) the hegemonic/leadership cycle. The 
extensive literature on the relationship between economic and hegemonic cycles has been 
comprehensively reviewed by Goldstein, and by Chase-Dunn. (85)
The problem with most of these approaches is that they continue to deploy a basically 
realist notion of the state. Alternatively, we can dis-aggregate our notion of the state. The 
transformative dynamic is mediated via a variety of social forces, elite interactions, and 
transnational class contacts. Political processes are not confined to or solely located at the 
level of the state, nor are international relations, by extension merely a matter of inter­
governmental political relations. (86)
Though such a broad extension of political analysis is somewhat beyond the scope o f the 
present enquiry, any extreme "over-realist reification" of the state which presents the state 
as a homogeneous bloc and obscures the social action "underneath" should be avoided. It is 
precisely these social forces within the state that account for much of its adaptive 
dynamism. Conversely, the blocking of these social forces by state elites can produce regime 
rigidities that inhibit adaptive dynamism. An excessive preoccupation with the state as a 
unitary actor hides a multitude of sins relevant to understanding why a state fails to adapt 
successfully to the challenges of a changing international order.
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Furthermore, it is also necessary to correct realism's assumption on the power-efficacy of 
hegemonic states. The hegemonic state may be able, to some extent, to translate its own 
norms and transform conventions and forms at the international level according its own 
needs, but the ability of non-hegemonic or peripheral states to resist or to individually 
interpret the hegemonic "wind" in international change is also "real" and must be taken 
into account. The process of incorporation of weaker states into a hegemonic order should 
not be analyzed too deterministically, as if all interactions are merely "top-down" in 
nature. Options do exist. Policy choices are made, albeit within constraints. Social forces 
can and do sometimes make a significant "difference" in the course o f these domestic 
adaptations to hegemonic influence.
Not only do the elite of non-hegemonic states have options concerning how to adapt to 
external hegemonic influences, but likewise, so do other social forces. The timing of the 
entry of social forces into the arena of regime change deserves special attention. Both North 
and South Korea underwent profound internal change prior to their subsequent rapid 
industrialisation. The role of social forces, particularly of the labour and peasant 
movements, should certainly not be ignored when analyzing how peripheral states adapt to 
international change.
Emulation and Imposition of Forms
The national manifestation of underlying competitive dynamics in the international system 
can be analyzed in two different forms. First, there is "emulation", whereby forms (either 
economic, social, political, or ideological) from one state are consciously and voluntarily 
imitated by another state in pursuit of anticipated advantages. Secondly, there is 
"imposition" of forms, which occurs through coercion or domination. In the case of 
emulation, the more powerful state acts as a model to be followed, whereas in the case of 
imposition the more powerful state forces the less powerful to develop in a particular way, 
usually in order to serve its own interests.
At certain moments in international history the role of force is overt and plays a crucial 
role in destroying old forms and making way for the reconstruction of state and society, and 
of international order itself. The direct source of this application of force may be external,
i.e. emanating from the international arena, or internal, in the form of civil war, revolution, 
rebellion, etc. Indeed, emulation may be a preventative technique to avoid an otherwise 
predictable or inevitable imposition of forms, or a revolution from below.
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The Structure of Opportunities and Regime Rigidities
I will employ two further concepts in my discussion of adaptation
to hegemonic order(s) by peripheral states. These are: (A) "the structure o f opportunities" 
and (B) "regime rigidities". The structure of opportunities refers to the manoeuvrability 
available to individual states, wherein economic and political choices are conditioned by the 
international environment. Each particular international order and each particular point in 
time provides a different structure of opportunities. These are not evenly distributed among 
all states (i.e. not equally available to all), but are differentially allocated according to pre­
existing international position and other factors, such as selectivity on the part of global 
power holders when granting opportunities to less powerful states.
Regime rigidities is a concept that refers to how internal structures and institutions specific 
to each state and its socio-economic formation may constitute obstacles to adaptation within 
the international structure of opportunities. Every state has some regime rigidities. These 
constitute a force resistant to change, or holding back dynamism in development. If regime 
rigidities are too great, the result will be a failure to modernise or develop successfully, the 
consequences of which can be very severe in terms of international standing.
Many factors may prevent a state from overcoming regime rigidities and adapting 
successfully to the changing domestic and external environment. Among these factors are: 
bureaucratic inertia, ideological or other dogmatism, corruption among the power elite, 
functionally weak states, and domestic heterogeneity or excessive regional differentiation. 
In addition, and perhaps most strategically, any fetters on technological advance could 
constitute regime rigidities.
The character of elite power is worthy of particular attention. For instance, an entrenched 
elite may attempt to preserve its interests by preserving a specific socio-economic and 
political system which reproduces those interests. If the elite puts its own self-preservation 
ahead of the "national interest" of the state, the resultant regime rigidities will hinder its 
successful adaptation to key international trends.
When an entrenched elite can only preserve its interests by blocking social dynamism and 
adaptation, the result is stagnation and eventually "relative backwardness". In this process 
the state eventually suffers a decline, i.e. "descends" in the international hierarchy. It may 
also suffer a legitimacy crisis as a result. In such circumstances, a social revolution may be 
the factor which can restore adaptive dynamism.
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By contrast, successful adaptation by the incumbent regime is an art of managing the 
reduction of regime rigidities so as to balance the tension between preserving elite interests 
and sustaining the conditions for dynamism and development. This is not easy. Tremendous 
difficulties present themselves in the course of social, economic, and political restructuring. 
The natural tendency to inertia by privileged interests and established institutions does not 
automatically, or easily, give way to the necessary or objective interests o f adaptation in the 
national interest. Nor is it straightforward or automatic that any elite is capable of 
"correctly" perceiving the "objective" situation and making the "right" policy choices.
It is my working hypothesis that even peripheral states have the possibility of exploiting the 
structure of opportunities in ways that may be advantageous to their own interests. 
However, they must do so by continually managing change so as to reduce regime rigidities. 
Successful adaptation, and thus a good correspondence with the prevailing conditions of the 
international system, brings certain rewards in regard to enhancing international standing. 
Unsuccessful adaptation, and thus a poor correspondence with prevailing conditions in the 
international system, usually brings historical punishment, i.e. unfavourable outcomes in 
terms of international standing. In short, to the extent to which the state can create a 
congruence between domestic and foreign policy (a positive balance) it will be more 
successful both domestically and internationally.
IV. East Asian International Orders
East Asia has had a distinctive regional framework of political processes for millennia. Like 
virtually all other distinct regions it has demonstrated a tendency to alternate between 
periods of hegemonic/imperial order and periods of multi-polar states systems or multi­
actor civilisations. (87) In this seemingly universal dialectic of alternating forms of 
international order, contradictions inherent in each form of order generate structural 
dynamics that eventually produce social-systemic transformation.
The concept of hegemonic order can be applied to East Asian history, with certain 
qualifications. Traditionally, imperial order was more common than hegemonic order, but 
neither were more common than non-hegemonic or non-imperial order. In the modern 
period, Sino-centric imperial order collapsed under pressure from predatory Western 
powers. It was replaced by a non-hegemonic and highly conflictual regional order.
The past century and a half in East Asia has been full of war, rivalry, revolution and 
conflict. The West, however, never established a unified imperial or hegemonic framework 
over all of East Asia. Yet a modernised Japan attempted to do so in the mid-twentieth 
century. Actually, Japan's attempt was imperial, in a modern form, rather than truly 
hegemonic, despite its overtures in the direction of attempting Gramscian hegemony, such
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as propaganda appeals to Pan-Asianism and co-prosperity.
Japan's ascendance from the periphery was predicated on a profound revolutionary 
transformation. This successful adaptation by Japan occurred prior to adopting a new 
strategy of ascendance via industrialisation and imperial expansion. Japan's challenge to 
both the crumbling Sino-centric international order and to the rival Western colonial 
powers disrupted the regional status quo. It contributed to social upheaval and conflict 
throughout the region. The Japanese project ended in failure but left an important legacy 
of nascent industrialisation and strong states in some of the areas it had controlled, such as 
Korea.
The American-Soviet "bigemony" after 1945 could be interpreted as an attempt to create 
modern hegemonic frameworks in the region, though in this case dominated by 
superpowers which were both essentially external to the region and its culture. Both the US 
and the USSR attempted to present their project in terms of universal values. In post-war 
Asia, US geopolitical goals emphasised the security of capitalist states and capitalist 
relations of production, whereas Soviet goals promoted the expansion of communism in the 
region.
The US influence in the region contributed directly to the re-habilitation of the Japanese 
economy, the creation of capitalist states in Taiwan and South Korea, and subsequently to 
the re-integration of these capitalist economies on a regional basis. This reconstruction 
involved establishing a new relationship with class coalition partners in Asia, stressing anti­
communism and security, while later tolerating the neo-mercantilism of East Asian NICs. 
This was more possible given the expansion of world trade and production under American 
hegemony. It was during this initial post-war US hegemony that Korea, like Taiwan, 
adopted an export oriented economic strategy and succeeded in achieving rapid and 
sustained economic growth under authoritarian government.
However, the Pax Americana was also characterised by Cold War alliance rigidities. 
Precisely because the US-USSR confrontation dominated the global political and strategic 
scene in the 1950s and 1960s, the rival Korean regimes had little choice but to initially 
emulate their patrons and cultivate ties of dependency. Later, however, as Cold War 
rigidities decreased, both turned to an active Third World diplomacy in search of new 
international support.
A shift in global inductrial structure was part of the hegemonic transition beginning in the 
late 1960s. This transition caused very important changes in foreign policy, by both great 
powers and peripheral states. For instance, the communist sphere was largely closed to the
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West until the early 1970s, when China accepted rapprochement with the US and Japan. At 
about the same time many other communist governments adopted a policy of economic 
opening to the West. This policy shift was symptomatic of the period of the gradual decline 
of US hegemony. It reflected the trend toward increasing multipolarity.
By the beginning of the 1980s this trend was accelerated and deeply entrenched. US 
hegemonic power concentration was reduced due to the full recovery of Western Europe 
and Japan, and the rise of the NICs. The hegemonic transition entailed a changed global 
industrial structure, marked by over-capacity in many sectors, widespread and often deep 
restructuring, and increased pressure on the liberal international trading system.
The period of American hegemony in Asia lasted until approximately the end of the 
Vietnam War, followed by increasing multipolarity in the region, as Soviet influence 
decreased, American military power retrenched, Japan and China re-emerged as important 
powers, and the combined economic impact of East Asian industrialisation elicited neo­
protectionist responses by the US and Western Europe. Nevertheless, even in the period of 
increasing multipolarity, the United States retained some hegemonic influence in East Asia, 
most effectively deployed in bilateral relations. Such was the success of the East Asian 
NICs, that by the mid-1980s the US increasingly pressured its East Asian partners to open 
their markets. The US also pressed for structural reforms designed to reduce its chronic 
trade deficit with East Asia.
In summary, the modern era in East Asia may be represented schematically as follows:
1. Sino-centric imperial order (the Qing empire and its tributaries; in crisis from the 
middle of the 19th century)
2. Non-hegemonic "dual" system (after the penetration by Western powers and co-existence 
of the Eastern and Western international systems)
3. Nippono-centric imperial order (Japan as the primary great power and industrial centre 
of the region)
4. Non-hegemonic interregnum (Soviet-American attempts to enter the power vacuum left 
by Japan's collapse, revolutionary upheavals throughout the continent)
5. Soviet-American bigemony (Cold War alliance blocs and partition of East Asia, eroding 
with Sino-Soviet dispute and resurgence of China and Japan)
6. Non-hegemonic multipolar order (Sino-American rapprochement, Sino-Japanese 
rapprochement, growing multipolarism, global shift in American hegemonic power, 
ascendance of Japan, NICs, and China)
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In the chapters to follow I will analyze the case study of Korea from the point of view of 
how the peripheral state adapta to changing phases of order in the international system. 
The analysis will entail discussion of changing hegemonic order and the domestic responses 
to change, following the schema of East Asian international order outlined above. This 
study focuses particularly on foreign policy behaviour, viewed as a reflection of domestic 
structure and the process of development, and as a key means of altering international 
standing.
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Chapter Two: The Emergence of the Korean Question in the Modern International System
Introduction
This chapter provides historical background to the post 1953 competition between rival 
Koreas. It explains the historical emergence of the modern Korean Question and identifies 
its key aspects. It includes discussion of the loss of sovereignty by Yi dynasty Korea, the 
liberation and occupation of Korea, and the political/diplomatic stages of the Korean War. 
An attempt is made to demonstrate the applicability of the analytical framework elaborated 
in the previous chapter to such a long term history of international status.
Part One: The Failure of Reform and Loss of Sovereignty
I. Korea in the Sino-centric International System
In the traditional Sino-centric world order Korea occupied a special position in the 
tributary system. According to M. Frederick Nelson, "In her relationship to China, Korea 
stood for centuries as the most perfect example of the peculiar Confucian order of Far 
Eastern international relations which preceded the Western state system." (1)
So long as Korea's monarchy fulfilled ritual tributary obligations to the Chinese imperial 
throne, Korea was free to manage its own affairs. In return, China offered protection.
By the 19th century the power of China was fundamentally challenged by Western powers, 
eager for economic and imperial expansion. After China's humiliating defeat in the Opium 
War (1840-42), and the imposition by the West of "unequal treaties", the tributary system 
slowly collapsed. The West imposed its own system of international relations based on 
contractual treaty law and the doctrine of the sovereign equality of states. In practice, and 
paradoxically, this new system often imposed severe forms of subordination rather than 
equality. From 1860 onward Western powers began the active dismemberment of the 
Chinese imperium.
When the Western onslaught shattered the framework of the tributary system, the fate of 
each East Asian state was largely determined by two factors : A) the extent and direction of 
Western interests and B) the nature of the domestic response to the Western challenge. Of 
all the East Asian states, Japan responded most successfully. The Meiji restoration brought 
about far-reaching social, economic, political and military reorganisation along Western 
lines. In Korea, the last of the important East Asian states to be opened to the West, the 
domestic response failed to measure up to the international challenge. It is this failure 
which in itself largely determined the status of Korea for many decades to follow. Partly 
due to Chinese protection, Korea remained isolated from the West during the heyday of 
British hegemony and rapid global growth from 1853-1873. Unfortunately, it was "opened"
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during the subsequent international period of waning British hegemony, slower economic 
growth, and increasing economic nationalism and imperial rivalry.
Many years were consumed, however, in an effort by the West, and later Japan, to clarify 
Korea's legal status under international law. The purpose was to "free" Korea from the 
tributary system in order to "open" it. Frederick Foo Chien defines Korea's international 
position in that period as one of a "dependent state" defined as one having almost complete 
control over domestic affairs, but subject to a degree of dependency upon another state in 
relations with third states. (2) Chien correctly points out the difference between this and the 
"suzerain-vassal" concept preferred by the West when describing the tributary 
relationship. Likewise, in Frederick Nelson's view, Korea's dependence on China actually 
allowed Korea more autonomy than the analogous Western concepts of protectorate or 
colony.
Korea's final chance for reform within the tributary system occurred during the reign of 
the Taewongun (1864-73). While sovereignty still existed the state might undertake 
modernising reform. The Taewongun attempted to strengthen the monarchy, the state, and 
the economy, but did so entirely within a traditional conservative framework (6), thus 
ensuring its failure.
This and subsequent failures led to tragic consequences with enduring historical legacy. 
Korea's regime rigidities, largely the consequence of the power of its landed elite, 
obstructed urgently necessary reform and weakened the state. Thereby, Korea's 
sovereignty was jeopardised and it became an object of great power rivalries. China's 
attempts to "protect" Korea eventually led to war for control of the peninsula.
For a time Korea's status was in limbo, a grey area of "dual status", simultaneously 
tributary and "sovereign". According to Martina Deuchler, China failed to comprehend 
that "the Confucian concept of suzerain-state vis a vis vassal-state could not be equated 
with state sovereignty as set forth by modern international law."(4) Rather than 
interpreting the Sino-Japanese treaty of 1871, the first modern treaty between Asian 
powers, as a sign that China was "oblivious to changing circumstances of the time" (5), it is 
equally plausible to conclude that China's actual intention was to use Western international 
law to protect its suzereignty over tributaries like Korea.
In 1876 Japanese envoy Mori Arinori declared that Korea was an independent state. (6) 
China replied that "Korea has always been a dependent state of China and the word 
dependent is synonymous with the word subordination." (7) Nevertheless, it was through 
China's auspices that Korea entered into its first modern treaty, the Treaty of Kangwha,
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signed on 27 February, 1876. (8) This "unequal treaty" included provisions for extra­
territoriality, opening three Korean ports, freedom to conduct commerce without 
restriction, and exchange of envoys, but did not include a most-favoured-nation clause. 
Martina Deuchler argues that the treaty: "revolutionized Korean-Japanese relations and 
ended Korea's centuries-old domination of this relationship...Japan initiated a reorientation 
of the traditional balance of power." (9)
The period between 1876 and 1895 was characterised by Sino-Japanese rivalry over Korea 
in the context of the widening of Korea's treaty relations with Western states. 
Paradoxically, the deeper was Korea's incorporation into the new system the more 
compromised its sovereignty became. As international rivalries intensified so did foreign 
interference. It became virtually impossible for Korea to manage its own affairs 
autonomously. From 1876 to 1882 King Kojong again undertook limited reform, but, given 
conservative intransigence and the monarchy's weakness, these reforms barely touched the 
basic social and economic structure.
To offset the growing influence of Japan, China "advised" Korea to enter into modern 
treaties with Western powers, a policy known as "Ch'in Chung Kuo, Chieh Jih-pen, Lien 
Mei-kuo" or "intimate ties with China, friendship with Japan, and alliance with the USA". 
(10) Ironically, once Korea was formally incorporated into the modern treaty system, 
China abandoned its traditional restraint and began to act more like a modern colonial 
power. Li Hung Chang, in charge of China's foreign affairs in this period, arrogantly 
declared in 1883: "I am King of Korea whenever I think the interests of China require me 
to assert that prerogative."
Whereas China allied itself to conservatism in Korea, Japan initially identified its interests 
with progressive liberal reformists. Japan hoped to reverse China's position in Korea 
through support for the Kapsin coup of 4 December, 1884, carried out by pro-Japanese 
reformers led by Kim, Ok-Kyun, a disciple of the Japanese liberal, Fukuzawa. (11) The 
Kapsin coup was decisively crushed by Chinese military intervention.
Japan and China reached an understanding on Korea on 18 April, 1885 in the Convention 
of Tientsin; essentially a co-protectorate. By establishing an equal right to intervene in 
Korea, Japan confirmed that China no longer had sole claim to suzereignty. According to 
Frederick Foo Chien, the year 1885 "witnessed the beginning of an international scramble 
for control" in East Asia (12). General Yuan Shih Kai was sent to Korea as the first 
"Director-General Resident in Korea of Diplomatic and Commercial Relations" (13), a title 
with transparent colonial overtones. Kim Dalchoong argues that China's overtly imperialist 
policies in Korea after 1885 were the definitive end to any hope of successful indigenous
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Korean efforts at modernisation. (14)
During the period of the Sino-Japanese "co-protectorate" over Korea from 1885 to 1894, 
China and Japan were the two primary economic contenders in Korea. China engaged in a 
concerted effort to undermine Japan's commanding position in the Korean market. 
According to Andrew C. Nahm, from 1885 to 1892, China's share of Korea's imports 
increased from a mere 19 percent to 45 percent, while Japan's market share dropped from 
a high of 81 percent to 55 per cent. (15) By 1893, on the eve of war with Japan, China's 
share of the Korean market was almost equal to that of Japan.
Japanese policy in Korea underwent re-evaluation in 1893. The conciliatory policy toward 
China was seen as allowing too much Chinese ascendancy. Japan was also increasingly 
concerned over the expansion of Russian interests in the region. The impending completion 
of the trans-Siberian railway created a sense of urgency in Japan. (16) Thirdly, Japan was 
aware that a revolt by the peasant-based Tonghak sect was brewing in Korea, which might 
further destabilise the peninsula.
Japan issued an ultimatum to Korea on 28 June, 1894 demanding to know: "are you a 
tributary?" and seized control of Kyongbok palace in Seoul on 24 July, forcing Korea to 
sign an agreement authorising Japan to expel all Chinese forces. On 16 August, 1894 Korea 
was forced to unilaterally abrogate all agreements binding Korea to China, and on 26 
August signed a new Treaty of Alliance with Japan, pledging Japan to "maintain the 
independence of Korea" and expel the Chinese. Under Japanese guidance, King Kojong 
promulgated sweeping measures in 1895 known since as the Kabo Reform. These measures 
were primarily designed to modernise and centralise the administration, but included the 
formal abolition of tributary relations to China.
The Sino-Japanese war was a decisive victory for Japan in every respect. (17) The full 
extent of Japanese ambitions were revealed in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed on 17 
April, 1985. (18) Japan demanded and won huge concessions from China including: the 
independence of Korea, the cession of Formosa, the Piscadores, Liaotung peninsula, and 
most significantly, of Port Arthur. China agreed to pay a large war indemnity and grant 
Japan a new treaty of commerce giving Japan the right to open factories inside China for 
industrial production and open more ports.
II. Korea as an "Independent" Buffer State
The destruction of Korea's tributary relationship to China confirmed its independent 
status. However, this independence was more nominal than real, and dependent on the 
emerging power relations between Japan and Russia. With the sudden demise of Chinese 
power, a scramble for spheres of influence broke out among the contending powers in the
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region. Globally, this was a period of high imperialism, but also rapid economic growth, 
unlike the preceding period 1872-1893; a downswing. Japan's rapid ascent via victory in the 
Sino-Japanese war set off a series of systemic power adjustments in the region. These 
developments can be summarised in three broad phases as follows:
Phase One: "Restraining Japanese Power"
Russia, France and Germany, in the Triple Intervention on 23 April, 1895, being alarmed 
by the possible consequences to the status quo of Japan's regional ascendance, acted to limit 
the gains Japan reaped from its victory over China. Japan was forced to return Liaotung 
and pledge to honour Korean independence. A pro-Russian government was installed in 
Seoul in February 1896, after the assassination of Queen Min by Japan and the flight of 
King Kojong to the Russian legation. Both China, which fell quickly under Russian 
protection, and Russia itself viewed Korea's independence, i.e. preventing Korea becoming 
a protectorate of Japan, as being vital to protecting Manchuria and thus to the very 
survival of the Qing dynasty. (19) As "compensation", Russia extracted lucrative economic 
concessions from Korea, and China as well.
Phase Two: "Bipolar Accommodation"
Japan and Russia entered into a series of negotiations to stabilise their spheres of influence, 
producing three agreements between 1896 and 1898. These were: the Komura-Waeber 
Memorandum (14 May 1896); the Lobanov-Yamagata agreement (9 June, 1896); and the 
Nishi-Rosen agreement (25 April, 1898). In preliminary discussions Russia and Japan 
agreed that Korea was "incapable of being independent". Therefore it was necessary to 
"find a modus vivendi for allowing Korea to exist". (20) The result was a tacit co­
protectorate over Korea, preserving formal independence and establishing it as a buffer 
state. Russian imperial aims in Korea were primarily strategic, though Japan's were both 
strategic and economic. Contrary to the spirit of the tacit co-protectorate with Japan, 
Russia soon acquired the exclusive right to provide the Korean government with advisers.
Phase Three: "Restraining Russian Power"
Russia leased Port Arthur from China on 27 March, 1898, thus altering the regional 
balance of power in its favour. Partly to conciliate Japan, Russia withdrew all assistance 
and military advisers in Korea and closed the Russo-Korean Bank (21). Russia's 
"indispensable condition" for a new agreement with Japan remained the same, i.e., 
preservation of Korea's "full independence". The main theme of negotiations was a 
proposal for a trade-off of spheres between Japan and Russia, known as "Man Kan 
Kokan", essentially exchanging a recognised Russian sphere in Manchuria for an exclusive 
Japanese sphere in Korea. The Russian military vetoed acceptance of Man Kan Kokan 
because it regarded any exclusive Japanese strategic domination in Korea as a permanent
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threat to the security of Russia's Maritime Province. (22) Korea itself attempted to revive a 
dormant proposal for an international guarantee of its neutrality, but this was not taken 
seriously by the powers concerned. (23) Following the Boxer rebellion in 1900, Japan, 
backed by Britain via the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902, and other Western powers, 
acted to check Russian expansion. Russian expansion in Manchuria was viewed as a threat 
to the status quo. In the Komura-Rosen talks of 1903 Japan decided to settle the matter of 
Korea's international status by pressing Russia for recognition of Japan's paramount rights 
in Korea. Russia's refusal to accept Japanese strategic rights in Korea led to the Russo- 
Japanese War in 1904-5.
HI. The Fall of Yi Dynasty Korea
When the Russo-Japanese War broke out in February, 1904, with a Japanese pre-emptive 
strike against Port Arthur, the first casualty was Korea's neutrality. The good will of the 
"disinterested" powers proved to be ephemeral. In retrospect the previous thirty years of 
Korean diplomacy with the Western powers could thus be judged to have ended in 
complete failure. As in 1894, Japan instantly seized control of Seoul, and imposed a new 
protocol whereby Japan promised to guarantee the independence and territorial integrity 
of the "Korean empire". Once again, this was actually a writ to drive the rival power, this 
time Russia, out of Korea - in the name of Korean independence, and thereafter to 
dominate Korea rather than to liberate it.
This protocol allowed Japan to legally garrison the entire Korean peninsula and expel all 
Russians. All previous agreements with Russia were declared null and void. By August, 
1904, Korea had agreed to accept Japanese appointed Finance and Foreign Affairs 
Ministers, and was required to consult with Japan prior to concluding any future treaties 
with other powers, including the granting of economic concessions or contracts. Thus a 
puppet government was created of "government by advisers". The envoys of the Korean 
emperor deployed abroad were recalled to Seoul permanently. This signalled to other 
powers that Korea was no longer in control of its own external affairs.
The defeat of Russia by Japan (24) resulted in a radically new configuration of power in the 
region. Japan emerged as the potential successor to China. Indicative of the diplomacy of 
the age, Japan's claim over Korea was consolidated via several
secret agreements on the division of imperial spheres between Japan and the Western 
powers. In the Taft-Katsura Agreement of July, 1905, the USA accepted Japan's control 
over Korea as the quid pro quo for Japan's reciprocal recognition of US control over its 
new colony the Philippines, recently acquired through war with Spain. In the renewal of the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance in August, 1905, Britain recognised Japan's right to take measures 
for the "guidance, control and protection" of Korea, whereas Japan would respect Britain's
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interests in China, Southeast Asia, and even India.
Taken together, these bilateral undertakings reveal a triangular entente between Japan, 
Britain, and the USA aimed at a new mutual accommodation of interests in Asia. The new 
power configuration is best understood in the context of the Treaty of Portsmouth between 
Japan and Russia, which provided a general settlement of the war. Japan's gains were 
considerable, including acquiring half of Sakhalin Island, possession of Port Arthur and 
Dairen, an equal right with Russia to economic penetration of Manchuria, and clear 
paramountcy in Korea.
These agreements cleared the way for a colonial administration in Korea. Between 1905 
and 1910, imperial Japan inexorably dismantled the old Korean state through sweeping 
reforms, the manipulation of the monarchy, and the brutal suppression of a war of national 
resistance fought by Korean partisans. Korean sovereignty was formally surrendered in 
1910 and Korea became a mere appendage of the Japanese empire. It did not have an 
opportunity to regain sovereignty until liberation from the Japanese in 1945.
IV. Conclusion
As the Sino-centric order collapsed under pressure from the Western states-system, the 
Korean elite failed to take advantage of opportunities for adaptation. In contrast to Japan, 
where a revolution created a modern centralised and industrialising state which thus 
protected Japan's sovereignty, Korea suffered from extreme regime rigidity. Given the high 
concentration of power in the hands of the landed elite and their hold over the state 
bureaucracy, reform was extremely difficult. The monarchy was essentially conservative 
and refused to confront the issue of expropriating and redistributing the wealth and 
property of the landed oligarchy. Progressive elements in the regime attempted to seize 
state power and carry out radical reforms but were blocked by an alliance of reactionaries 
and the Chinese. Popular impetus for revolutionary social change was also blocked by an 
alliance of reactionaries, the monarchy, and foreign powers. Korea's position as a tributary 
to China might have been the key factor blocking the possibilities of reform. China itself 
was under leadership that rejected modernisation except in an ad hoc fashion.
In response to Western intrusions into Asia, the Qing dynasty broke its long held policy of 
non-interference in Korea's internal affairs and adopted an essentially colonialist policy 
toward Korea. Thus the state remained essentially unchanged and extremely weak. Once 
penetrated by foreign powers, Korea endured a series o f pathetic puppet cabinets and 
endless court intrigue. Next, it suffered two wars on its soil between the rival powers 
between 1894 and 1905. Finally, it became first a formal protectorate and then suffered 
annexation by imperial Japan.
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Korean economic and political development were deeply affected by Japanese colonialism. 
On the positive side, the legacy was one of extensive infrastructural, industrial, and 
bureaucratic development. On the negative side, Korean political development was 
distorted or stunted, lacking experience with an autonomous civil society. When liberation 
came in 1945, the role of new social forces, such as the industrial working class, the 
nationalist and communists movements, peasant, youth, and women's organisations, were 
crucial to the politics of transition from a colonial to a post-colonial society. However, the 
transformative agency of these new social forces was constrained within a new power 
framework established by the US and USSR.
Part Two: Liberation, Partition, and War
I. Introduction
This section examines how the dramatic international change at the end of the Second 
World war affected Korea. It analyses the nature of political intervention by the occupying 
powers and its effects on the restoration of Korea's sovereignty. The period of occupation 
was characterised by the imposition of new social, economic, and political forms, leaving 
little room for autonomous development. National division weakened Korean sovereignty 
by creating a permanent source of political tension, ideological polarisation, and military 
confrontation between rival Korean regimes.
World economic crisis in the 1930s, and general war in the 1940s, led to global 
reorganisation at war's end. In East Asia the central features of this reorganisation were 
the sudden collapse of the Japanese imperium and the rush by the rival superpowers to fill 
the power vacuum. The new geopolitical framework in Asia emphasised self-determination 
and the use of hegemonic as opposed to imperial methods. This was, however, accompanied 
by revolutionary upheaval by nationalist and communist forces throughout the region, with 
China as the epicentre.
The position of Korea in the post-war international order was directly affected by these 
regional conditions. The defeat of Japan transformed Korea's international status from 
colony to occupied territory, divided between American and Soviet spheres. Like much of 
the Asian continent, Korea was convulsed by revolutionary upheaval, social and economic 
crisis, and eventually civil war. The shattered dream of immediate independence in a 
unified national state died hard among Korean nationalists and communists alike.
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The political characteristics of this new period of hegemonic order were quite different than 
those of the preceding imperial period. Both the US and USSR were supporters of 
dismantling the Japanese empire and restoring Korean sovereignty. The Americans wanted 
two essential characteristics in regimes within their sphere: anti-communist forces in 
control of the state, and freedom for private capital. The Soviet Union, in contrast, required 
a communist or socialist party in power, and a nationalised economic base. These 
conflicting requirements made any national reunification of Korea extremely problematic.
The regional situation in Northeast Asia was only one aspect of a new global rivalry. The 
United States sought to restructure the world so that a liberal capitalist order could flourish 
and within it American interests on world scale. In order to fulfil the global designs of an 
emergent US hegemony, the US soon found itself committed to a scale of intervention that 
was truly formidable. Nevertheless, the reorganisation of Asia was as pivotal to America's 
global hegemonic project as was the reorganisation of Europe. The investment of resources 
the US made in post-war Asia was immense by any standard, including its involvement in 
occupation, reconstruction, and war, followed by a long-term commitment to economic and 
military assistance to client regimes.
II. Liberation and Occupation in Korea
The sudden collapse of the Japanese imperium created a situation of extreme social, 
economic and political disruption in Korea. Not only were the integrated direct linkages 
with the Japanese metropole severed, but the vital industrial, energy, and food transfers 
between North and South Korea were also ruptured, increasing the local chaos. US policies 
in South Korea tended at first to make a bad situation worse, whereas in North Korea there 
was a swifter and more successful reconstruction.
During the war the anti-Japanese powers had not recognised a Korean government-in-exile. 
US Secretary of State Cordell Hull advocated a policy of non-recognition of the Korean 
Provisional Government (KPG) or any other body making similar claims. President 
Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull developed a proposal for a four power 
trusteeship over Korea, to be administered jointly by the US, USSR, Britain and China. (25)
In March, 1943 Roosevelt began discussions on the trusteeship with Britain and the USSR. 
At the Cairo Conference in November, 1943, at Chiang Kai-shek's initiative, (26) The Cairo 
Declaration specifically committed the allies to restore the independence of Korea. The 
phrase used was: "mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, (the allied powers) 
are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent." (emphasis 
added) (27) The KPG, and other Korean nationalists, responded with alarm to the phrase 
"in due course". (28)
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The great powers met in a series of war-time conferences and discussed Korea's post-war 
fate at each of them. In Teheran in November, 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin 
discussed the trusteeship together for the first time. The USSR tentatively agreed to the 
trusteeship, seeking a larger role for the USSR in post-war Asia. At Yalta in February, 
1945, the allies reached tacit agreement that no foreign troops should be permanently 
stationed in Korea; therefore Korea's neutrality would be internationally guaranteed. Such 
an agreement presumably applied to either a joint foreign administration or an 
independent Korean state. (29) In talks between Stalin and Harry Hopkins in Moscow from 
26 May to 6 June, 1945, the trusteeship was shortened to five years, with a four power 
administration based on equal representation among all four powers, with minimal 
occupation forces.
Unfortunately, the trusteeship plan was never formally approved in any written binding 
agreement, and this was its undoing. When President Roosevelt died and was succeeded by 
Harry Truman, US policy on Korea abruptly changed course, irrevocably damaging the 
trusteeship proposal. Truman jettisoned the US State Department's plans for joint 
occupation of Korea as a single zone. (30) Above all, it was probably the successful testing 
of the atomic bomb in July, 1945 that led Truman to advocate a "temporary" military 
occupation of Korea in separate occupation zones. (31)
According to Soo Sung Cho, "Although it was officially maintained that American troops 
entered Korea only to facilitate the surrender of the Japanese forces, the primary objective 
of the proposal was to prevent Soviet occupation of the entire peninsula", which was 
considered a threat to Japan's security. (32) Peter Lowe argues Truman was "strengthening 
American interests vis-a-vis Russia, which included restricting the amount of territory to be 
occupied by the Soviet Union". (33)
Though Korea was a de facto partitioned country, it was not a divided state in de jure terms 
until 1948. In principle, the possibility of reunification of the occupation zones into a single 
national government existed throughout 1945-48. The irony of this period is that the US re­
introduced the trusteeship proposal soon after military occupation began, as a means of 
negotiating the conditions for restoring Korean sovereignty and establishing a unified 
national government.
The reason the US returned to the trusteeship idea had the same rationale as its earlier 
unilateral abandonment, i.e. to limit the scope for exclusive Soviet influence. For the USSR, 
returning to the trusteeship idea was a welcome diplomatic means of eliminating the 
exclusive zone of American influence in the South. Given these motives, the trusteeship
40
negotiations were doomed to failure from the outset.
The outcome of the Soviet-American negotiations can also be explained by the disparity in 
political advantages in the region. The Soviet Union had significant political advantage, due 
to the revolutionary tenor of the time and to the presence of trained Korean cadres in the 
Soviet occupation force. The colonial period had produced a dispossessed peasantry and a 
militant working class, social forces that tipped the domestic political balance to the left. 
The popular demands of the period were for independence in a unified republic, land for 
the peasantry, employment at a living wage for workers, and punishment of collaborators, 
many of whom were conservatives.
The United States, in contrast, was totally unprepared for the revolutionary situation that 
characterised post-colonial Korea. In effect, the US occupation in South Korea was an 
attempt to establish a strategic enclave in what amounted to hostile political territory. 
Given the advantage on the ground for the left, it was always likely that a unified Korea 
would tilt toward the Soviets, and thus be a threat to American interests. It was precisely 
because of the American political disadvantage in Korea, and this spectre of losing a zero 
sum game, that US policy in Korea developed as it did.
This situation also explains key differences in Soviet and American occupation policies. For 
the USSR, a socialist-led coalition government was both acceptable and feasible, requiring 
relatively little force to achieve, given the strength of popular forces. For the United States, 
a conservative-led coalition government, even with moderate socialist participation, was the 
only acceptable outcome. However, this would require significant use of force and intense 
intervention in the political process to achieve, since the conservatives were a tiny minority 
of the population and were extremely unpopular.
A conservative regime was unacceptable to the Soviets, since it was directly antagonistic to 
their strategic interests. A communist regime was equally unacceptable to the United States 
for exactly the same reasons. Both occupying powers therefore set about creating a regime 
in their zone of occupation that was precisely what the other power could not accept, thus 
making trusteeship and unification completely unworkable. This geopolitical logic led 
inexorably toward deeper ideological polarisation and intensified conflict in Korea.
IH. The Question of Self-determination
The issue of self-determination is central to any analysis of Korea in the immediate post­
war period. In turn, self-determination cannot be separated from the question of 
legitimacy. While both occupying powers sought to present their client regime as the sole 
legitimate representative of the Korean people, two mutually exclusive claims could not
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both be legitimate. Therefore, the legitimacy issue immediately became a key axis of 
occupation politics.
Immediately upon Japan's surrender, there were two contending claims for national 
representation: the KPG, established in 1919 in Shanghai; and the Korean Peoples 
Republic (KPR) established on 6 September, 1945 in Seoul. Both claimed to be the sole 
legitimate national successor to the Japanese colonial Government General. These claims 
had nothing to do with any artificial North-South division of Korea. The politics of the 
KPG versus the KPR was a national political confrontation between the conservatives, 
backing the KPG (led by Kim Ku), and the broad left, backing the KPR (led by Yo Un- 
hyung. The occupying powers, however, recognised neither the KPG nor the KPR as the 
legitimate successor to the Government General.
Scholars remain deeply divided over the question of how to assess the legitimacy of the 
KPG and the KPR. Gregory Henderson argues that for both the KPR and the KPG "The 
Independence Movement was still the source of legitimacy." (34) J. Alexander Kim notes 
that "The new Peoples' Republic was formed with an eye to capturing an aura of 
legitimacy" which required that it willingly incorporate leading nationalists, including 
conservatives, with a "popular reputation earned in the struggle for independence." (35) 
According to Grant Meade, a former civil affairs officer in the American Military 
Government in South Korea, the KPR was in fact "apparently supported by a majority of 
the people" but "seemed to lean more towards Soviet ideology than toward American." 
(36)
While the social and political base of the KPR was a national convention of "peoples 
committees", i.e. Soviets, the KPG, in contrast, had the endorsement of the newly formed 
conservative Korean Democratic Party (KDP), which recognised the KPG as "the only 
legitimate government of Korea since 1919". Bruce Cumings argues that the KDP lacked 
any clear programmatic goals other than the protection of vested interests, and was 
"obsessed with opposing the Peoples' Republic and groups associated with it." (37)
The different political advantages of the US and USSR are reflected in the very different 
manner in which the two occupation powers dealt with the Peoples Committees, the basic 
organisational power behind the KPR. (38) The USSR accepted the existence of the Peoples 
Committees and used them as local organs of Korean administration. The United States, in 
contrast, suppressed the Peoples Committees, viewing them as part of an outlawed Korean 
administration and the popular arm of a communist conspiracy.
The US established a formal military government in the South which claimed to have
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"exclusive control and authority in every phase of government" while explicitly singling out 
the KPR for condemnation and banning. (39) President Truman declared that "The 
assumption by the Koreans themselves of the responsibilities and functions of a free and 
independent nation...will of necessity require time and patience." (40)
Superpower rivalry created an atmosphere that fed extremism and ideological polarisation. 
Syngman Rhee, the most prominent nationalist in exile, returned to South Korea from the 
United States promising that he would "use the KPG as a focus of legitimacy to undermine 
the Peoples' Republic" and "isolate the communists". (41) Rhee and his rightwing allies 
rejected any cooperation with the left, despite the fact that the KPR offered Rhee its 
Chairmanship. The KPG rejected a KPR offer to join in a coalition government constituted 
on the basis of equal representation of left and right. Rhee consistently advocated exclusion 
of all leftwing forces from the Korean interim government.
The USA chose to ally itself to Southern conservatives against the KPR. According to Grant 
Meade, the US actually viewed the KPR as "an illegal attempt to usurp power on the part 
of a minority communistic element." (emphasis added) (42) Actually, the truth was the 
reverse. US policy was an attempt to assist a minority element to usurp power. Mr. 
Benninghof, the US political officer in Korea assisting General Hodge (the commander of 
US occupation forces), considered the KPR to be a "communist front", while regarding the 
KPG circle led by Kim Ku and Rhee to be "democratic forces". (43) In short, "The 
American authorities viewed the Peoples' Republic as a front organization for communist 
activity." (44)
As Soo Sung Cho argues, had the US recognised the KPR as a legitimate expression of self- 
determination, Korea could have been unified and independent. He explains the US non­
recognition policy as a reflection of a fundamental US attitude toward Korea: "America 
was not necessarily ready to grant Korean independence at the expense of its own national 
interests. It was true she wanted the peninsula to be free, independent, and united, but not 
if it were to be governed along communist lines." (45) Thus, US policy during the 
occupation can be understood as a series of decisions that led inexorably to a hardening of 
national division. Young Whan Kihl argues that the partition of Korea occurred due to 
"considerations of political and military expediency among the great powers." (46)
Max Beloff contends that the US refusal to have any dealings with the KPR meant, in effect, 
that the "authority" of the KPR administration was limited only to the Soviet zone of 
occupation. (47) The contrast between Soviet utilisation of the KPR's Peoples Committees 
as the basis of a new administration and the American establishment of a military 
government that usurped all administrative authority from the KPR, resulted directly in
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"North and South Korea...being made, by the two occupying powers, into two distinct 
political and economic entities." (48)
It would be inaccurate, however, to conclude that only the US intervened in the domestic 
affairs of Koreans to influence the outcome in its favour. Centralisation of the Korean 
interim administration in the North was imposed from the top down beginning from 1946, 
but not having full effect until 1947. (49) The US State Department's study of the 
"communist takeover" in North Korea acknowledges the "indirect” character of Soviet 
control (50). However, though the Soviet Union made the Peoples Committees "legitimate 
agencies of government", scholars such as David J. Dallin, have argued that the popular 
organs were eventually controlled by the Communist Party and Soviet Occupation 
authorities. (51) Scalapino and Lee likewise strongly emphasise the extent of Communist 
Party and Soviet manipulation of the Peoples Committees. (52) The USSR is widely 
considered to have systematically altered the balance of representation on Peoples 
Committees in favour of chosen communists.
This debate is anything but academic, since it goes straight to the heart of the issue of 
legitimacy and the question of self-determination in occupied Korea. The KPR had the 
strongest claim to national legitimacy, but was undermined by both the US and USSR. 
When US missionary Horace Underwood toured South Korea in December, 1945, he came 
to the conclusion that the "Republic (KPR) is the strongest and most active organization 
throughout the South." (53) Underwood ascribed KPR popularity to its programme of 
"free land and free factories"!
A US military intelligence report of the time warned that "Without military government 
intervention in its favour, no other party (than the KPR) would be allowed to flourish." (54) 
Likewise, Bruce Cumings argues that without foreign intervention "the Peoples' Republic 
and its committees would have won control of the peninsula in a matter of months". (55) 
Though he considers the KPR to have been a communist front, Charles M. Dobbs argues 
that "By suppressing the peoples' republic and identifying themselves with a minority 
group, the Americans distressed and antagonized the people." (56) Ironically, a US State 
Department study of the occupation completed in 1949 concluded that it was only after the 
outlawing of the KPR that it began to be dominated by communist elements. The mistake 
was made because "army circles" immediately concluded that the KPR was "Communist- 
dominated and controlled." (57) According to Matray, the KPR was communist led but 
enjoyed popularity and administrative efficiency. Therefore, if the US had been impartial 
this could have led to cooperation with the KPR, as in the North, (58) thus facilitiating 
peaceful reunification. In the final analysis, "Neither power was willing to make 
concessions toward Korean independence and reunification if such concessions would dilute
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their ability to control the outcome or to prevent domination by the opposing power." (59)
The Moscow Agreement of 27 December, 1945, through which the trusteeship idea was 
resurrected, emphasised arrangements for a provisional Korean government to be formed 
by consulting all "democratic parties and social organizations". (60) The definition of what 
constituted a "democratic" organisation was central to the political conflict. The total 
inability of the powers to agree a common definition of "democratic" was the key to the 
failure of the trusteeship negotiations. The US hoped to reduce the in-built majority of the 
left and buttress the position of the minority rightwing, whereas the Soviet Union hoped to 
exclude the far right altogether and ensure a communist led government.
The Joint Commission negotiations began and ended in complete impasse. The talks opened 
in Seoul on 20 March, 1946. The Soviet Union began the talks by rhetorically recognising 
the Peoples Committees as legitimate organs of self-government. By contrast, the US 
started with an effort to by-pass all Peoples Committees in favour of its sole candidate for 
consultation, the US appointed Representative Democratic Council in Seoul.
A series of formulae for consultation were nevertheless proposed and debated, all of which 
hinged on the criteria for eligibility. These criteria were a screening device designed to 
change the ratio of political representation. Whereas the Soviets wanted to disqualify all 
"undemocratic" forces who had opposed the trusteeship, the US demanded that 
"undemocratic" leftwing organisations be excluded from consultation. (61) The first round 
of twenty-four sessions adjourned, sine die, on 8 May 1946.
Bruce Cumings argues that the hardening of positions by both powers occurred even before 
the Joint Commission talks opened. (62) Carl Berger likewise maintains that as early as 
January, 1946, the US already assumed that Soviet strategy would be to push for the early 
establishment of a Korean provisional government, and thereby a "communistic state" in 
Korea, "by manipulating a subversive movement through loyal party members." (63) 
According to James Matray, "fears of sovietization dictated the behaviour of the American 
delegation." The end result "guaranteed that Korea would be a permanently divided 
nation." (64)
While the talks proceeded, both sides took decisive action to entrench their political allies 
and crush the opposition. In the North, this took the form of creating a new provisional 
regime openly led by communists. This regime decreed a series of sweeping revolutionary 
changes in the spring of 1946, including radical land redistribution and nationalisation of 
basic industries. The land reform, which confiscated land without compensation and 
redistributed title free to the peasantry, expropriated the Northern landlord class and
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displaced it, as emigres, to the South, thus eliminating the political base for a conservative 
party in the North.
In the South the US carried out violent campaigns of suppression against the communist 
party and the Peoples Committees and established instead a provisional administration 
stacked with conservatives. (65) In one scholar's view, "American occupation officials were 
preoccupied with limiting leftist political power...Communist dominance in the north meant 
that maximum rightist representation in the American zone was crucial to the maintenance 
of some sort of balance." (66) In short, before and after the failure of the first round of 
talks "both commands began actively to foster the stabilisation of their political, economic, 
and social situations as separate entities. This could be done only through the elimination of 
hostile groups from their respective zones." (67)
Though conventional wisdom long argued that the Soviet Union was to blame for national 
division, Bruce Cumings challenges this view by contending that Soviet measures taken>in 
the North were often in response to action taken first by the United States. There was a 
series of escalations through which the US, and then the USSR, moved inexorably toward a 
"separatist" solution to the crisis in Korea. (68)
When President Truman decided to re-open the stalled Joint Commission talks, the US 
issued an ultimatum to the Soviets - if no breakthrough occurred in the Joint Commission 
the US would unilaterally implement the Moscow Decision in the US zone, i.e. the US would 
move to formally establish a separate regime in the South. In February, 1947 the US 
government decided to provide an aid package to South Korea of several hundred million 
dollars over three years. James Matray interprets this as "in essence a decision to create a 
separate government south of the 38th parallel." (69)
The second round of the Joint Commission talks began more promisingly with a new 
formula for consultation with "democratic parties and social organisations" with both sides 
making limited concessions for the sake of progress. The Soviets allowed former, as 
opposed to active, opponents of the trusteeship to be consulted, while the US agreed to 
exclude all former collaborators from consultation. Both sides agreed to establish the first 
all-Korea national consultative body. However, when this body convened on 25 June, 1947, 
the proceedings were marred by intense controversy over what appeared to be gross 
disparity in the proportional representation of the South. The situation was no better 
outside, as the South was convulsed by serious riots and a general strike led by the leftwing 
Democratic National Front.
The Joint Commission talks again mired in impasse over the issue of the over­
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representation of the South in the consultative procedure. The US was intransigent. The US 
State Department insisted that there could be "no compromise on this issue". (70) As in the 
first round, the US delegation concluded that to concede to the Soviet's consultation 
formula would "inevitably lead to a communist-dominated Korea.” (71)
The US soon concluded that it was no longer possible to negotiate an agreement with the 
Soviets on Korea that would be acceptable to the US. The only alternative was to 
consolidate such a regime in the South alone. Therefore, the US proposed separate zonal 
consultative procedures and immediate elections for a National Assembly. The Soviets 
rejected this proposal. The US responded with unilateral action, including a punitive 
campaign against the southern left, active political assistance for the southern right, and 
moves toward establishing a separate southern government.
IV. The Role of the United Nations
The post-war world order was shaped in part by American-inspired international 
organisations, such as the UN. The UN can be seen as a mechanism through which US 
hegemony expressed universal norms. It embodied the rules of the world order and 
ideologically legitimated its norms. (72) When the problem of how to restore Korean 
sovereignty became unsolvable bilaterally, the US looked to the UN's multilateral 
framework as a way out of the impasse. The shift to the UN illustrates how the hegemonic 
power of the United States, in the international system as a whole, was brought to bear to 
legitimise US policy. The decision to take the Korean Question to the UN occurred in late 
June, 1947. The US State Department's plans called for elections in each zone, to be held 
under international supervision, but if this was not possible, then in the South alone. (73)
The only alternative to the UN was a US proposal to by-pass the Joint Commission and 
establish a new four power conference on Korea, with Britain and China joining. The 
Soviet Union rejected this plan, for fear of being placed in a minority of one. The Soviets 
also rejected another American proposal that separate zonal elections lead to separate 
zonal legislatures, that would subsequently be merged on the basis of the population ratio 
between North and South (favouring the South by a ratio of two-thirds). Thus, through 
separate zonal elections, the US could manipulate the political process in the South in order 
to produce a conservative majority, and then see this majority dominate a national 
legislature. The Soviet Union insisted on equal representation between North and South, 
thus neutralising the South's demographic advantage.
It was obviously impossible to reconcile US and Soviet interests in any such formula. 
Therefore, the US unilaterally submitted of the Korean Question to the UNGA on 17 
September, 1947. The General Assembly was chosen rather than the Security Council
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precisely in order to avoid a Soviet veto and maximise the legitimation of US policy. Soviet 
Ambassador to the UN, Andrei Gromyko, declared unequivocally that submission of the 
Korean Question to the UN was illegal, and a violation of the Moscow Agreement. He based 
this case on the UN Charter's stipulation that matters arising out of the settlement of the 
Second World War were not within the jurisdiction of the UN. However, the UNGA 
rejected the Soviet argument and voted on 23 September to include the "Question of the 
Independence of Korea" on its agenda.
This first vote in the UN on the Korean Question reflected the balance of political forces as 
they then existed in the UN. The vote was 41 to 6 with 7 abstentions. The six opposed were 
all Soviet bloc states, while those abstaining were Third World countries: Afghanistan, 
Egypt, Ethiopia, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Syria. The US, West European, and Latin 
American bloc easily constituted a majority in the UNGA. This bloc was in effect the US 
hegemonic sphere. The Soviet Union had no power to overturn such a decision and was 
obliged to join in the UN debate or default to the US. As a direct result, the Soviet- 
American Joint Commission ceased to function on 23 October, 1947. The UNGA rejected a 
Soviet counterproposal calling for immediate simultaneous troop withdrawal, by an 
overwhelming margin. (74)
The US proposal called for UN supervised elections in each zone, to be followed by troop 
withdrawal after a Korean provisional government had been established. The implication 
of this policy was that the UN would take primary responsibility for establishing a Korean 
government and overseeing the process of restoring independence. Charles Dobbs observes 
that "the American government ....pushed the international organization to play a partisan 
role." (75)
The UN established the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) in 
November, 1947 to implement the proposal on elections. The members were: Australia, 
Canada, China, El Salvador, France, India, the Philippines, Syria, and the Ukraine. 
UNTCOK had a mandate to observe National Assembly elections. Thereafter, it would 
consult with that body toward establishing a government, and concerning the assumption of 
authority from the occupying powers.
From the moment of its inception UNTCOK showed signs of disquiet with the US plan for 
elections in the South alone, given the (correct) assumption that the Soviets would not 
cooperate with UNTCOK in the North. Several UNTCOK members protested that separate 
elections in the South only would result in a separate Southern government, thus deepening 
national division, whereas it was the goal of UN intervention to facilitate reunification. In 
essence, some members concluded that UNTCOK's mission was not compatible with US
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policy in Korea.
Separate elections, however, were a key element in US strategic policy, as confirmed by 
National Security Council Document 8 (NSC 8) of April, 1948, which set out global strategic 
goals. Therefore, the US was not easily reconciled to UNTCOK's objections. Its solution was 
to shift essential deliberations on the Korean Question to the Interim Committee, the so- 
called "Little Assembly", a smaller group of UNGA members in which US influence could 
be wielded more effectively. It was to the Interim Committee that the US submitted a draft 
proposal for separate southern elections. Within UNTCOK, Australia and Canada openly 
opposed the US proposal. Nevertheless, it was passed on 26 February, 1948 by a vote of 31 
to 2, with 11 abstentions. The Soviet Union and its allies boycotted the vote. (76) Within 
UNTCOK, Australia, Canada, France, India and Syria made clear their opposition to 
separate Southern elections. Nationalist China, El Salvador, and the Philippines, all closely 
tied to US hegemonic influence, strongly supported the US proposal.
US policy met with stiff resistance in South Korea itself. Only Rhee and the extreme 
rightwing were willing to cooperate in a policy of separate Southern elections leading to a 
separate Southern government. Virtually all other Southern political forces chose to resist 
this policy. Even rightwing leaders chose to attend an emergency North-South conference 
held in Pyongyang, from 19-30 April, 1948 - a remarkable show of national unity across the 
ideological spectrum. Their joint communique called for withdrawal of all foreign troops 
and the convening of an all-Korea political consultative conference to make final 
arrangements for national elections for a National Assembly. (77)
Despite all this opposition both within UNTCOK and in Korea, separate UN supervised 
separate took place in South Korea on 10 May, 1948. Since most of the "opposition" 
boycotted the election, victory fell to Rhee and his conservative allies. As J. Alexander Kim 
concludes: "With the Communist leadership outlawed, the assassinated Yo Un-hyong's 
party of little significance, Kim Koo no longer participating, and most of the members of 
the American sponsored coalition committee boycotting the election, the well financed 
Korean Democratic Party...carried the largest number of seats." (78)
The outcome of the election was largely what the US had anticipated. However, the 
legitimacy of the new Southern regime was questioned from the outset. Australia, Canada 
and India registered official doubts about the fairness of the election. Despite such dissent, 
UNTCOK was officially satisfied with the formal conduct of the election. The new National 
Assembly was dominated by the rightwing, and Rhee was elected President by this body on 
20 July, 1948. The US was the first to recognise the new Republic of Korea on 12 August, 
1948, but delayed establishing full ambassadorial relations until after the UN had reviewed
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the procedures. The new state officially assumed sovereignty from the American Military 
Government on 15 August, 1948, claiming to be the only legitimate government of Korea.
The establishment of a separate regime in the North soon followed that in the South. 
Elections for the Supreme Peoples Assembly were held in the North and it is claimed, 
clandestinely in the South, on 25 August, 1948. The North attempted to give the impression 
of a national election by utilising a joint committee of the North and South Korean Workers 
parties. The Northern regime later used this device to claim that since their's was the only 
national election, it was the only legitimate one. The North chose 212 delegates, and allotted 
360 to the South, in a 572 seat assembly. The South's delegates were chosen through bloc 
votes cast by representatives of mass organisations. The Democratic Peoples Republic of 
Korea (DPRK) was proclaimed on 9 September, 1948, claiming to be the only legitimate 
national government.
In this manner the modern "Korean Question" was created, i.e. the question concerning 
recognition of the Korean state, and the problem of its reunification. Two regimes claimed 
exclusive legitimacy as the sole national government. The pattern of recognition and 
membership in international organisations that initially emerged from this situation was a 
near prefect reflection of Cold War dichotomies. Though the UN did not officially condemn 
the DPRK, it did not recognise it and therefore conferred no international legitimacy upon 
it. North Korea could only secure its international status by establishing relations with the 
communist states and other governments "outside" of the US hegemonic sphere. The UN 
officially threw its weight behind the legitimacy of the ROK, maintaining special 
commissions to assist and supervise it. The US and its allies recognised the ROK as the only 
legitimate government in Korea.
The de facto situation, however, was that there were two states, yet no government 
recognised two states. In practice they recognised one or the other. South Korea had the 
advantage of the support of the UN and the large US-led bloc's support and thus was far 
better placed to gain entry into various international organisations. However, it was 
impossible to join the UN for either regime so long as the US or the Soviet Union stood 
opposed.
The US/UN intervention, in the process of restoring sovereignty to an independent Korea, 
created a deep and lasting problem of contested international legitimacy and status. Neither 
the southern nor the northern regime were reconciled to permanent division and both 
espoused reunification, by force if necessary. Civil war was a virtual inevitability.
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V. The Korean War: Politics by Other Means
The Korean War (1950-53) was a classic example of Clausewitz's dictum on the relation of 
war to politics. The initial issue was unification and the determination of the form of 
government and social system. But as the war expanded, it came to embody a global 
importance. It became the focal point of conflict between "capitalism" and "socialism”. It 
stood at the centre of US policy of containing the advance of communism in Asia. It also 
gave the question of the role of the UN in the new international order a new urgency.
The outbreak of war in Korea created a situation of tension between the UN, engaged in 
multilateral arbitration of the conflict, and the role of the great powers in applying 
traditional bilateral methods of arbitration. This tension was central to the war's outcome. 
The war greatly increased the nominal role of the UN, but concomitantly led the US to 
assume a vastly increased level of repsonsibility for its conduct and to a permanent 
commitment of military resources to South Korea.
Despite the apparent primacy of the UN role, the war reinforced that bilateral diplomacy 
between the great powers in attempted arbitration of the Korean Question. The UN allowed 
itself to be involved in a major conflict on the basis of an overwhelming commitment by one 
member state, the US, acting in opposition to another member of the Security Council. This 
situation could have led to world war. The UN was in effect subject to US policy and was 
placed in the position of having to endorse an American act of war in Asia.
In the event, the UN was unable to devise a formula that could successfully resolve the 
Korean Question. Repeated attempts to make UN arbitration the dominant factor, pursued 
by Britain, India and others, failed throughout the course of the war. Ultimately, the role of 
force, and a bilateral negotiation process (the armistice) determined the inconclusive 
outcome of the conflict. The final attempt at mulitlateral arbitration at Geneva in 1954, a 
continuation of the armistice negotiations process, met with no better success to resolve the 
basic issues of national division and legitimacy. This failure left a legacy of continued 
conflict and a potential threat to the peace of Northeast Asia and the world.
From the outset of the war to its conclusion, there was a bitter irony to the role of the two 
Korean governments. What started as a local rivalry, in effect a civil war, ended by being 
fully internationalised, resulting in the subordination of both Korean governments to the 
great powers, and to the international community as represented by the UN. Both Korean 
governments were overthrown in their turn and then restored by a great power patron in 
the course of the war. Both were re-occupied by large foreign armies. Both were 
economically ruined and had to be supported by foreign assistance.
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The question of who was the "aggressor" in the war left a bitter legacy that fueled the 
propaganda war between the two Koreas and their allies for decades after the fighting 
ended. The military situation transformed Korea into a potential flashpoint in the global 
Cold War, and both sides garrisoned the military demarcation line with vast permanent 
forces. North-South Dialogue was made nearly impossible for many years thereafter, given 
the political polarisation that the war had done so much to deepen.
The full account of the Korean War is outside the scope of the present enquiry. However, 
though the military events of that war are usually the main subject of attention, an intense 
political and diplomatic struggle was waged behind the scenes in an attempt to resolve the 
Korean Question. This diplomatic dimension of the war has unfortunately been given little 
systematic academic attention. (79) It is, however, the critical aspect of the conflict. Though 
I cannot, for lack of space, discuss in detail the rich account of this diplomatic struggle, the 
political phases of the war (which of course occurred in tandem with key military events) 
can be periodised as follows:
1. The DPRK offensive against the ROK to reunify Korea. This precipitated UN debate 
over "aggression" and the decision for UN intervention. The ROK government rapidly 
collapsed (liberated?) and most of South Korea was occupied by North Korean forces, 
joined by Southern partisans.
2. The US and UN decision to commit vast resources to a counter-offensive to restore the 
ROK government and the pre-war status quo. DPRK forces were compelled to withdraw 
behind the 38th parallel. The ROK government was restored (liberated?).
3. The US and UN decision to invade the DPRK in pursuit of the destruction of the KPA, 
dissolution of the DPRK, and reunification under UN supervision. Most of the DPRK was 
occupied by US, ROK, and other UN forces.
4. The decision by China to enter the war in order to secure its border and to restore the 
DPRK. US and UN forces were compelled to withdraw below the 38th parallel and the 
DPRK government was restored (liberated?).
5. The Chinese and DPRK decision to cross the 38th parallel in pursuit of the destruction of 
UN forces and reunification. UN neutralists attempt cease-fire arbitration.
6. The US and UN decision to defend the ROK and restore the status quo. US/UN counter­
offensive. Decision to re-cross the 38th parallel in order to establish a defensible line of 
military demarcation. Continued UN neutralists efforst at cease-fire arbitration.
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7. After the failure of the PRC/DPRK spring offensive of 1951, intended to again drive the 
UN forces south of Seoul, the US definitive decision not to widen the war, the dismissal of 
General MacArthur, and the decision to begin armistice negotiations.
8. The decision by the great powers to accept a de facto military line of demarcation, a 
limited military armistice agreement (i.e. no political settlement) and abandon the goal of 
reunification by force. South Korea rejected this settlement, but its compliance was 
guaranteed by the UN.
Each stage of the war entailed a particular diplomatic situation and a set of political issues 
to be decided. At each stage the war could have been concluded, but decisions were made to 
continue or escalate, until the final stage. Thus, a series of key political decisions 
determined the course and outcome of the war. Phase One was the catalyst for the political 
dimension of the war. This section will conclude with an account of the main elements of the 
Phase One framework.
The DPRK attack on 25 June, 1950 was described as an "unprovoked aggression", 
implying attack by one state upon another state. (80) On 25 June, 1950, the Security 
Council (in the absence of the USSR), called for immediate cessation of hostilities and 
DPRK withdrawal behind the 38th parallel. It acknowledged the ROK as the "lawfully 
established government" of Korea and called upon UN member states to "render every 
assistance" to the UN and to "refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean 
authorities." (81) The DPRK offensive was described as a "breach of the peace", therefore 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter was invoked.
The US immediately viewed the DPRK offensive in a larger startegic context, including 
China and Indochina. (82) After frantic appeals for help from the ROK, President Truman 
ordered US naval and air forces to support the ROK on 27 June, 1950. (83) Acting on a 
report from UNCOK, the Security Council concluded that the DPRK was executing a 
"well-planned, concerted, and fullscale invasion of South Korea" (84) and advised member 
states to "furnish such assistance to the R.O.K. as may be necessary to repel the armed 
attack". (85) Yugoslavia tried twice from 25-27 June to invite the DPRK to explain its case, 
but failed. (86) Zhou Enlai, PRC Foreign Minister, denounced these decisions as illegal, 
"adopted with the aim of supporting the American armed aggression" and constituting 
interference in Korea's internal affairs. (87) The USSR argued that the conflict was a civil 
war (88), the result of ROK armed provocation, and insisted on seating the PRC in the 
Security Council and inviting DPRK representatives to the UN as the prerequisites for any 
legal UN deliberations on the Korean Question. India was sympathetic to this approach and
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began to act as intermediary for the Chinese in particular. (89)
On 7 July, 1950, the Security Council approved a resolution creating the Unified 
Command, with a mandate to "repel the armed attack and to restore international peace 
and security". (90) The US appointed a Supreme Commander (MacArthur). Most 
importantly, the wording of this key resolution left open the option of later crossing the 
38th parallel into North Korea. India, Egypt and Yugoslavia abstained. The USSR 
excoriated the UN for "cynicism", since the majority of Security Council members were 
"directly dependent on the USA." (91) While Britain already sought a negotiated settlement 
with the USSR, the ROK ambassador to the UN, Chang Myun, argued that the 38th 
parallel was now "meaningless" and that "liberation and unification of all Korea was 
essential, after which there should be UN supervised elections for the whole country". (92) 
John Foster Dulles concurred, seeing the Korean War as "the opportunity to obliterate the 
line (38th parallel) as a political division." (93)
From this context, therfore, the conditions were created for extension of the war, inevitably 
bringing Chinese intervention and involving the UN in an effort to achieve reunification by 
force. As a closing note, the CIA predicted the risks and responsibilities such a course of 
action would entail. On 18 August, 1950, the CIA submitted a report entitled " Factors 
Affecting the Desirability of a UN Military Conquest of all Korea". It viewed the likelihood 
of Soviet acceptance of the conquest of North Korea as being very slight, thus it would pose 
a "grave risk of general war". Even if the Soviets did acquiesce, however, due to the 
unpopularity of Rhee's regime, "to re-establish his (Rhee's) regime and extend its authority 
and its base of popular support to all of Korea would be difficult, if  not impossible." 
Finally, even if this could be done, "The regime would be so unstable as to require 
continuing US or UN military and economic support." (94)
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Chapter Three: Post-War Reconstruction: Breaking Out of Dependence?
Introduction
After the Korean War and the failure of the Geneva conference in mid 1954, national 
division was confirmed as the enduring status quo. Both Korean regimes were absorbed 
with urgent tasks of national reconstruction, again occupied by foreign forces, and 
dependent on foreign aid for their survival. Both also sought to establish their own foreign 
policy and increase their level of international support. This chapter examines the record of 
reconstruction in both Koreas and their attempt to realise independence. It asks the 
question: To what extent did they escape dependency?
Part One: North Korea: Self-Reliance and the Independent Line
I. Introduction
North Korea's membership in the "socialist community" was of a very specific character. 
Because of the contested nature of its international status, it was isolated from the 
mainstream international community, e.g. the UN, and therefore greatly dependent on the 
support of its communist allies. Despite this limitation, however, North Korea was 
relatively free to pursue bilateral diplomatic relations elsewhere in the world. This 
manoeuvrability was significantly enhanced by the policy of the "independent line" in 
foreign policy, based on a "self-reliant" national economic strategy.
Initially, as a small aid-dependent state, devastated by war, North Korea desperately 
needed reconstruction assistance. However, instead of finding itself in a clearly delineated 
Soviet sphere of influence, North Korea was occupied by Chinese forces and could therefore 
exploit the triangular relationship between itself and the two communist great powers. (I) 
Thus, North Korea chose to selectively emulate both the Soviet Union and China as it 
reconstructed (2) while simultaneously charting an independent course from both. (3)
Within the Cold War alliance system there was relatively little room for manoeuvre. 
Outside that strategic system, however, there were diplomatic opportunities. The Second 
World War and its aftermath significantly weakened the colonial system, and nationalist 
movements were active throughout Asia, Africa and the Middle East. The DPRK very early 
recognised the great significance of the emergence of this trend in international relations. 
North Korea's prospects of improving its international status depended on its acquiring as 
much support as possible from the emerging Third World. North Korea's new policies of 
national self-reliance and an independent foreign policy were well suited to this task. The 
anti-imperialist thrust of North Korean policies had resonance for many leaders of the
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governments and movements in the Third World, especially their common desire for 
independence from colonial powers.
II. Economic Reconstruction
Most studies emphasise the great importance of foreign aid in the reconstruction period. (4) 
Nevertheless, North Korean economic policy was predicated on the concept of "Juche", 
first promulgated by Kim II Sung on 28 December, 1955. (5) Initially, the DPRK's economic 
and military dependence was deepened after the war. However, the DPRK took advantage 
of its dependence by turning foreign assistance into a means of enhancing its long term 
economic autonomy. Juche was essentially the "orthodox Stalinist concept of 
comprehensive economic development", in which every socialist economy would develop a 
comprehensive set of heavy industries, with the machine-building sector at its core. (6) 
Indeed, between 1953 and 1960, North Korea's indigenous machine tool industry grew to 
become the largest single branch of industry. (7)
Kim II Sung actively sought out reconstruction aid from the entire socialist community. In 
September, 1953, he led a delegation to Moscow, followed by a similar trip to China in 
November. Other DPRK delegations visited the Eastern European states in 1953, including 
Poland, Hungary, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Bulgaria. (8)
The socialist states adopted a policy of rendering substantial assistance to the DPRK. For 
instance, the USSR offered one billion rubles in assistance in September, 1953, and the PRC 
offered eight trillion yuan over a ten year period. (9) In September, 1953, Hungary agreed 
to provide free grants for reconstruction. Rumania signed an agreement providing $7.2 
million in aid on 23 October, 1953, and the GDR signed an assistance treaty in October, 
1953. Bulgaria and Poland signed similar agreements in November. Poland promised 
delivery of mining equipment and assistance in railway reconstruction. Czechoslovakia 
concentrated on machine tool industries and industrial factories. (10)
By consolidating such an aid-dependent relationship with the socialist states, the DPRK 
took the risk of becoming a true satellite. However, this risk was reduced by the fact that 
aid was received from several states. The DPRK was therefore not entirely dependent on 
any one government, as it had been prior to the war. In the eyes of the West and the UN, 
however, this aid relationship confirmed the DPRK's subordinate position in the socialist 
bloc.
However, the reconstruction assistance the DPRK sought in 1953 was absolutely essential 
and not a matter of choice. According to one source, 36 per cent of all industrial production 
capacity was destroyed in the Korean War, including 100 per cent in iron ore, pig iron,
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crude lead, transformers, coke sulphuric acid, chemical fertilisers, cement, and carbide; 26 
per cent of electric power capacity; and 22 per cent of the chemical industry. (11) Much of 
this destruction was the direct result of US bombing of industrial and infrastructural 
targets. (12)
Thus, much of the heavy industrial base inherited from Japanese colonialism and 
subsequently expanded from 1945-50 was destroyed. (13) As Aidan Foster-Carter argues, 
this heavy industrial base had not originally been part of an auto-centric industrialisation 
process, but rather "...clearly conformed to the classic model of colonial dependence." (14) 
Liberation from Japan in 1945 had provided the opportunity to nationalise an extensive 
industrial structure and re-direct it to national development goals. The total exclusion of 
the former colonial power after liberation eliminated many of the typical problems of "neo­
colonialism" in North Korea. (15)
North Korea's industrial plant was concentrated in mining, metals, and chemicals and the 
country was well endowed with natural resources to support these basic industries. On this 
foundation, the DPRK had the opportunity to develop a viable military industrial complex. 
Thus, the state targeted the development of iron and steel and machine tools as the basis for 
expanding industrialisation.
The DPRK's post-war reconstruction plan was designed to occur in three stages. After a 
brief preparatory period, the three year plan for 1954-56 would restore pre-war levels of 
production. This would be followed by a five year plan for 1957-61, to consolidate the 
foundation for further industrialisation. (16) These plans were substantially underwritten 
by foreign assistance. For example, in 1954 foreign assistance accounted for a third of 
DPRK revenue. By 1957, however, this proportion had dropped to only 12.2 per cent. 
During the three year plan, some 75.1 per cent of capital investment in North Korea was 
financed from grants from other communist governments. (17)
Considerable economic expansion took place from 1954-57. For example, some 240 
industrial plants were reconstructed or expanded, and some 800 medium and large plants 
were newly constructed. Thus the total share of industry in national investment in capital 
construction during 1954-56 was recorded as 49.6 per cent; increasing to 51.3 per cent 
during the subsequent five year plan, 1957-1960/61. Overall industry increased from 23.2 
per cent of GVSP in 1946, to 40.1 per cent in 1956, and 57.1 per cent in 1960. (18)
Eastern European assistance was very important to reconstruction throughout this period. 
For instance, the DPRK signed a trade agreement with the GDR annually from 1954, until 
reaching a long-term agreement for 1958-61. The GDR provided machinery and equipment
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for the chemical industry and synthetic textiles, in exchange for metals and agricultural and 
marine products. Czechoslovakia signed a long term agreement for 1954-60, providing 
$12.6 million in credits, including technological assistance. Rumania agreed to 
non-commercial terms of payment in 1954, and Bulgaria provided medical assistance to 
the DPRK. (19) Poland signed an agreement on aid for 1954-57, and Bulgaria and Mongolia 
both agreed on non-commercial terms of payment in trade with the DPRK in 1955.
These economic relationships developed in parallel with a close diplomatic relationship, the 
"pioneer" of North Korea's independent foreign policy. For instance, diplomatic relations 
with Bulgaria and Albania were upgraded from consular to ambassadorial level in 1955. 
On 12 July, 1956, the DPRK and Mongolia issued a Joint Communique in which they 
confirmed the "Panchsheel", i.e. the five principles of mutual relations pioneered in 
Sino-Indian diplomacy, as the basis of their relationship. Mongolia promised aid for 
1956-57 of large quantities of foodstuffs, including 50,000 sheep, 2000 cows, and 5000 tons 
of wheat.
The USSR signed an agreement with the DPRK in 1955 that provided for the sharing of 
technological information on a nearly free basis. As a result of this agreement, thereafter 
over forty new industrial plants were constructed in the DPRK with Soviet technical 
assistance. In addition the USSR provided economic aid of some 300 million rubles 
between 1956 and 1958. According to one source, the total amount of Soviet grants and 
credits to the DPRK between 1953 and 1959 was 2,800 million old roubles, equivalent to 
$690 million. (20) The Eastern European states, however, seem to have specialised in 
providing assistance to particular industrial sectors. This approach proved to be highly 
successful in transferring technology and technical expertise to the DPRK, while apparently 
minimising the political strings attached.
Did Kim II Sung bite the hand that fed him? A major policy debate was waged inside the 
DPRK between 1956-58 to decide the fundamental direction of national development. Kim 
II Sung's faction rejected integration into the "socialist international division of labour", 
whereby North Korea would exchange its raw materials for industrial and consumer goods 
from the more developed socialist economies. They advocated further enhancement of 
national industrial self-reliance, especially strengthening heavy industry.
But this was not all. Kim U Sung's new programme included the nationalisation of all 
industry and collectivisation of all agriculture. Kim II Sung was opposed by the "Soviet" 
and "Yanan" factions, who advocated a less self-reliant industrial strategy, and less 
extreme nationalisation and collectivisation. Kim II Sung himself, and particularly his style 
of leadership, came under direct criticism after the 20th Party Congress of the CPSU in
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early 1956, and Khrushchev's open criticism of Stalin's cult of personality.
The economic debate and power struggle within the DPRK, which were inseparable, came 
to a head in the crisis of August, 1956, when Kim II Sung faced a direct challenge to his 
authority. Kim II Sung visited the USSR, GDR, Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, 
Bulgaria, Albania, Poland, and Mongolia between June and July, 1956, in another attempt 
to garner economic and political support (21). In his absence, his opponents tried to oust 
him, but failed. The USSR and the PRC intervened in the DPRK's political crisis and 
pressured Kim II Sung not to purge his opponents from high positions. Ironically, such 
foreign intervention eventually served to strengthen the Kim II Sung faction's ability to 
attack its opponents, on the grounds that they were less "nationalist" and more dependent 
on foreign support, thus undermining Korea's independence.
The legacy of Soviet political intervention in the August, 1956 crisis was the increasing 
departure of Kim II Sung's line from that of the Soviet Union. Anastas Mikoyan's personal 
intervention in the 1956 crisis was accompanied by the recall of the Soviet Ambassador 
from Pyongyang (Ivanov), after a very hot exchange of words. The DPRK responded with a 
drastic reduction in coverage of Soviet news events. This marked a sharp break with the 
previous period of adulation of the Soviet Union and its culture. There were also ideological 
sources of tension. The Kim U Sung, or "Kapsan" faction, had been critical of the "peaceful 
coexistence" line from the time of its initiation by Molotov in February, 1955. The DPRK 
later welcomed the purge of Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich in July, 1957. Most 
significantly, in December, 1957, the DPRK and USSR agreed that dual Soviet-DPRK 
citizenship for "Soviet Koreans" would be abolished. This forced Soviet Koreans to return 
to the USSR if they wanted to retain Soviet citizenship. The effect of this measure was to 
neutralise the power of the Soviet faction in the North Korean power structure, and 
establish the independent identity of the Kapsan faction.
Kim II Sung's Kapsan faction emerged stronger than ever and launched the "second 
Korean revolution" in 1958. This included expropriation of all remaining private capital, 
total collectivisation of agriculture, the intensification of Kim II Sung's cult of personality, 
the consolidation of the "Kapsan" faction's control of the KWP, the army, and government 
organs, and strengthening the "Juche" line for an independent economy and foreign policy.
The Chollima, or "Flying Horse" movement was launched in the countryside to accelerate 
the pace of collectivisation and mobilise agriculture in support of further industrialisation. 
North Korean policy diverged from the USSR's model and swerved toward Maoism and the 
Great Leap Forward. Kim II Sung not only resisted the admonitions of the USSR to join 
COMECON, but also disagreed with the economic and political revisionism of the
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Khrushchev leadership.
Despite the political difficulties for the Kim II Sung leadership in this period, aid from 
Eastern Europe, as discussed above, remained substantial. For instance, the amount of aid 
given to the DPRK between 1956 and 1958 by Rumania was 25 million rubles, while 
Bulgaria provided 30 million rubles in aid and Hungary gave 7.5 million rubles. Even 
Albania provided 10,000 tons of pitch (22). According to Yoon T. Kuark, the East European 
socialist states remained very active in the reconstruction process inside the DPRK, 
rebuilding entire industries and cities. (23)
By 1961, through the generosity of the socialist community, North Korea had achieved an 
industrial "miracle." It was in fact the most industrialised economy in the Third World 
and became a "model" for many emerging countries. Through this economic 
reconstruction the DPRK improved its international standing, particularly in the Third 
World, and created capabilities that would enable it to undertake an expanded diplomacy.
IH. Foundations of an Active Third World Diplomacy
As discussed above, for most of the 1950s the DPRK was preoccupied with national 
reconstruction and did not have ample resources for a pro-active foreign policy. Its 
primary aim was to strengthen its position vis a vis the regime in South Korea, i.e., 
successful reconstruction put it in a better position to extend the revolution to the south.
The diplomatic relations of the DPRK were at first conducted within a narrow circle of 
sympathetic socialist governments. Its full diplomatic partnerships outside the circle of the 
Soviet Union, China and Eastern Europe were very few. For example, the DPRK 
established diplomatic relations with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) on 31 
January, 1950. North Vietnam remained the DPRK's only "Third World" diplomatic 
partner for several years. North Korea saw close parallels between its own situation and the 
partition of Vietnam (from July, 1954).
The DPRK was somewhat slow to widen its diplomatic partnerships to the Third World. 
The breakthrough followed the rise of Nasser in Egypt, the Suez crisis of 1956, and the 
challenge posed by Arab nationalism to Western power. However, it was not until 25 
September, 1958, when the DPRK extended diplomatic recognition to the National 
Liberation Front of Algeria (not yet even in power) that the DPRK began to actively expand 
its Third World partnerships.
This does not mean, however, that North Korea was diplomatically passive. For instance, 
the UN Arab-Asian group, having lobbied for peaceful settlement of the Korean War,
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represented a potential pool of partners. As early as 1954, the DPRK joined with Burma, 
Ceylon, China, Indonesia, Mongolia, Japan, and North Vietnam in a statement regretting 
the lack of participation by Asian states in the Geneva Conference. They issued a Joint 
Communique rejecting foreign military bases on their soil or attempts to divide and 
oppress them through military agreements.
North-South relations, however, remained a sterile arena in the 1950s. The policy line of 
strengthening the "democratic base" in the North was accompanied by a soft line on 
reunification. Between 1954-58, the DPRK made a series of proposals reflecting its line on 
peaceful reunification. These proposals included: a North-South conference, and/or a joint 
session of the SPA and the ROK National Assembly; a non-aggression pact and 
simultaneous troop reductions; converting the Korean Armistice into a peace agreement; 
an international conference for peaceful reunification; simultaneous withdrawal of PRC 
Volunteers and US forces; North-South negotiations on economic and cultural contacts; 
and national elections under the supervision of neutral nations. (24) The ROK rejected 1^1 
these proposals.
In Asia, the DPRK began early on to dip its toe in the waters of international diplomacy. It 
attended the Asian Conference for the Relaxation of International Tension (ACRIT), held 
in New Delhi, 6-10 April, 1955. India, the host, was a key contact through which to expand 
Third World diplomacy. The DPRK courted India's favour and support.
At ACRIT, the DPRK spokeswoman, Pak, Jung-ae, asked the conference to confirm the 
principle that the question of Korean reunification should be dealt with by Koreans 
themselves without foreign interference and that all foreign military forces should be 
withdrawn. Another DPRK delegate, Kuak, Mal-yak, suggested that all Asian governments 
approve the five Panchsheel principles agreed between India and China (on Tibet) in 1954 
and that they resist attempts to form alliance blocs such as SEATO.
These proposals illustrate the DPRK's early recognition that non-alignment would be an 
effective means of appealing to Third World governments. ACRIT established the Asian 
Solidarity Committee, under the auspices of the World Peace Organisation. However, it 
was quickly overshadowed by the historic meeting of Afro-Asian governments in Bandung, 
Indonesia, in 1955.
Prior to Bandung the only independent caucus of Afro-Asian governments had been the 
"Arabo-Asian" UN group. This group first met in 1950, with a quorum of twelve: 
Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, and Yemen. Later, the Colombo Powers (India, Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, and 
Pakistan) worked toward the convocation of an Afro-Asian conference outside the UN, with
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Indonesia playing a leading organisational role.
Ali Sastroamidjojo, of Indonesia, was particularly influential in the process of organising 
Bandung. Since the Bandung conference was a major watershed in the history of Third 
World solidarity movements, it may seem peculiar that the DPRK was not present. This 
was due to the decision by the organisers not to invite regimes whose presence might offer 
an opportunity for disruption or detract from the theme of unity. Amongst all the Asian 
and African states considered as eligible for participation, those excluded were Israel, 
South Africa, the ROK, and the DPRK. Alvin Rubenstein, commenting on this invitation 
formula, concludes that it "demonstrated the impotence of an Afro-Asian constellation 
encompassing all political outlooks." (25) Despite its exclusion from Bandung, however, the 
DPRK supported the new movement. The DPRK diplomatic yearbook reproduced 
Bandung conference documents with very favourable commentary. (26)
After Bandung, DPRK relations with the Third World accelerated. It is no coincidence that 
a more active foreign policy corresponded with a gradual reduction of foreign aid. By 1956, 
the percentage of foreign assistance in the budget had fallen to 16.5 percent, from a high of 
31.4 percent in 1954. The proportion of foreign aid in the national budget continued to fall, 
reaching a mere 2 percent by 1960. (27)
After the Korean war, the DPRK expressed its international identity by seeking causes to 
support and enemies to denounce. It quickly discovered its leit motif in the independence 
struggles of the Third World. The first major international crisis that the DPRK took real 
note of was the Suez Crisis in 1956, when the radical nationalist regime of Gamal Abdul 
Nasser announced its intention to nationalise the Suez Canal. The DPRK Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs issued a statement on 14 August, 1956, supporting Egypt's policy. When 
Great Britain, France, and Israel used military force to attempt to regain full control over 
the Suez Canal, the DPRK responded with an official statement of support for Egypt on 3 
November, 1956. (28) The DPRK sent financial aid of 60,000 won to Egypt in the aftermath 
of the invasion, a symbolic token of its support.
The DPRK was likewise keen to forge ties with radical nationalists in Asia. The DPRK 
regarded Indonesia as a prime mover in the Afro-Asian movement and therefore courted 
Indonesia and its nationalist leader Sukarno. Indonesia had one of the largest communist 
parties in the world, and the second largest in Asia: the PKI. From 1956 on, various 
Indonesian delegations visited the DPRK. The DPRK willingly supported Indonesia's claim 
for the return of West Irian to Indonesian sovereignty.
As the cases of Egypt and Indonesia illustrate, the DPRK established a policy of reciprocity 
with Third World diplomatic partners. The DPRK gave full, often unconditional, support
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on their key interests in exchange for support for the DPRK's position on the Korean 
Question. In this way the DPRK canvassed widely in the Third World for support for its 
reunification proposals, and for diplomatic recognition as well.
In 1956 the DPRK established a national branch of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity 
Organisation (AAPSO) (29), the first major Third World Solidarity organisation outside 
the UN. AAPSO was led by prominent nationalists seeking to strengthen the independence 
of post-colonial states. The ideological orientation of AAPSO was compatible, though 
certainly not identical, with that of the DPRK.
The politics of the Third World solidarity movement were complicated by competition over 
its leadership. For instance, the Soviet Union wanted to challenge the Chinese and 
Indonesian bids to lead a "second Bandung", while Tito called for "non-alignment". The 
USSR cultivated ties with the leadership of AAPSO and promoted it as the rightful 
successor to Bandung. (30)
After making the decision to join the Afro-Asian movement, the DPRK's foreign relations 
further accelerated. In 1957 the first head of state from a major Third World country 
visited the DPRK: Ho Chi Minh (7-12 July, 1957). His visit coincided with the completion of 
several agreements, including the first material aid from North Korea to Vietnam. (31) 
They formed a close relationship based on common resistance to the interference of the US 
in their national reunification.
The DPRK's policy in the Third World soon began to bear tangible fruits. The DPRK 
signed new trade agreements with India, Egypt, Indonesia, Burma, and Mongolia in 1957. 
These trade agreements are significant because they mark the first substantial 
trade/diplomatic relations with states not within the socialist community (Mongolia being 
the exception).
The DPRK soon put priority on improving diplomatic and trade relations with India, 
Egypt, and Indonesia. They were perceived as being the most important countries in the 
Third World solidarity movement. The DPRK pioneered the "South-South" approach to 
economic development with these governments. The trade agreement with Egypt, 
negotiated from 6-10 December, 1957, illustrates this approach. Under the agreement, the 
DPRK would export commodities such as steel, magnesia clinker, naphthalene, and silk to 
Egypt, in exchange for crude cotton, textiles, viscose, dye, leather, and other products. It 
was an exchange of goods of similar composition; being primarily raw materials or 
manufactures in which the parties had a comparative advantage (e.g. steel for the DPRK, 
cotton textiles for Egypt), and at a similar level of economic development.
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Egypt was particularly important, having emerged "victorious" from the Suez Crisis. It 
had defended the principle of the Third World's right to nationalise foreign assets. Nasser 
was the first President of AAPSO, and AAPSO headquarters were in Cairo. The first 
AAPSO conference was held in Cairo in December, 1957, with Nasser's protege Anwar 
Sadat in charge. Thus, only three years after Bandung, the DPRK attended its first AAPSO 
summit conference.
In India and Indonesia, the DPRK was particularly active in attempts to establish closer 
relations with worker and union movements. The DPRK sent a delegation to the Indian 
Labour Union Congress in December, 1957, and a delegation of Indonesian labour unions 
visited the DPRK in April, 1957. Party to Party relations were also targeted for 
improvement. A delegation of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) visited Pyongyang in 
December, 1957, issuing a Joint Communique between PKI and the KWP on 30 December,
1957.
»
The DPRK made one of its first forays into Latin America, where it was weakest 
diplomatically, by dispatching a delegation of Korean students to visit Argentina, Chile, 
and Cuba in October, 1957. Such people to people, worker to worker, and party to party 
diplomacy was a building bloc for diplomatic relations at the government to government 
level. In Latin America, it was a way of establishing relations with sympathetic socio­
political forces where little prospect of formal diplomatic relations otherwise existed.
Every opportunity was taken to make symbolic gestures of support for anti-imperialist 
struggles. Non-intervention was a central principle in this diplomacy. A statement issued by 
the DPRK on 20 February, 1957, reflects this position. They supported the USSR's call for a 
Middle Eastern settlement on the principle of non-intervention, announced in reaction to 
the Eisenhower Doctrine. A Middle East crisis emerged when the US landed a contingent of 
marines in Beirut to support King Hussein of Jordan, who feared an Egyptian and Syrian- 
backed coup attempt. Through this crisis, the DPRK identified itself as a strong supporter 
of Arab nationalism.
The DPRK's careful preparatory diplomacy expanded to the granting of diplomatic 
recognition to new regimes in the Third World, particularly those that the DPRK hoped 
would be sympathetic to its own cause. On 5 March, 1958, the DPRK extended recognition 
to the United Arab Republic, which was created through the merger of Egypt and Syria in 
February, 1958. The DPRK was successful in opening an official trade mission in Cairo on 
23 July, 1958. The creation of the UAR set off a chain of events in the Middle East that 
worked in the DPRK's favour. The US attempted to counterbalance the UAR by
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encouraging a merger between Iraq and Jordan, known as the Arab Union. However, the 
sudden overthrow of King Faisal in Iraq on 14 July put an end to this plan. The DPRK 
immediately recognised the new radical Iraqi regime on 17 July, 1958.
This reversal from a conservative to a radical regime, and the DPRK's quick response, is an 
early example of a recurrent phenomenon. The DPRK exploited many such cases of 
reversal. It recognised and established diplomatic relations with new radical nationalist or 
socialist regimes replacing a conservative one with which the DPRK had poor relations. In 
December, 1958, an Iraqi delegation arrived in the DPRK and issued a Joint Communique 
declaring Iraq's intention to work toward the establishment of full diplomatic relations 
with the DPRK and closer economic and cultural ties. In 1959 the DPRK enhanced its new 
relationship with Iraq. A trade agreement was signed while a DPRK representative 
attended the first anniversary celebrations of the Iraqi revolution. This agreement included 
provision for the opening of a trade mission in Baghdad, with consular functions.
Similarly, when Guinea made the decision to break its ties with the French Community and 
become completely independent, the DPRK quickly succeeded in establishing diplomatic 
relations with Guinea on 8 October, 1958. In this type of relationship the DPRK could give 
active support to bolster the international legitimacy of a new state or government when 
that government needed it most. In return the DPRK hoped for reciprocal diplomatic 
support.
Another example of this strategy is the DPRK's recognition of national liberation 
movements even before they came to power. The first example of this is the DPRK's 
recognition of the Algerian provisional government of the National Liberation Front, and 
the establishment of diplomatic relations on 25 September, 1958, before Algerian 
independence from France was officially established. Algeria remained extremely grateful 
for this support thereafter.
The use of symbolic gestures of solidarity increased, reflecting ever greater interest by the 
DPRK in conflicts throughout the Third World. For example, on 17 May, 1958, the DPRK 
government issued a formal protest concerning US intervention in the internal affairs of 
Indonesia. The DPRK accused the US of giving military support to a rebel government then 
being organised in Sumatra. The CIA may have been involved in a military operation in 
Indonesia at that time, including various support roles by the US naval and air forces in the 
region (32). Sukarno's government successfully quelled the rebellion in the summer of 1958.
In another instance, the DPRK issued an official statement on 17 July, 1958, protesting US 
military intervention in the Lebanon. US intervention began on 15 July, the day after the
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coup d'etat that toppled the conservative monarch of Iraq. Over 14,000 US troops landed in 
Lebanon, accompanied by some seventy naval vessels and hundreds of aircraft. They were 
there to support the pro-Western government of President Camille Chamoun, who invoked 
the Eisenhower Doctrine in order to suppress an armed rebellion by the domestic 
opposition. The DPRK called the US intervention an "invasion" and broadened its symbolic 
support to the struggle of "Lebanon, Jordan, and the Arab people" against US and British 
imperialism. When the UN held an Emergency Session on Lebanon and Jordan, the DPRK 
supported the USSR's proposal to end US-UK military intervention. US troops left the 
Lebanon by 25 October, 1958, without engaging in any combat.
The DPRK's diplomacy, particularly trade, with Asian states such as India, Indonesia, and 
Burma, and with Arab states, such as Egypt and Iraq, expanded rapidly in the late 1950s. 
In particular, the process of decolonisation, especially in Africa, not only changed the 
composition of the UNGA, but the character of Third World politics and its role in 
international relations. North Korea's diplomacy succeeded by closely shadowing the 
conflicts between the Third World and the West and building concrete solidarity with 
nationalist-oriented Third World movements and governments. It was a long term, and 
revolutionary, diplomatic strategy.
The DPRK early recognised the ample opportunities in Africa to expand its influence and 
gain diplomatic supporters. Decolonisation progressed rapidly in Africa and produced a 
number of radical nationalist regimes. In 1960 the DPRK congratulated Patrice Lumumba 
of the Congo on the attainment of independence, and Kwame Nkrumah upon his 
inauguration as President of Ghana. These two radical leaders were of particular interest to 
the DPRK. Other African leaders were also congratulated on attaining independence, e.g., 
A. Rashid Shemask of Somalia, Uber Maya of Dahomey, and Modeibo Keita of Mali. The 
DPRK granted diplomatic recognition to Togo, Dahomey and Nigeria and established full 
diplomatic relations with Mali, which was taking the radical nationalist road. The sheer 
number of new states emerging in Africa made it a key region in terms of the crucial vote 
on the Korean Question in the UNGA. North Korea soon established a stronghold in Africa, 
outpacing the ROK. North Korea's ability to emphasize a common anti-colonial heritage 
explains much of its early success.
However, the most significant single breakthrough in the Third World, at least in symbolic 
terms, was not in Africa, but in Latin America, long the stronghold of the US and thus the 
ROK. The revolution in Cuba led by Fidel Castro, which overthrew the Batista regime, 
offered an opportunity for diplomatic reversal. An agreement was reached on 29 October, 
1960, for the promotion of diplomatic relations and cultural cooperation between Cuba and 
the DPRK.
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Thus, on the first of December, 1960, Ernesto "Che" Guevara, as President of the National 
Bank of Cuba, led an economic delegation of the new Cuban revolutionary government to 
visit the DPRK. In a Joint Communique of 6 December, 1960, the DPRK enthusiastically 
welcomed the Cuban fight against imperialism and colonialism. North Korea praised Cuba 
as an example that "encourages all Latin America's spirit". The DPRK gave its 
endorsement to the Havana Declaration, praising its emphasis on land reform and the 
nationalisation of US "monopoly" corporate interests, policies which North Korea wanted 
to promote throughout the Third World. Cuba, in return, gave its full support to the 
DPRK's position on the reunification of Korea free from all foreign interference. Cuba and 
North Korea entered into a trade protocol on the same day and ratified the establishment of 
diplomatic relations. (33)
This was precisely the type of ideal relationship the DPRK sought. This marked the 
beginning of a very close and lasting relationship between the two countries. Cuba was tjie 
first government in Latin America to succeed in carrying out a socialist revolution and 
breaking out of the US sphere of influence. It was also the first to establish diplomatic 
relations with the DPRK, thus breaking North Korea's diplomatic isolation in the Western 
hemisphere. In the view of Robert Scalapino, "Cuba, more than any single country, is a 
symbol to the North Koreans of the future triumph of communism over the United States" 
(34). Cuba and the DPRK took a similar revolutionary view of the role of so-called 
"proletarian internationalism", i.e. active and militant Third World solidarity, particularly 
in opposition to US power around the world.
As in the Cuban case, the DPRK had special interest in supporting fellow revolutionary 
regimes in the Third World under threat from foreign intervention. For instance, in 
December, 1960, the DPRK released statements condemning imperialist intervention in the 
Congo, Laos, and Algeria (35). The DPRK condemned the US for intervention against the 
Lumumba regime in the Congo and insisted that Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, who 
had been kidnapped (allegedly with CIA connivance), should be promptly released. North 
Korea also called for the punishment of the "criminals led by Mobutu", who were seizing 
the opportunity to usurp power in the Congo. (36) The death of Lumumba cost the DPRK 
an important new ally in central Africa.
In Laos, the DPRK condemned US support for Phoumi Nosavan and expansion of the civil 
war in Laos. North Korea claimed that the US was using a Thai mercenary forces in Laos 
in an effort to overthrow Souvanna Phouma and other neutralists, and suppress the Pathet 
Lao, including the paramount leader Souphanouvong. A coup d'etat in December ousted 
the "neutralist" regime of Kong Le, which had been established in August, 1960. In Algeria,
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the DPRK protested the massacre of Algerians by French military police. These Algerians 
had been protesting a recent vote, which the DPRK characterised as a means of 
"perpetuating French colonialism" in Algeria. The DPRK also accused the US of 
supporting the massacre through supply of weapons to the French.
A nascent pan-Asian communist community took shape in the late 1950s, embodied in the 
triangular relations between the PRC, DPRK and the DRV. Relations between the USSR 
and the PRC were strained, as revealed in the Mao-Khrushchev summit in 1958. The 
DPRK adopted an increasingly pro-PRC and anti-Khrushchev line. The DPRK was closer 
politically to China than to Eastern Europe as well. The DPRK and China shared the 
problem of national division and both viewed the US as a primary obstacle to reunification. 
Both were reluctant to sacrifice their national interests for the sake of avoiding the risk of 
nuclear war with the US, which was what the USSR's policy of peaceful coexistence implied.
Kim II Sung made a state visit to North Vietnam in late November, 1958. This choice ,of 
destination suggests that the DRV was the DPRK's closest Asian partner, next to the PRC. 
This was Kim II Sung's first state visit to a Southeast Asian country. New agreements on 
trade and payment were signed between the DRV and DPRK, which accompanied an 
earlier agreement on scientific and technological cooperation. A Joint Communique was 
issued between Kim U Sung and Ho Chi Minh on 1 December, 1958. In it the two pointed 
approvingly to the emergence of new nationalist regimes in Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America, and to the strengthening of national liberation movements aiming at 
independence from colonialism. They praised the "spirit of Bandung", noting that it was 
being supported by more and more Afro-Asians. Kim and Ho applauded the "victory" of 
the Lebanon and Jordan (presumably over the US and UK), and gave their full support to 
the new Republic of Iraq, the "Republic of Algeria", the Republic of Guinea, and to the 
PRC's struggle to liberate Taiwan. They urged the US to withdraw from Taiwan.
Relations with the PRC likewise greatly improved in this period. China, which had 
defended North Korea's very existence in the war, posed as a strict respecter of Korea's 
independence. On the request of the DPRK, all PRC troops left North Korea by October, 
1958. In tandem, the Kim II Sung faction succeeded in purging the leaders of the August 
1956 rebellion and launching the "second revolution" based on Kim II Sungism, as 
discussed above. Despite the fact that this move came directly at the expense of the Yanan 
faction, i.e. the leadership group with personal ties to China's leaders, the PRC did nothing 
to prevent it.
Kim II Sung strengthened ties to the PRC by making a state visit there in the winter of
1958. Zhou Enlai led a PRC delegation to the DPRK in February, 1958. The DPRK and the
68
PRC both followed a militant anti-US line, based on driving US influence out of East Asia. 
They both put great emphasis on the principle of the autonomy of each communist party 
within the international socialist movement, took a hard-line Marxist-Leninist position on 
many issues, and were "anti-revisionist", meaning opposed to the brand of communist 
reformism promoted by Khrushchev, while espousing their own home-grown versions of 
communist ideology under the banner of their respective "great leaders".
Although the PRC, DRV, and DPRK had much in common, there was a limit to this type of 
communist pan-Asianism. The DPRK could not afford to lose the vital support of the USSR 
in the international community, vital to its international status. None of the three could 
truly afford to alienate the USSR in strategic or economic affairs either, where they 
benefited from the support of a more powerful and industrialised ally. Finally, a complete 
break with the USSR might have invited China to assert itself, thus exposing the DPRK and 
DRV to a new danger to their independence. The policy of "equidistance", i.e. relying for 
support on both the USSR and PRC and seeking not to alienate either while being 
independent from both, was decisively confirmed in the wake of the military coup d'etat in 
South Korea in May, 1961. The DPRK responded by affirming a ten year treaty of alliance 
with the USSR and a similar treaty of alliance with the PRC.
The DPRK's close relations with China also made its other relations in the Third World 
somewhat vulnerable. For example, relations with India came under stress because of the 
Sino-Indian conflict and the DPRK's close relationship with the PRC. The DPRK found it 
difficult to disguise its sympathy for the PRC in the dispute with India. One scholar has 
gone so far as to conclude that the DPRK "sided with Peking" (37). The DPRK hoped to 
wriggle out of this dilemma by blaming "American imperialists" for the Sino-Indian 
conflict in 1959. Nevertheless, economic relations with India were further consolidated, 
though India continued to postpone the establishment of full diplomatic relations with the 
DPRK. To be fair, India was even-handed in this policy, and likewise denied full diplomatic 
relations to the ROK.
IV. The Fall of the First Republic in South Korea: North Korean Reunification Proposals 
The "student revolution" that toppled the authoritarian regime of President Syngman Rhee 
in South Korea in April, 1960, provided the DPRK with an opportunity to advance new 
proposals on the Korean Question (38). After many years of criticism, even by its allies, for 
its corruption, inefficiency and abuse of basic democratic rights, the Rhee regime fell on 26 
April, in the wake of blatantly rigged presidential elections held on 15 March, 1960.
The fall of the Rhee regime opened an opportunity for the DPRK to make its case for 
change more widely heard. Indonesia, India, and Burma publicly supported the DPRK's
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position, i.e. support for the student revolution and a call for the withdrawal of all US 
troops from South Korea. While attending the second Executive Committee meeting of 
AAPSO, in Accra, Ghana, in April, 1960, the DPRK won support from AAPSO for its new 
reunification proposals (39).
The KWP Central Committee issued an appeal to South Koreans to expel the US from the 
country. North Korea issued a call for a North - South negotiation process, but at 
non-governmental level, i.e. between political parties and social organisations, toward 
formation of a new national government. The DPRK proposed that an interim government 
for the South should be set up by the students, workers and peasants, eliminating all 
vestiges of the Rhee regime. (40)
However, the Rhee regime was replaced by an interim government led by Rhee's Foreign 
Minister, Ho Chong, who was denounced by the DPRK as an American "puppet". The 
"opening" to a democratic political system in South Korea offered the possibility of a more 
conducive atmosphere to North-South negotiations. However, North Korea's efforts to 
manipulate the unstable political situation in South Korea only contributed to fears by the 
South's military about communist resurgence and the threat posed by North Korea. The 
military coup d'etat in South Korea in May 1961 closed the door to any "people to people" 
diplomacy on the Korean peninsula. The conditions were still not right for inter-Korean 
dialogue.
V. The UNGA Debate on the Korean Question
From the outset of UN debate in 1947, the UNGA Political Committee consistently denied 
the DPRK the right to participate in UN debates on the Korean Question. In contrast, the 
ROK was allowed to participate as an observer - without a vote. The US and the ROK 
wanted to preserve the unilateral nature of Korean participation, since to grant the DPRK 
equal participation might undermine the ROK's claim to exclusive international legitimacy.
On substantive matters, the US and ROK proposed that Korea be reunified via national 
elections supervised by the UN, conducted on the basis of proportional representation in 
accordance with the population ratio between North and South Korea: a formula that gave 
a distinct electoral advantage to the South. The USSR and its allies, on the other hand, 
proposed that the Koreans be allowed to settle the Korean Question themselves without 
foreign interference: a policy designed to get US forces and influence out of South Korea 
and give the left a clear playing field. The Soviet Union and the DPRK also wanted 
UNCURK (The United Nations Commission for the Unification and Reconstruction of 
Korea) to be dissolved, since they had never accepted the legitimacy of that body or its 
competence to deal with the Korean Question.
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From 1947 to 1958, the Western, pro-ROK majority clearly held sway in the UNGA. 
However, by 1958, the growing role of new Third World members began to alter the 
balance of forces in the Political Committee. The changing political composition of the 
UNGA reflected the process of de-colonisation, one of the most important processes of 
formal change in the international system at the time. As a direct result, the issue of 
whether or not to grant the DPRK the right to be represented in the UN debate on the 
Korean Question gained fresh impetus.
A growing number of Third World governments joined the socialist states in criticising the 
sole participation of the ROK. Among the states that publicly supported the call for the 
DPRK's right to participate in the UN debate were: India, Indonesia, the United Arab 
Republic, Burma, Ceylon, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Ghana, Yugoslavia, Yemen, 
Morocco, and Saudi Arabia. They were joined by the USSR and the East European socialist 
states.
There were no Latin American states prepared to openly support the DPRK's right to be 
heard at the UN. This is a reflection of the conservative tenor of most of those regimes at 
that time, and the extent of US influence in Latin America.
Despite the support of many African, Asian, and socialist states however, the DPRK 
continued to be denied the right to participate and the Political Committee continued to 
grant the ROK the sole right to represent Korea in the annual debate. This allowed the 
ROK to present its own narrative of the historical development of the Korean Question 
without the threat of being contradicted by the DPRK.
It is often claimed that the DPRK rejected UN competence in the Korean Question. 
However, via the USSR, North Korea actually applied to join the UN. In 1956 and again in 
1958, the Soviet Union proposed that both Korean governments simultaneously enter the 
UN -as full members. The US and its allies opposed this on the grounds that the DPRK was 
not a peace-loving state, but an aggressor, and that the DPRK had violated the Armistice 
and did not recognise the competence of the UN in the Korean Question. From 1958 
onward the annual debate over DPRK participation grew more intense.
The Soviet proposal on simultaneous UN entry represented a significant change in 
approach, since it implied that divided nation status would be legally accepted and 
normalised, at least in the short term. The reasons that the US did not accept this proposal 
are not entirely clear, but its parallel action toward the NNSC provides some clues. The US 
acted to undermine the legitimacy of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, as
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established under the terms of the Korean Armistice. Why it did so involves strategic, 
geopolitical interests. During the Geneva Conference in 1954 the possibility of introducing 
nuclear weapons into South Korea had been discussed as a future contingency. This raised 
the isssue of the desirability of undermining the NNSC's supervisory role. It was precisely 
at the time when the US acted to undermine the functions of the NNSC and introduce 
nuclear weapons into South Korea that the US chose not to accept dual UN membership as 
a solution to the Korean Question.
VI. Conclusion
The post-war reconstruction period was a considerable success for the DPRK. Having 
survived near annihilation in the Korean War, North Korea surpassed all expectations in 
the period of reconstruction. North Korea found a secure position within the arms of its 
socialist friends and allies, which cushioned it from the diplomatic isolation the West 
attempted to impose. From this position, North Korea quickly re-established itself as an 
industrial nation.
The key explanatory factor in the success of North Korea must however be its break with 
dependence, particularly vis a vis the USSR. While taking full advantage of the assistance 
provided by the socialist community, in effect an extraordinary transfer of industrial 
technology to a peripheral state, North Korea again defied easy predictions and succeeded 
in politically distancing itself from Soviet tutelage or domination. The presence of the 
Chinese army in North Korea up to late 1958 certainly contributed to this feat, but most of 
all it was Korean nationalism that determined the outcome. Kim II Sung deliberately 
steered the nation away from complete integration into the Soviet camp and established a 
new Third World model of independent national development. The technical and financial 
assistance provided by the USSR and Eastern Europe was channelled into a national 
strategy of self-reliance with a clear emphasis on heavy industry. By the end of the 1950s 
the DPRK no longer needed such high levels of assistance.
The independent foreign policy of the DPRK was a successful strategy. It directly reflected 
the North's need to reach out to the largest constituency possible in the international 
community if it hoped to alter its international status, given the rigidity of Cold War 
alliance systems. The strategy of identifying closely with the anti-colonial, national 
liberation movements of the Third World was viewed as a long term revolutionary strategy. 
By laying the foundations of this policy in the 1950s the DPRK successfully established 
momentum that accelerated for the next twenty years. As the international system changed 
through the struggles for de-colonisation, the DPRK benefited from its record of solidarity. 
The main trends in the Third World were consistent with basic North Korean goals such as 
the removal of American forces from South Korea and the right to resolve the Korean
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Question without any foreign interference. The result was a rapid emergence from the 
confines of the Soviet sphere and erosion of the isolation imposed by the US and its allies. 
Independence bred success and success brought increased international support. North 
Korea exploited the structure of opportunities and began an ascent from the periphery.
Part Two: South Korea:The Penalties of Dependence
I. Introduction
South Korea's participation in the international community after the Korean War was 
more secure than that of the DPRK, largely as a result of US and UN patronage. However, 
although the majority of UN member states recognised the ROK, they stopped short of 
affirming its claim to be the sole legitimate government of Korea.
The relative failure of ROK foreign policy in this period can be explained by the 
complacency that diplomatic security induced. Through its favourable reception by the 
West and the UNGA, the ROK had the opportunity to join mainstream international 
institutions. Nevertheless, to a considerable extent it simply defaulted on this opportunity. 
Surprisingly, South Korea maintained a narrow range of diplomatic partners during most 
of this period. Rhee followed a semi-isolationist, virulently anti-communist foreign policy 
which compounded the negative image of his domestic authoritarianism. The ROK locked 
itself into the Cold War system, fully embracing its alliance structure. Ideology in the ROK, 
however, was a mere caricature of Western liberalism, though Rhee ritually eulogised the 
virtues of "freedom" and espoused unflinching loyalty to the idealised "free world".
The foreign and domestic policies of Rhee were therefore largely counter-productive, even 
detrimental, to enhancing international support. As a result of its myopia and arrogance 
the ROK squandered initial advantages and allowed its rival, North Korea, to make 
significant gains in the Third World - almost unchallenged. In both strategic and economic 
terms, the extreme dependency of the ROK upon the United States during this period 
detracted from any ability or even desire to assert a more pragmatic, independent foreign 
policy. On the contrary, the ROK was "self-isolated" from much of the emerging Third 
World and did precious little to enhance its relationship with established supporters, even 
in the West. This self-isolation also extended to Japan. Rhee stubbornly refused to mend 
fences, despite the very considerable benefits this might have conferred on ROK 
reconstruction.
At the end of the Korean War the ROK was in a desperate economic and social situation.
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What little progress that had been achieved economically since 1948 had largely been 
erased by the devastation of war. Much of the material wealth of the ROK had formerly 
been concentrated in Seoul, a city which was repeatedly destroyed during the fighting. 
Economic reconstruction was imperative to strengthen the ROK's international position, 
for without a strong economic base the ROK would remain a weak and dependent state, 
utterly reliant on the support and protection of foreign powers to sustain its existence.
During the course of the war the ROK had been weakened as a functioning government and 
in practice it was overshadowed by the United Nations Command. The relocation of the 
government to Pusan for much of the war was more of a "Babylonian captivity" than a 
necessary strategic precaution. The US simply preferred to keep Rhee out of the way. Both 
the organs of government and the political system itself were in great disarray at war's end. 
The strongest political institution was the armed forces, which however remained formally 
under UNC authority - under the terms of the Taejon agreement of July, 1950.
Even the foreign policy of the ROK had been virtually pre-empted by the UNC during the 
war. Thus, Rhee needed to re-capture the state and re-create a foreign policy. If Rhee could 
strengthen the international legitimacy of the ROK this would strengthen his otherwise 
vulnerable domestic legitimacy. However, Rhee adopted national reunification as his 
overriding aim, and assumed an uncompromising position toward the Korean left and the 
DPRK, thus promoting an international image of belligerency where one of peacefulness 
would have been far more constructive.
II. The Strategic Underpinning of Reconstruction
In order to make itself more secure from the threat of renewed aggression by the DPRK, 
the ROK strengthened its strategic bonds with the United States. Strategic ties to Japan 
were ruled out by anti-Japanese feeling, having the effect of reinforcing bilateral 
dependence on the US. In the immediate post Korean War period, President Rhee not only 
solicited a direct pledge of protection from the US, but also tried to convince the US to back 
him in a renewed attempt to reunify Korea by force.
The United States had assumed the role of a hegemon in the Pacific for the non-communist 
countries. In the bipolar Cold War power configuration, the US was the sole great power in 
the capitalist camp in Northeast Asia, with Japan clearly subordinate. It was only later that 
the ascendance of Japan, and communist China, led toward a quadripartite power 
configuration. Nevertheless, the recognised the sovereignty of the states in its sphere of 
hegemony. The United States itself did not desire an extreme dependency of the ROK. It 
preferred to enhance the role of Japan as a supportive economic and strategic partner in 
the region. However, South Korea obstinantly blocked American desires in this regard.
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As discussed above, the two pillars of ROK foreign policy were its strategic alliance with 
the US and its anti-communism. The principles of anti-communism were extended not 
merely to the DPRK and its allies, but even to neutralist regimes and "anti-Western" Third 
World governments. Rhee viewed himself and the ROK as being locked into a life and 
death struggle with Communism, which he portrayed simplistically and demagogically as 
an insidious global conspiracy. Rhee's conception of the Cold War had considerable 
resonance with that of John Foster Dulles, except that Rhee was even more willing than 
Dulles to assume a totally uncompromising bellligerence in regard to all forms of socialism 
and radical nationalism. Rhee likewise viewed the ROK as a loyal member of the "Free 
World", and despised those who chose neutrality in the Cold War, depicting them as 
dangerous traitors to the cause of "freedom".
Rhee's strategic dependence on the US was inextricable from his persistent bellicism. He 
insisted that the US retain a military presence in the ROK - indefinitely. This committment 
was the quid pro quo for his reluctant acquiescence to the Armistice in 1953. It was in the 
course of the Armistice negotiations that Rhee made the proposal, on 6 June, 1953, for a 
mutual defense pact with the US. (41) Rhee's irredentism was all too apparent. He 
threatened renewed war in the absence of such support. The ROK would "exercise our 
innate right of self- determination to decide the issue conclusively one way or the other. We 
can no longer survive a stalemate of division " (42). These statements were probably 
bluster, but Rhee was a master at bluster, and deployed it to force the Americans to give 
him what he wanted. To the Americans, Rhee was "the devil they knew", and he knew it. 
This was in fact his greatest advantage in dealing with the United States. South Korea was 
so vulnerable the Americans dared not risk the consequences of removing Rhee.
President Rhee was particularly concerned over the strategic threat that the presence of 
large numbers of Chinese troops in the DPRK posed to his regime. He insisted that these 
PRC forces should be "driven out of our territory, if in so doing we have to fight them 
ourselves." (43) According to one source, Rhee "did everything he could to prevent a truce" 
and even after stalemate was clear to everyone else he appealed in person to the US 
Congress to wage atomic war in order to win back control of North Korea. (44) Rhee 
argued that to accept an armistice which allowed Chinese forces to remain in Korea was 
tantamount to "an acceptance of a death sentence without protest." He insisted that the 
Korean conflict "Should be settled by punishing the aggressors, unifying Korea." (45) Rhee 
proposed the simultaneous withdrawal of US and PRC forces. The UNC and the United 
States, however, settled for acceptance of Chinese occupation of North Korea.
Rhee's identification of his strategic interests with the US was couched, for effect, in
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melodramatic rhetoric. For instance, he assured President Eisenhower that "the defense of 
the United States is as dear to us as is that of our own, for the ultimate safety or security of 
the whole free world hangs upon that of the United States... we have lost already too many 
nations to the Soviets...To disappoint the Koreans is to disappoint most of the 
anti-communist elements everywhere. The United States will in the end find itself a 
democratic oasis in a communist desert." (46)
Even the United States was made uncomfortable by South Korean rhetoric and 
belligerency. For instance, President Eisenhower personally urged Rhee to renounce any 
intention to renew the attempt to reunify Korea by force. (47) At the same time, the United 
States accepted that divided nation status might have to be sustained for an indefinite 
period. In public, the US viewed a bilateral defense agreement with the ROK as an 
appropriate step toward "the development of a more comprehensive system of regional 
security in the Pacific area." (48) In private, it was understood that this was a useful means 
to keep Rhee and the ROK armed forces in check and under ultimate American commapd. 
Eisenhower committed the US to providing economic aid in order to reconstruct industry 
and agriculture, the real American priority.
Despite all these American assurances and largess, Rhee openly doubted that the 
reunification of Korea would be achieved by a political means. He told Eisenhower in a 
letter dated 19 June, 1953, "Personally, I do not believe that the Communists will agree, at 
a conference table, to what they have never been made to agree to on the battle field." (49) 
He played upon US fears of the "domino effect" by evoking the spectre of US collapse in 
East Asia, saying, "What is to follow for the rest of the far East? And to the rest of Asia? 
And the rest of the free world?" (50).
Rhee's strategic doctrine revolved around the constant repetition of the "threat from the 
North" scenario. He used this argument not only to insist on more military and economic 
aid from the Americans, but also to justify the imposition of a national security state in 
South Korea. The ROK was not a signatory to the Armistice, and its final terms were only 
shown to the ROK government a mere one hour before their presentation to the PRC and 
DPRK. According to the ROK, its concurrence in these final terms was "never solicited." 
By not signing the Armistice, however, Rhee made the compliance of the ROK conditional 
upon continued US influence in, and commitment to, his government. Yet, this apparent act 
of defiance was in fact an empty gesture which only deepened the dependence of the ROK 
on the United States. The US could not afford to risk allowing Rhee to have full control over 
the situation in South Korea, lest he act irresponsibly and precipitate another war. Rhee 
was "shocked" to find that the sovereignty of the ROK was compromised by UN 
involvement in the Korean Question, but this had been the case at least since June 1950.
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Although Rhee had many enemies in Washington and raised the ire of the US President on 
several occassions, he also retained powerful friends. Ultimately, Rhee was acceptable to 
Washington, but not admired. His complete loyalty to the US and his total identification 
with the general strategic and political interests of the "Free World" were classic in their 
purity. However, such loyalty was not without its compensation. Nevertheless, his 
ideological eccentricity was such that he never had a true commonality of views with the 
US. Rather, his closest affinities were actually with other anti-communist regimes in Asia 
and particularly those in divided nation status, i.e., the Republic of China and the Republic 
of Vietnam. It was to these regimes that Rhee turned for additional strategic support, 
rather than to Japan or the European powers.
When the US government issued an official post Armistice clarification of Korea policy on 7 
August, 1953, it stressed that "We recognize that the Republic of Korea possesses the 
inherent right of sovereignty to deal with its problems, but it has agreed to take no 
unilateral action to unite Korea by military means..." However, the US made equally clear 
that any renewed "unprovoked armed attack" from North Korea would be considered a 
"resumption by the Communist forces of the active belligerency which the armistice has 
halted" and constitute "a new war". (51)
This formula, though originally intended to be temporary, became the basic doctrine of the 
US in regard to Korean security. It represents a compromise between Rhee and Dulles, 
whereby the US did not commit itself to automatic war if the south initiated hostilites (as 
Rhee demanded), but kept open the option of renewing the war if the armistice broke down 
as a result of aggression from the North. Since the Korean Armistice is merely a truce and 
not a formal peace treaty, this American doctrine was compatible with the indefinite 
maintenance of a divided Korea.
In the same declaration of US Korea policy, the US announced a three to four year program 
for the rehabilitation of the Korean economy. This program was coordinated through the 
Combined Economic Board, under the joint chairmanship of Korean and American 
representatives. The total program contemplated "expenditure of approximately one billion 
dollars of funds...out of prospective defense savings" in the US budget (52). The manner in 
which the US economic aid was administered constituted a real restraint upon the exercise 
of South Korean sovereignty, since US officials had a direct say in its administration and 
the US could use the threat of suspension of aid to pressure the Rhee government into 
policy compliance. Thus, through insisting on an extreme dependence on US strategic and 
economic support, the Rhee regime openly circumscribed the sovereignty of Korea within 
the parameters set by American patronage.
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The reluctance to settle the Korean Question in political negotiations with the communists 
was not only an ROK attitude, however. It was shared by US Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles. The Geneva Conference, beginning in April, 1954, gave the USSR, PRC, and DPRK 
the opportunity to present new proposals for a political solution. This was the only 
occassion at which all the parties to the conflict have ever sat down together and discussed 
possible political solutions. The Communist side put forward proposals for internationally 
supervised national elections in Korea (as opposed to UN supervision). This constituted a 
significant concession on their part in relation to their earlier position. Nevertheless, these 
proposals were dismissed by the Americans as disingenuous. After being initially received 
by European allies as a basis for discussion, these proposals were rejected after the US 
exerted considerable behind-the-scenes pressure, emanating from Dulles. (53) The outcome 
of the Geneva conference, embodied in the Allied Sixteen Nation Declaration on 15 July, 
1954, amounted to a recognition of complete impasse. (54)
In the wake of the Geneva Conference, President Rhee held personal consultations with 
President Eisenhower in Washington, from 27-30 July, 1954. Subsequent discussions 
followed these and by 17 November, 1954, a joint statement of US-ROK policy objectives 
was released. The ROK's stated policy was to "cooperate with the United States in its effort 
to reunify Korea", including efforts in the UN, and to "Retain Republic of Korea forces 
under the operational control of the United Nations Command" and to "Continue to 
encourage private ownership of investment projects". (55) The agreement by Rhee to 
perpetuate US operational control of ROK armed forces via the umbrella of the UNC was 
remarkable given its explicit foreign control over the armed forces of a supposedly 
sovereign state.
In return for this pivotal concession, the US pledged to provide the ROK with economic and 
military assistance during fiscal year 1955 of up to $700 million, of which $280 million was 
economic aid. In addition, the US government committed itself to "Support a strengthened 
Republic of Korea military establishment" and to employ its military power "in accordance 
with its constitutional processes" against any future aggression against the ROK. (56).
Having achieved a firm US committment to its security, the ROK thereafter stridently 
rejected all communist initiated proposals on peaceful reunification. For instance, the ROK 
dismissed the PRC's proposal for national elections in Korea, under international 
supervision, as a mere "propaganda trick". It equally excoriated Molotov's "peaceful co­
existence" proposal made in the UNGA in 1955, calling for the ROK to recognise the 
DPRK. The ROK categorically rejected this proposal on the grounds that South Korea was 
the "only legal government of Korea" and recognition of the DPRK would put it in an
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"equal position" with the ROK. Indeed, the ROK derided Molotov's speech as a "repetition 
of the Geneva meeting proposal and a disguised invasion plan of the communists." (57)
In response to Molotov, Rhee's government insisted that the UN should demand the total 
withdrawal of the "Red Chinese armies from Korean soil" in accordance with the UN 
resolution of 1 February, 1951, "branding the Red Chinese invaders as aggressors." The 
ROK also called upon the UN to "declare the truce in Korea to have been ended in effect by 
the Communist violations of it" (58).
The ROK was most adamant that occupation by US and other foreign troops be continued 
in the South indefinitely. Shortly after Rhee returned to Seoul from Washington in July, 
1954, the UNC announced that it would greatly reduce the number of UN forces stationed 
in the ROK, in tandem with the PRC's decision to substantially reduce its troop levels in the 
DPRK. The ROK leadership, in both the military and the government, condemned this 
UNC decision (59). The ROK response was an attempt to undermine the armistice, not oqly 
through criticism of the Neutral Repatriation Commission's work and the role of the Indian 
Custodian Force in particular, but most importantly, through concerted campaigns against 
the role of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC).
The ROK launched a campaign of vilification against the communist members of the 
NNSC, Czechoslovakia and Poland, accusing them of obstructing proper supervision in the 
DPRK and thereby having allowed the DPRK and PRC to build up their military forces in 
the north in violation of the Armistice. This campaign accelerated when the ROK 
government demanded, on 29 September, 1954, the expulsion of the Polish and Czech 
members of the NNSC. On 29 January, 1955, the ROK Foreign Minister even demanded 
that the NNSC be disbanded (60). Demonstrations against the NNSC, reminiscent of those 
against the Soviet-American Joint Commission some years before, were staged by Rhee's 
political machine in the summer of 1955. The ROK responded to criticism of these 
demonstrations by explaining to UNCURK officials that they were "spontaneous." (61)
However, the US also considered the possibility of undermining the NNSC as early as the 
Geneva Conference in 1954. Nevertheless, when the ROK first publically attacked the 
NNSC in 1954 and 1955, the US remained aloof, and even lodged a protest in 1955. 
However, in 1956, the US and the UNC came around to the ROK position on the NNSC. In 
May, 1956, the UNC announced that it was unilaterally suspending its role in the operations 
of the NNSC. This meant that it would no longer cooperate in the supervision of compliance 
with the terms of the Armistice. In June, 1956, the NNSC relocated its headquarters to the 
demilitarised zone. (62)
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Ostensibly, the US and the UNC unilaterally abrogated their role in the NNSC because it 
was manifestly impotent to perform its role. However, if the US and the UNC really wanted 
to strengthen the essential peacekeeping role of the NNSC they might have chosen to 
strengthen it, rather than abandon it, or at least try to negotiate a suitable replacement. In 
an alternative view, the key to the decision to undermine the NNSC, is summarised by Kim, 
Hak Joon. According to Kim, by unilaterally abrogating its functions in the supervisory 
role of the NNSC, "the United Nations Command could abrogate the provision of the 
armisitice agreement as to the introduction of new arms and military personnel." (63) This, 
and not supposed "incompetence", is the real reason the US sought to undermine the 
NNSC's supervisory role.
This action undermined renewed efforts by the communist states to move beyond the 
armistice agreement, but most of all it allowed the US to introduce nuclear weapons into 
South Korea, by-passing the Armistice's restriction on introduction of new weaponry. The 
UNC announced to the DPRK and PRC in June, 1957, that it would "restore the military 
balance" in view of the "continued illegal introduction" into the north of new weapons and 
supplies. (64)
South Korean belligerency and paranoia persisted late into the reconstruction period. For 
example, Chinese troop withdrawal from the DPRK was imminent in early 1958. In this 
context, the ROK Ambassador to the US, Yang, You Chan, wrote to the US Secretary of 
State to say, "The fact that the Chinese Communists may withdraw from north Korea is 
deceptive because they will be poised just north of the Yalu ready to attack us as before." 
The ROK position on reunification was likewise unchanged. Yang declared that "the 
Government of the Republic of Korea will accept elections under the U.N. supervision only 
in the liberated northern part of Korea..." (65).
Given this attitude, progress toward a political solution via North-South dialogue was 
virtually impossible. For example, on 5 February, 1958, the DPRK formally proposed 
national all-Korea elections under the supervision of neutral nations. This was essentially 
the same proposal put forward at Geneva, designed to get round DPRK objections to UN 
supervision, given the UN's role as a "belligerent" in the Korean war. This proposal, like 
others, was not given serious consideration.
III. ROK Diplomacy: The Limits of Anti-Communist Foreign Policy
The official ROK Foreign Ministry interpretation of the post-war situation and the role of 
anti-communism merits quotation:
"The failure of the establishment of a united government, by the Soviet intervention, and 
the establishment of the communist regime in North Korea - against the will of the North
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Korean people - inevitably led to the Korean government's policy of anti- communism. 
This tendency hardened through the North Korean invasion, supported by the USSR and 
China, on 25 June, 1950. During the three years of the war the main task of our diplomacy 
had to be unity for the repelling of the communist invasion. To achieve this task the 
Korean Government reinforced the relationship with Western nations. This pro-U.S., 
pro-Western tendency did not change after the truce in 1953. Under these circumstances, 
the First Republic, following the basic diplomatic strategy of anti-communism, and 
anti-North Korea, didn't have any contact with North Korea and other communist 
countries, as well as the non-aligned, neutralist, countries, even regarding some of these 
countries, which proposed unfavourable attitudes toward the Republic of Korea, with 
hostility" (66). (my translation).
It is clear that Rhee's hostility toward socialist and neutralist regimes was viewed as being 
consistent with the policies of national survival pursued during the Korean war. In the view 
of Park, Sang-Seek, the ROK has from the outset pursued three main diplomatic goals: ,1) 
To secure a mutual defense system against the threat from North Korea; 2) To expand 
economic relations with other countries in support of economic growth; and 3) To enhance 
the superiority of the ROK's international status to that of North Korea and to gain 
international support for the ROK's reunification policy. (67)
The ROK relied on a small circle of intimate diplomatic partners to fulfill these goals. Prior 
to the outbreak of the Korean war, the ROK had established full diplomatic relations, in 
chronological order, only with the US, Nationalist China, the UK, France, the Philippines, 
and Spain. In the post Korean war situation, the first government to establish full 
diplomatic relations with the ROK was the Republic of Vietnam, on 2 May, 1956. The 
affinity of interests between the Asian anti-communist regimes mirrored the affinitiy 
between the communists discussed above. In Asia, the ROK had close diplomatic ties with 
Nationalist China, South Vietnam, and the Philippines, all closely tied to the US. Outside 
Asia, the ROK relied heavily on the good auspices of the US in conducting its foreign 
policy. According to one scholar, this diplomatic reliance on the US was due to the fact that 
"the U.S. could defend the Republic of Korea on the Korean peninsula militarily while 
supporting it at international forums diplomatically." (68)
Most of Latin America had recognised the ROK in 1949. However, the ROK relied 
especially heavily on US diplomatic channels to conduct relations with Latin America. It 
thus economised on expenditures for diplomacy, but in so doing compromised its 
independent conduct of foreign affairs. The ROK relied on the support of the Latin 
American governments in the UNGA to counterbalance the neutralist and Afro-Asian 
governments that were sympathetic to DPRK participation or to Northern reunification
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proposals.
In fact, the ROK was so confident of Latin American support and the reliability of 
US diplomatic channels there that it did not even establish ambassadorial relations 
with a Latin American government until after the UN debates on the Korean 
Question began to show increasing support for the DPRK, i.e., post 1958. After this 
shock to its complacency, the ROK established diplomatic relations with Brazil on 
31 October, 1959, its first real bilateral diplomatic partner in Latin America.
All the same, the Rhee government conducted relations with Latin America on a very low 
profile, making little effort to upgrade relations. Even trade between the ROK and Latin 
America was negligible. There were no Latin American diplomatic representatives in Seoul, 
nor any Korean diplomatic delegates in Latin America. The ROK only established its first 
such diplomatic mission in Latin America in Brazil, in July, 1962, after the military came to 
power in Seoul.
Compounding this complacency, the ROK's diplomacy in Asia and Africa was largely a 
"negative" one. According to one scholar of Korean-African affairs, the ROK "approached 
Asia and Africa mainly to prevent North Korea from contacting them", fearing that the 
Afro-Asian states would "support North Korea's demand for the withdrawal of the U.S. 
troops from South Korea and would recognize North Korea as the sole legitimate 
government on the Korean peninsula." (69) In the view of Suh, Jae-Mahn, "Korea took the 
same view of the non-aligned bloc as the Dullesian view of immorality or uselessness. 
Further, the neutralism of the non-aligned bloc was regarded among Koreans as 
pro-communist." (70)
The anti-imperialist overtones of the Afro-Asian movement after Bandung in 1955 were 
neither appreciated nor accepted in Seoul during Rhee's tenure. The ROK made no real 
effort to identify any common interests with these regimes, despite the fact that the ROK 
could have done so by stressing its own experiences under Japanese colonialism. The ROK 
simply defaulted to the DPRK, to its own disadvantage. By 1958, as previously mentioned, 
this complacency began to have a real impact on the course of the UNGA debate on the 
Korean Question.
The First Republic's Middle East policy was similarly passive or even "virtually 
non-existent" in the 1950s. The ROK maintained full diplomatic relations only with 
Turkey (from 17 June, 1957), which had contributed forces to the UNC in the Korean war. 
O f all Middle Eastern states, only Turkey was a member of NATO. It was only in 1957 that 
the ROK sent its first significant goodwill mission to the Middle East, led by General Kim,
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Jung-Ryul. He visited Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan. (71) The choice of 
regimes to be visited clearly reflects the ROK's emphasis on courting conservative 
pro-Western governments and those interested in anti-communist or pro-Western security 
alliances, such as CENTO.
Surprisingly, the ROK was even relatively isolated in Asia. For example, although the 
Colombo Plan was launched in 1950, the ROK was long excluded from participation, only 
gaining admission in 1965, through the sponsorship of Malaysia. Diplomatic relations with 
Malaysia were not established until 2 February, 1960. The ROK was able to break out of 
relative isolation in Asia vis a vis the Colombo powers only when the Colombo Plan itself 
expanded beyond the South and Southeast Asian region and the Commonwealth sphere, to 
encompass more of Asia and the Pacific.
According to Michael Haas, the ROK was particularly interested in joining the prospective 
"Asian and Pacific Treaty Organisation" (APATO), conceived of as a kind of Asian 
counterpart to NATO. However, APATO was shelved for fear of its being "too 
provocative." After the French defeat at Dienbienphu, the focus of the US and Western 
powers turned to Southeast Asia, where SEATO was established. However, the US resisted 
the idea of a pan-Asian, pan-Pacific, anti-communist alliance. Instead, the US prefered to 
build up a system of bilateral security arangements in Asia, including bilateral agreements 
with Japan, the ROK, the Philippines, Nationalist China, and South Vietnam. Therefore, in 
the view of one observer, "Korea could be said to be part of a psuedo-APATO 
organisation." (72) The ROK favoured a larger pan-Asian organisation including both 
Southeast and Northeast Asian governments, and attempted to foster such an organisation. 
This is one area where the ROK did in fact try to take some diplomatic initiative, though 
unsuccessfully.
The ROK first established diplomatic relations with a Southeast Asian government - the 
Philippines - on 3 March, 1948, followed by Thailand on 1 October, 1953 and South 
Vietnam on 2 May, 1956. Relations with Malaya were established only in February, 1960. 
In 1953 the ROK did send a goodwill mission to Burma and Indonesia, but this gesture to 
neutralist leaning governments was only attempted out of a sense of political exigencies, i.e. 
the anticipation that the DPRK would approach these governments for support. The official 
ROK Foreign Ministry diplomatic history of this period comments on this situation as 
follows: "It was unavoidable for our government to be interested in the movement of the 
Afro-Asian bloc since this bloc developed as a new power within the U.N. after the Bandung 
conference in April, 1955." (my translation) (73) The ROK, like the DPRK, was excluded 
from Bandung, due to its involvement in Cold War alliances.
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It was the emergence of a large number of newly independent African states that eventually 
led the ROK, even under Rhee, to recognise the importance of developing ties with these 
regimes, if only out of consideration for their impact upon the annual UNGA debate. (74) 
The year 1960 was therefore a turning point in ROK policy toward Africa. In January, 
1960, the ROK Ambassador to France, Chung,II Kwan, was despatched on an extended 
goodwill mission to Africa. His mission visited Liberia, Libya, Tunisia, Ghana, Ethiopia, 
and Sudan. The inclusion of Ghana on the itinerary, it should be noted, was rather 
"exceptional", since Ghana was one of the leaders in the Pan-African and Afro-Asian 
movements.
This mission was followed by another, which took place after President Rhee's resignation, 
in June and July, 1960. It was headed by the ROK Ambassador to West Germany, Son, 
Won U. It visited the Congo (Leopoldville), Cameroon, Nigeria, Togo, Guinea, Mali, and 
Morocco, while another mission led by the ROK Ambassador to Italy, Kim, Young Ka, was 
sent to visit Madagascar, Somalia, Sudan, and the United Arab Republic. (75) The inclusion 
of Guinea, Mali, and the UAR in the missions'destinations suggests that by this time the 
ROK was becoming more aware of the need to compete with the DPRK for support among 
radical or neutralist governments in Africa.
The ROK's relations with the Afro-Asian "bloc" in the 1950s were considerably hampered 
by its extremely hostile attitude toward India, which was then a key leader in the 
Afro-Asian movement. As mentioned earlier, Rhee nurtured a vendetta against Nehru and 
India as a result of India's role in the POW repatriation issue. Indian troops were allowed 
onto ROK soil to supervise POWs against the expressed opposition of Rhee. In addition, 
India had been instrumental in working out a reasonable compromise between the hostile 
parties over the POW issue in the Armistice talks, which had had the effect of undermining 
Rhee's intransigent position, i.e., no repatriation of any kind against the so-called "free 
will" of the POWs. After the signing of the Armistice, some POWs had been allowed to seek 
assylum under India's neutral jurisdiction. Rhee was enraged.
This continued to poison relations with India even after the Geneva conference. For 
instance, in a letter to the UN Secretary General dated 8 June, 1955, Y.T. Pyun, the ROK 
Foreign Minister, lodged a formal protest concerning "India exercising a casting vote in the 
Repatriation Commission, whose membership evenly divided between two communist and 
two neutrals beside the Indian Chairman, knowing as we did that India, with its 
propensities to curry favour with the communist countries would side with the communist 
members on crucial question. This Government's fears were fully substantiated by the 
Indian Chairman's pro-communist actions within the Neutral Nations Repatriation 
Commission." (76)
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The ROK government opposed the presence of the Indian Custodian Force in Korea, 
viewing it as "a threat to the anti- communist prisoners of War because of their (India) 
known pro-communist bias." The ROK actually accused India of forcing POWs to "change 
minds and wish to go back to the communist countries." (77) India's decision to allow 
several ex-POWs to return voluntarily to the DPRK was a particular source of ROK 
resentment. India reciprocated with public and private criticism of the Rhee regime, 
including Rhee's negative attitude toward the armistice, his reluctance to abandon the 
policy of reunification through force, and "undemocratic aspects" of the Government of the 
Republic of Korea.
There were other aspects of India’s diplomatic role in the Korean Question that annoyed, 
and occasionally infuriated the Rhee regime. For instance, in late 1955 the ROK strongly 
disapproved of India's mediation in the UN on the Korean Question. The ROK protested 
comments made by Mr. Menon, India's Ambassador to the UN, who had said that the PRC 
would accept a UN sponsored vote in Korea. This was part of a follow-up attempt to pursue 
the similar communist proposal made at Geneva in 1954. i.e. to acccept the principle of 
internationally supervised elections throughout Korea, which had earlier fallen flat. The 
fact that India continued to act as a liasion for the PRC infuriated the ROK. The Rhee 
regime made its position very clear, calling the proposal "a device to fool the free nations of 
Asia." According to the ROK, a "free vote in North Korea is not possible until the entrance 
of U.N. armed forces is allowed and makes possible withdrawal by the Chinese army." (78) 
Calling India a communist dupe was not a very constructive policy, to say the least.
But relations were not this frosty will all other Asian regimes.
As discussed above, President Rhee's strident anti-communism and the situation of national 
division made him the "natural ally" of two other anti- communist, irredentist regimes in 
East Asia, i.e. Nationalist China and South Vietnam. These three regimes shared a common 
interest in overcoming communist power in Asia. The influence of the Soviet Union in Asia 
and the existence of the Peoples Republic of China had drastically altered the regional 
balance of power. Only the countervailing force of the United States, in close strategic 
cooperation with these three anti-communist regimes, could prevent reunification of all 
three under communist auspices. The ROK, ROC, and ROV understood this basic 
geopolitical situation but were often dismayed at the seemingly contradictory policies of the 
US, which did not wholeheartedly give them domestic support nor did the US automaticaly 
favour their strategic initiatives. However, they were not capable of an independent 
alliance. Instead, they sought to promote their own interests by pooling their influence with 
the United States in order to persuade Washington to increase its support.
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In the case of Vietnam, ROK emphasis on this regime began with the partition of Vietnam 
after the Geneva conference and the emergence of the ROV as a major client of the US. 
Rhee paid an official visit to the ROV in November, 1958. In his arrival statement in 
Saigon, Rhee succinctly summarised his view of South Korea's common interests with 
South Vietnam. Rhee said "Vietnam and Korea both have suffered under alien colonial 
rule. Both are divided countries fighting for survival against the cruel and brutal 
aggression of Communism. Yes, our countries are divided, but divided only for the 
moment. Both will persevere to victory and the unification of our lands and our peoples in 
liberty and peace." (79) President Rhee and President Diem of the ROV issued a Joint 
Communique as a consequence of their summit meeting on 7 November, 1958, expressing 
very similar sentiments.
The ROK took the initiative in 1959 to further strengthen ties with its anti-communist 
partners in Asia. It proposed the formation of an "Asian Anti-Communist Countries 
Conference". The ROK put particular emphasis on recruiting the ROV and ROC .to 
participate in this conference at the level of Head of State. The initiative was greeted with 
only a lukewarm response. The US did not favour such an approach and the Rhee regime 
was not able to exercise independent leadership on the matter in the face of American 
disapproval.
IV. ROK Relations with Japan: A Lost Opportunity?
The defeat of Japan in 1945 brought about an abrupt termination of relations between 
Korea and Japan and utterly transformed their relationship. Korea regained sovereignty 
before Japan did. The Korean War, however, provided an opportunity for the 
rehabilitation of Japan - by American design. A peace treaty with Japan was signed by 48 
states in San Francisco, on 8 September, 1951 (excluding the USSR and PRC). The Korean 
War "produced a big American demand for Japanese goods and services, and a sudden 
spurt in the whole economy resulted." (80) By some estimates US procurements in Japan 
during the course of the Korean War totalled some five billion US dollars. (81)
The natural periphery of the Japanese economy was in such places as Korea, Taiwan, and 
Southeast Asia. US hegemony in Asia, after the communist revolution in China, was not 
secure without a strong Japan. A strong Japan needed an economic periphery in Asia. 
Therefore, the US envisioned rehabilitating the Japanese economic centre within the region, 
which would strengthen the security of Japan and reduce the burden on the US treasury of 
huge aid subsidies to client regimes in Asia. (82)
The Japan with which the ROK government had to deal in the 1950s was a very different 
regime than the one that had governed colonial Korea. Nevertheless, the economic power
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of Japanese industry and Japanese capital remained very considerable. The historical 
bitterness of the Korean nation against Japan gave rise to fear that any re-integration with 
Japan would inevitably bring renewed Japanese exploitation or even domination of Korea. 
(83) Rhee understood the popular sentiment toward Japan and dared not antagonise the 
nation by "betraying" it to the Japanese. He could not afford the political risks this would 
have entailed. (84)
By the terms of the peace treaty signed at San Francisco, Japan formally acknowledged the 
liquidation of its entire empire, including Korea and accepted the existence of an 
independent state in Korea. Japan was obliged through agreements with the US to abide by 
the US position concerning the national division of Korea and China. Japan compliantly 
recognised the ROK and the ROC and rejected recognition of the DPRK and the PRC. This 
made Japan, in a new sense, the "natural ally" of the ROK.
As early as the autumn of 1951, the United States began to put pressure on Japan to initiate 
talks with the ROK concerning restoration of diplomatic relations. Japan complied. 
However, Rhee's anti-Japanese attitude soon created serious obstacles to progress. Rhee 
consented that talks begin in early 1952, but insisted on Japanese reparation payments of 
two billion US dollars. The San Francisco Treaty did not specifically regulate the question 
of reparations with former parts of the Japanese empire. Rhee hoped to force Japan into 
providing massive assistance as the price for diplomatic normalisation. Alternatively, he 
deliberately set the "price" too high in order to create an impasse.
The ROK-Japan talks quickly entered an acrimonious stalemate. The situation deteriorated 
into armed hostilities on 21 November, 1954, when two Japanese ships of the Maritime 
Safety Agency (the Dki and the Hekura) were fired upon in waters off Takeshima, an island 
occupied by the ROK but which Japan claimed as its national territory. The government of 
Japan protested Korea's claim to this island on 30 November, 1954, demanding "the 
immediate withdrawal of the Korean authorities from the island in question, and removal 
of all the equipment, including the guns, and a formal apology of the Korean government." 
(85) The ROK government responded on 13 December, 1954 with an unabashed defense of 
its right to exercise territorial jurisdiction over "Dok-do" as "an integral part of the 
Korean territory." (86) The Korea-Japan territorial dispute was further compounded by 
friction over the rights to marine resources in the waters between Korea and Japan.
The most sensitive issue of all was the ill-treatment of the Korean minority in Japan. Most 
Koreans then in Japan had been conscripted as forced labour during the Pacific War and 
therefore in some sense were a kind of hostage community. Furthermore, Japan's attitude 
toward Korean emigration from Japan to North Korea, which was liberal, was an
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extremely sensitive issue for the Rhee regime.
Japan also disputed unresolved issues of property rights in Korea; regarding Japanese 
property "left in Korea" at the end of the Pacific War. This property rights dispute 
involved the fundamental issues of colonialism and the legality of the US military 
occupation's dispensation of former Japanese property in Korea. After several years of 
difficult discussions, the issue was finally resolved on 31 December, 1957, when the 
government of Japan informed the Korean Mission in Japan that remarks made by the 
Chief Japanese delegate to the talks, Kanichiro Kubota, on 15 October, 1953, were 
withdrawn, and that Japan's property claims made in the Korea - Japan talks on 6 March, 
1953, were likewise being withdrawn (87). Japan and Korea issued a Memorandum of 
Understanding regarding Measures on Koreans detained in Japan and on Japanese 
Fishermen detained in Korea, on 31 December, 1957. Both sides thereby agreed to release 
certain nationals of the other side who had been held in "Alien Detention" camps. Korea 
agreed to resume overall talks with Japan from 1 March, 1958.
South Korea agreed that the same five key issues would be discussed in the new round of 
talks as had been discussed in the previous three Korea-Japan Conferences. These issues 
included discussion of basic relations; in order to clarify, and confirm, that "the treaties 
and agreements concluded in and before 1910 are null and void " and that furthermore 
"respect for non-intervention in sovereign rights" would henceforth be observed. Korea 
insisted that Japan formally admit that all international treaties of the protectorate and 
colonial period were repudiated by Japan. This would further confirm the sovereign 
independent status of Korea. Other issues to be discussed included the status of Koreans 
resident in Japan, including the property claims of Korean residents and repatriation of 
Koreans to the ROK. The issue of a "Peace Line" to demark the fishery zones of Korea and 
Japan was on the agenda, and the conclusion of a formal fishery agreement. (88)
Korea hoped that at the re-newed talks Japan would agree to return "Korean art treasures, 
ancient books, the gold reserve, shipping tonnage, and other properties taken from this 
country." In the event, however, the ROK was greatly disappointed by Japan's response, 
which in the ROK government's view "seemed to reflect some idea that Korea wronged 
Japan instead of the reverse." (89) Rhee complained of Japan's "insincerity", referring 
specifically to Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi. Rhee warned that "the talks themselves are 
jeopardized by Japan's threats to send Koreans into Communist slavery, and to do so 
unilaterally, and in violation of agreements previously made with us." This was a reference 
to Japan's plan to repatriate some 100,000 Korean residents to the DPRK. This was within 
the legal rights of Japan but was total anathema to the ROK government, locked as it was 
in a struggle for legitimacy with the DPRK. Thus repatriating any Koreans to the "illegal"
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regime in the north could be interpreted as an act hostile to the ROK.
Unfortunately for the Rhee government, however, a majority of Korean residents in Japan 
actually preferred repatriation to the DPRK over the ROK. Rhee hoped that Japan would 
cooperate with his government on this issue in order to reduce the embarrassment of such a 
lopsided exodus. On the whole, Rhee concluded that "We are compelled to say, regretfully, 
that as yet there are too many reasons for distrust of Japan and not enough reason for 
trust." (90)
Japan did attempt, however, to overcome the obstacle of the repatriation issue. On 4 
March, 1959, Prime Minister Kishi clarified and explained Japan's position on the 
repatriation issue to ROK Foreign Minister Chung W. Cho. Japan defended its policy on 
the basis of adherence to the principle of freedom to choose one's place of residence, 
therefore it would not support forcible repatriation to the ROK of residents in Japan 
against their will. However, Japan assured the ROK that "The Japanese Government's 
decision does not mean any change whatsoever in its established policy of non-recognition 
and non-assistance toward north Korea." (91)
In nearly a decade of abortive talks with Japan the ROK achieved no progress toward 
reinforcing its own international position through closer links with a resurgent, democratic 
Japan. Pressure from the United States was perhaps alone responsible for the re-convening 
of the stalled talks on several occassions in the 1950s. In the same manner that Rhee 
"complied" with US insistence, but simply went through the motions of talking with Japan, 
without signing a new treaty on basic relations. His ability to assert his own policies was 
circumscribed by American influence over his government, but not dictated by it.
V. ROK Adjustment to International Realities
By the end of the Rhee era in 1960, the ROK was not much stronger either economically, 
politically, or diplomatically than it had been a decade before. The Rhee regime was 
marked by increasing corruption and autocratic tendencies that continued to alienate it 
even from many Western governments. It relied excessively on the United States for 
economic assistance. UNKRA (United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency) played a 
modest economic role in Korea after the war. This multilateral assistance was more 
symbolic than substantive, in comparison to the vast sums the US provided in bilateral 
assistance, some two billion US dollars in economic assistance alone. (92) The ROK opted 
for an economic policy of import-substitution, with virtually nil exports. Domestic 
consumption was very heavily subsidised by US aid flows, while government administration 
was inefficient and corrupt. The one area where some progress was made was in the 
construction of basic infrastructure and the provision of mass education. The ROK
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economy was only linked to the international economy through inflows of aid funds and was 
therefore entirely uncompetitive, safe behind its protectionist barriers.
In the last years of the Rhee regime, 1958-1960, policy began to take a new direction. Three 
changes occurred which prompted the ROK out of its complacency. First, the United States 
made a decision to drastically reduce grant aid to the ROK, preferring to shift assistance to 
loans. Thus the ROK's fundamental economic policies were affected. (93) It was also at this 
time that the Rhee government, under heavy US pressure for more effficient economic 
management, began to move toward indicative economic planning, and accepted the 
Nathan Consultancy on economic planning. A process was being set in motion that would 
totally transform the Korean economic system in the next few years. (94)
Secondly, the pace of anti-colonialism and decolonisation was quickening in the 
international system. The membership of the UNGA was soon affected by this trend. The 
US and its close allies no longer had an automatic majority in the UNGA. The ROK 
government, even under Rhee, eventually recognised the implications of this trend and 
began active diplomatic outreach to Third World governments. However, this was limited 
in scope, particularly because of the strict anti-communism of the Rhee regime.
The third change was in the balance of power on the Korean peninsula itself. While the 
ROK had a fairly stagnant and still agricultural economy, the DPRK had successfully 
re-industrialised. By 1960 the DPRK had strengthened itself to a degree that was potentially 
dangerous to ROK national security, given the weak state of the ROK economy, its 
enormous aid dependency, and its endemic political instability. North Korea was politically 
stable and militarily powerful. The Kim II Sung faction had completed the process of 
eliminating all rivals to power. The withdrawal of Chinese forces from the DPRK in late 
1958 meant there was no occupying force to act as a constraint on DPRK adventurism.
Nevertheless, the balance of forces in the UNGA remained overwhelmingly in favour of the 
ROK as late as 1958 and 1959. When the PRC announced the final withdrawal of its forces 
from the DPRK, Great Britain engaged in a diplomatic correspondence with the PRC on 
behalf of all those countries that had contributed forces to the UNC in Korea. The UNC 
nations declined to accept that all UNC forces should withdraw from South Korea. The 
response of the UNC was encapsulated in a resolution of the UNGA on 14 November, 1958, 
passed by an overwhelming vote of 54 to 9. The resolution reafirmed the UNGA resolutions 
concerning Korea of 14 November, 1947, 12 December 1948, 21 October 1949, 7 October 
1950,11 January 1954,29 November 1955,11 January 1957, and 29 November 1957. (95)
The new resolution of 14 November, 1958 spoke directly on behalf of the UNC nations.
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Noting the corresspondence on their behalf by Great Britain with the "communist 
authorities", it reiterated that the UNC nations wished to see "a genuine settlement of the 
Korean question in accordance with United Nations resolutions" and were "prepared to 
withdraw their forces from Korea when the conditions for a lasting settlement laid down by 
the General Assembly have been fulfilled." They argued that the greater part of UNC 
forces had already been withdrawn from Korea, therefore they welcomed the decision by 
China to withdraw its forces from North Korea.
The importance of the resolution is that it specifically called to the attention of the 
communist authorities the determination of the UN "to bring about by peaceful means 
establishment of a unified independent and democratic Korea under a representative form 
of government, and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area." It 
called upon the communist authorities to accept the UN's objectives in Korea and to 
achieve unification "based on the fundamental principles for unification set forth by the 
nations participating on behalf of the United Nations in the Korean Political Conference 
held at Geneva in 1954." (96)
It is clear from this resolution that the international status of the two Koreas had not 
changed from 1954 to 1958. Little progress had been made to advance the debate in the 
UNGA, given the exclusive participation of the ROK and the exclusion of the DPRK. The 
UNC group was still a coherent voice and still commanded overwhelming support in the 
UNGA. In this sense, the ROK still maintained clear advantages over the DPRK.
VI. Conclusion
South Korea entered the post Korean war period as an extremely dependent regime. 
Rather than actively seeking to reduce this dependency, the Rhee regime converted it into 
the cornerstone of all policy, both domestic and foreign. This dependency therefore 
"distorted" South Korean policy in a number of important ways. First it produced an 
extremely skewed domestic economic structure, reliant on foreign financed imports and 
having no internationally competitive exports. Second, it produced a foreign policy that was 
self-damaging precisely because of its anti-communist zealotry. The opportunities lost were 
of several types, e.g. the self-isolation from much of the emerging Third World and the 
rejection of re-integration with an expanding Japanese economy.
The conclusion to be drawn from this period is that extreme dependency carried with it 
significant penalties for the ROK in terms of its long term development. Rhee squandered 
initial advantages in the competition with North Korea and allowed the ROK to lag behind 
while its rival developed dynamic new policies designed for a rapidly changing 
international environment. The ROK developed regime rigidities that were a mirror of
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international Cold War ideology. This policy undermined ROK legitimacy with a growing 
number of emerging Third World and socialist regimes and to some extent damaged its 
standing even in Western diplomatic circles. Domestically, the effect of these policies 
constituted a fetter on dynamic modernisation and economic development.
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Chapter Four: DPRK Diplomacy 1960-1975: The Success of Third World Solidarity
I. Introduction
North Korea's foreign policy was most successful in the Third World. This can be explained 
by the correspondence between its policies and international trends such as anti­
colonialism, anti-imperialism, national liberation, and non-alignment. The peak in 
international support for the DPRK coincided almost exactly with the peak of the Third 
World solidarity movements in the mid 1970s.
The principal goal of DPRK diplomacy was to gain support for the withdrawal of US forces 
from South Korea. The United States was presented as the primary obstacle to peaceful 
reunification and the common enemy of all Third World forces seeking real independence. 
US military presence in South Korea was portrayed as a colonial occupation via a puppet 
regime, to be used as a base for aggression against other Asian peoples.
Several factors explain the effectiveness of DPRK diplomacy in this period. First and 
foremost is the consistent line on Third World independence: i.e. a militant anti-colonial 
and anti-imperialist line. Thus, the DPRK was able to identify its vital interests with other 
Third World movements. In particular cases it was able to identify the Korean situation 
with other "divided nations" or those with territorial disputes, e.g. Vietnam, China, Yemen, 
Congo, Somalia, Palestine, Indonesia, Mauritania, and Cuba; or major conflicts such as the 
Vietnam and Indochina wars, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the liberation wars of Africa.
II. Initiation of Active Third World Diplomacy
There are four principal reasons why the DPRK launched an active diplomacy in the Third 
World in the early 1960s. First, the period of domestic reconstruction was successfully 
completed. A strong industrial and political base enabled the DPRK to redirect resources to 
diplomacy. Secondly, North Korea's room for manoeuvre was enhanced by the Sino-Soviet 
split, and the withdrawal of Chinese troops in 1958. The "second revolution", Juche, and 
the Kapsan faction's control of the KWP enabled Kim II Sung to launch and sustain an 
independent foreign policy. (1)
Thirdly, the emergence of new organisations and movements such as AAPSO, the Non- 
aligned Movement (NAM), the Tricontinental Solidarity Conference, the Afro-Asian 
conferences, the "New Emerging Forces", and many national liberation movements 
provided a ready forum in which to operate, and the DPRK tended to endorse them all. The 
success of many national liberation movements changed the composition of international 
organisations. The political composition of the UNGA was altered, with direct effects on the 
UN debate on the Korean Question.
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Fourthly, the DPRK had to respond to changes in South Korea. The military coup in the 
South in May, 1961, closed the door to "people to people" diplomacy on the Korean 
peninsula. The new military regime in the South simultaneously launched an active Third 
World diplomacy. North Korea could not afford to default to the South in the competition 
to win over the regimes of the Third World.
North Korea had good credentials as a post-colonial government that had experienced a 
war of liberation from a colonial power, (Japan), and then a war of resistance against a 
Western great power,(US). Its industrial reconstruction was a marvel in its time, and 
admired. It was an avid advocate of independence and had no foreign bases on its soil. It 
was an adamant opponent of any form of colonial domination or imperialist exploitation of 
the Third World. Its line was compatible with almost any form of Third World solidarity 
and it did not take a doctrinaire position in Third World leadership contests. Its basic 
demands for US withdrawal and no foreign interference in Korean reunification wcjre 
broadly acceptable to the spirit of the Third World movement.
During the decade of the 1960s the DPRK established full diplomatic relations with over 
twenty states, the majority of which were African and Middle Eastern. The launching of the 
active Third World policy coincided with the sudden emergence of many newly 
independent states, particularly African (in 1961), and the founding of the Non-aligned 
Movement in Belgrade in the same year, led by India, Egypt, and Yugoslavia.
This Third World diplomacy was directly aimed at the UN’s annual Korea debate. The UN 
became a new target of DPRK proposals on reunification. This was partly a response to the 
ROK's reunification policy under Park Chung Hee, which endorsed UN supervised all- 
Korea elections on the principle of proportional representation between North and South. 
In response, North Korea devised a campaign calling for: DPRK participation in the UNGA 
Korea debate, without preconditions; dissolution of UNCURK and the UNC; withdrawal of 
all foreign forces from Korea; and, paradoxically, an end to the UN debate on the Korean 
Question.
By the end of the 1950s the DPRK had already established a good base for expanding 
economic and political relations. Early contacts with Third World regimes focused on trade 
issues and opening consular or diplomatic relations. Indonesia agreed to open consular 
relations with the DPRK during a visit by DPRK Vice Premier and Trade Minister Lee Ju- 
yun, 4-17 June, 1961. In the same tour, India agreed to allow the DPRK to open a trade 
office after talks between Lee and Nehru. Burma agreed to open consular and trade 
relations; Burma to export raw materials including cotton, rubber, wood, rice, and
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minerals, in exchange for North Korean machinery, tools, chemicals, and cement. (2)
The DPRK joined AAPSO in 1957, but was not very active in Africa before the 1960s. 
Africa quickly emerged as a key region, given its impact on the UNGA debate. Initially, the 
DPRK targeted radical nationalist and socialist orientated regimes and movements. Among 
the first to be approached was Mali, which signed an agreement on trade and cultural 
relations in July, 1961, after talks with President Keita. On 30 September, 1961, Mali and 
the DPRK announced their decision to establish full diplomatic relations. A similar 
agreement on trade was signed in June, 1961 with Guinea after talks with President Sekou 
Toure. Guinea was important because it had opted out of the French Community, unlike 
most other Francophone African governments. Guinea agreed to export raw materials such 
as coffee, coconut, pineapple, perfume and iron ore in return for North Korean textiles, 
cement, fish and canned goods. (3) The same tour was received by President Kwame 
Nkrumah in Ghana, one of the most prominent anti-imperialist and Pan-Africanist leaders.
In the Middle East, DPRK delegations likewise focused initially on radical nationalist 
regimes. Nasser agreed that the United Arab Republic and the DPRK would establish 
consular relations during a DPRK visit from 22 July - 1 August, 1961. Nasser pointedly 
thanked the DPRK for its support during the Suez crisis in 1956. A trade agreement was 
also signed with the Yemen Arab Republic in September, 1961, and an agreement on 
economic and cultural cooperation was reached with Morocco, even though it was a 
conservative regime. The DPRK exchanged visiting delegations with Iraq and Algeria.
In fact, the DPRK sent 17 government delegations abroad in 1961, and received 28 foreign 
delegations. Some 78 new agreements were signed. The DPRK joined six international 
organisations, mostly of a scientific or cultural nature. Party to Party relations were also 
robust, including communist parties from Ceylon, China, Cuba, Indonesia, Malaya, Syria, 
Venezuela, and Vietnam. In addition, Pyongyang hosted an international conference of 
labour organisations from Asia, Africa and Latin America in May, 1962.
DPRK trade and goodwill missions soon broadened their scope. In 1962 they travelling to 
Algeria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Cuba, Iraq, Nepal, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, and Tunisia, among 
others. Consular relations were opened with India, and Cambodia in 1962, both neutralist 
governments. A reciprocal opening of trade offices was agreed with Ceylon, Togo, and 
Somalia. The DPRK also signed new trade or other agreements with Guinea, Mali, the 
UAR, India, Cuba, Vietnam, and Ceylon.
Nevertheless, the DPRK had full diplomatic relations with only a few Third World 
partners, including Algeria, Cuba, Guinea, Mali, and North Vietnam, all radical nationalist
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or socialist regimes. By 1963 this was already increasing, as full ambassadorial relations 
were established with Uganda (2 March), the Yemen Arab Republic (9 March), the United 
Arab Republic (24 August), and Indonesia (16 April). A trade office was opened in Uruguay 
in May, 1963, and Bolivia sent a goodwill delegation to the DPRK, indicating modest 
progress with Latin America. In Africa, the DPRK approached Kenya for the first time in 
1963, reinforcing its interest in regimes outside the radical circle. New trade agreements 
were signed with Mali, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Ceylon. In all, over fifty Afro-Asian 
delegations visited the DPRK in 1963 alone. The DPRK participated in AAPSO events and 
thereby further expanded its range of contacts.
By the time of the 15th anniversary celebrations of the founding of the DPRK, delegations 
from 22 countries were in attendance, including such leading Afro-Asian governments as 
Indonesia, Cuba, Guinea, Mali, Algeria, UAR, Yemen Arab Republic, Cambodia, Iraq, and 
Ghana. In 1964, the DPRK joined ten international organisations, most scientific or 
sporting. A goodwill mission to Africa expanded contacts to include Senegal, Niger, and 
Zanzibar.
The evidence reviewed above suggests that the Third World diplomacy was already a 
success by 1964. Relations were consolidated or elevated to a higher level. For example, 
Kim II Sung played host that year to state visits by President Sukarno of Indonesia and 
President Keita of Mali, key contacts in their respective regions. Such visits by prominent 
Afro-Asian heads of state elevated the prestige of the DPRK, and set a precedent for many 
such summits that followed.
The Joint Communiques and speeches of these two leaders (Sukarno and Keita) during 
their respective visits illustrate the themes of solidarity. Kim II Sung emphasised the 
"common past, ideals, and enemy" between Mali and North Korea and praised Keita for 
establishing a strong independent country. (4) Keita endorsed the DPRK's reunification 
policy. They jointly demanded withdrawal of all foreign military forces and bases from 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and condemned colonialism and imperialism. They 
explicitly stressed the importance of cooperation and solidarity among the new Afro-Asian 
states as a means of strengthening their independence and self-reliant economies. (5)
The joint statements during Sukarno's visit in November, 1964, called for withdrawal of all 
foreign military forces from Asia and invoked the "spirit of Bandung." Kim and Sukarno 
hailed their summit as a contribution to Afro-Asian and Latin American solidarity. The 
DPRK was careful not only to back Indonesia against Malaysia in its territorial dispute (6) 
but also to endorse Sukarno's proposals for a Conference of Newly Emerging Powers. (7)
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Another significant diplomatic event in 1964 is evidence for the early success of Third 
World diplomacy. The Asian Economic Conference held in Pyongyang, was attended by 
delegations from 34 countries: 13 from Asia, 19 from Africa, and 2 from Oceania. Kim II 
Sung took the opportunity to promote North Korea's model, declaring that all the liberated 
countries should establish a self-reliant economy and struggle against imperialism - old and 
new (neo). He said that the cooperation and solidarity of Asian, African and Latin 
American countries could break down imperialist attempts at intervention and he 
reaffirmed the DPRK's support for liberation and anti-imperialist struggles. (8) The final 
declaration of the Asian Economic Conference endorsed independent and self-reliant 
national economies. Kim II Sung had good timing, since 1964 was also the year UNCTAD 
took up the banner of advancing Third World interests in the international trading system.
At this critical juncture, DPRK relations with key Afro-Asian allies were consolidated, 
including the UAR, Algeria, Indonesia, Mali, Guinea, Cambodia, Congo (Brazzaville) and 
Mauritania. Full diplomatic relations were established with five Afro-Asian states: 
Indonesia ( 16 April), Mauritania (1 1  November), Cambodia ( 20 December), Congo 
(Brazzaville) (24 December), and Ghana (28 December). Statements from Joint 
Communiques with these governments, summarised below, illustrate the successful use of 
Third World solidarity:
President Nasser and Choi, Yong-gun, head of the DPRK's delegation to Egypt, exchanged 
endorsements of non-alignment, Korea's reunification policies, the liberation struggles of 
Africa, and condemned Western use of Israel for interference in Arab affairs. (9) With 
Algeria's leader, Ben Bella, the DPRK endorsed OAU and NAM decisions on maintaining 
present borders in Africa, rather than pursuit of radical revision of political geography as 
demanded by some Pan-Africanists. The DPRK-Algerian solidarity statements extended to 
liberation struggles in Africa, Indochina, and even Cuba, while condemning Israeli attacks 
on Syria. In joint statements with President Keita in Mali, the DPRK condemned Belgian 
intervention in Stanleyville, endorsed African liberation movements, Indonesia's struggle 
and the North Kalimantan peoples' liberation movement. Sekou Toure's statements 
(Guinea) were similar. (10) Choi and Prince Sihanouk found common ground in opposition 
to the US and expansion of the war in Indochina, support for Cambodia's neutrality, and 
the tri-continental struggle. (11)
A major diplomatic landmark in the competition with South Korea occurred in 1964. Two 
states that had previously had diplomatic relations with the ROK only agreed to establish 
relations with North Korea. First, the Congo (Brazzaville), after the August 1963 
revolution, and under the leadership of Massamba-Debat, decided to open diplomatic 
relations with Pyongyang. When it did so the ROK invoked the Hallstein Doctrine (i.e. the
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doctrine of no relations with any state having relations with North Korea). This was 
repeated when Mauritania established diplomatic relations with the DPRK. Thus the 
DPRK had made a net gain of two supporters at the ROK's expense. This was an extremely 
important precedent. The shift in allegiance reflected the importance of Third World 
solidarity. For instance, Mauritania and the DPRK issued a Joint Communique on 4 
November, 1964, calling for withdrawal of all foreign military forces from Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America and endorsing the second Afro-Asian conference. (12)
The culminating achievement of the early 1960s was Kim II Sung's official state visit to 
Indonesia, 10-15 April, 1965, and his summit with Sukarno, to celebrate the tenth 
anniversary of the Bandung conference. The visit was Kim U Sung's first to a non­
communist Afro-Asian country. It was officially described in the DPRK as being due to 
Sukarno's leading role in the Afro-Asian and anti-colonial movements of the time. (13)
Kim II Sung made his debut in Third World summitry by delivering a speech on North 
Korean socialist construction, stressing the self-reliant national economy. Sukarno called 
for all foreign troops to leave Korea and endorsed reunification free from foreign 
interference. (14) Kim II Sung endorsed Sukarno's decision to withdraw Indonesia from the 
UN, depicted as a tool of imperialists for maintaining the old international order.(15) They 
jointly called for a strengthened anti-imperialist movement among the tri-continental 
forces.
III. The DPRK and Third World Conflicts:The Vietnam War Era
The DPRK made use of its anti-imperialist credentials in the Third World. In the period 
1960-1975 international conditions were particularly ripe for "declaratory solidarity", 
given the number of conflicts in the Third World, especially Indochina.
For instance, in mid-February, 1961 the DPRK protested the assassination of Patrice 
Lumumba in the newly independent Congo, accusing Belgian colonialists, Congolese 
traitors, the US, and UN Secretary General Dag Hammerskjold of complicity in the crime. 
(16) Another example is Cuba. The DPRK supported the Cuban struggle against the US, 
especially in the wake of the aborted Bay of Pigs invasion. Cuba was regarded as a "divided 
nation" because of the US naval base at Guantanamo Bay, therefore sharing a common 
interest in expelling US forces. In a Joint Communique in August, 1961, Cuba and the 
DPRK supported the right of Vietnam and Laos to resolve their unification issues free from 
foreign interference, and the struggle of the tri-continental solidarity movement against 
colonialism and imperialism. (17) In October, 1962 the DPRK condemned the US military 
blockade of Cuba and later sent material aid, including tractors, medicine, rice and 
concrete mixers, in November, 1963.
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The DPRK supported India when it annexed Goa from Portuguese colonial control in 1961. 
However, during the Sino-Indian border conflict, the DPRK essentially chose China. The 
DPRK issued a statement in November, 1962 characterising the Sino-Indian border conflict 
as one arising from the heritage of imperialism in India, but condemned India for its 
actions, calling upon it to accept China's proposals. (18)
There was no such ambiguity on the Vietnam and Indochina conflicts. As early as April, 
1961, the DPRK Foreign Ministry began to accuse the US of expanding its intervention in 
Vietnam. (19) The DPRK identified its own situation very closely with that of Vietnam and 
made the conflict a priority. Analogies between the Korean and Vietnam Question were 
directly exploited to strengthen DPRK diplomacy.
Ho Chi Minh paid a state visit to the DPRK from 16-22 June, 1961. In their Joint 
Communique, Ho and Kim II Sung demanded US troop withdrawal from all of Asia, 
depicting the US as the primary obstacle to reunification of China, Vietnam, and Korea. 
They emphasised the importance of cooperation among Asian, African and Latin American 
peoples in the fight for peace, national independence, and social development. (20) Later, in 
March, 1962, the DPRK endorsed a North Vietnamese statement condemning the US 
invasion of South Vietnam. (21)
With the coming Vietnam conflict in view, and in response to the military coup in South 
Korea, North Korea launched an internal debate on military policy. The DPRK adopted a 
more militant confrontational stance vis a vis Seoul and Washington. The Kapsan faction, 
having consolidated control at the Fourth KWP conference in 1961, pressed for greater 
military expenditure. The policy of "equal emphasis" on economic and military 
development was approved in 1962. This policy included increased material assistance for 
other struggles, particularly that of the Vietnamese. Accordingly, in December, 1963, the 
DPRK established a committee to support the South Vietnamese struggle. However, the 
policy of equal emphasis put ever greater strain on North Korea's economic development. 
(22)
The year 1965 was a definite turning point in North-South competition. When the ROK 
normalised relations with Japan in 1965, signing what North Korea considered to be a 
"separate peace", this raised fears in Pyongyang of resurgent Japanese economic and 
political influence on the Korean peninsula. With Japanese assistance, South Korea began a 
transition to an export-oriented, rapid growth economy, thus better able to compete with 
industrialised North Korea. South Korean intervention in the Vietnam War provoked the 
DPRK.
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Another significant factor causing a shift in policy was the diplomatic setback to the DPRK 
resulting from the 1965 coup in Indonesia, the overthrow of Sukarno and the liquidation of 
the PKI. The DPRK responded to this crisis by shifting more resources to diplomatic 
activity in Africa and the Middle East, and exploiting conflicts such as the Arab-Israeli 
wars and African liberation struggles.
The DPRK launched a worldwide propaganda offensive against the ROK as a result of its 
combat involvement in South Vietnam. The DPRK successfully exploited the mood of the 
Third World against US intervention in Vietnam by making analogies to the Korean 
situation. The result was a dramatic shift in the mood of the UNGA, where the debate on 
the Korean Question entered a new phase marked by rapid DPRK advances.
The intensification of US military intervention in Vietnam and despatch of ROK combat 
divisions to South Vietnam in 1965 precipitated renewed debate in Pyongyang on defense 
policy. On the model of the Vietnamese conflict, Kim U Sungists advocated a "war of 
national liberation" to be waged from South Korea via a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary 
party and national front.
This debate culminated in the special KWP Representatives Conference in October, 1966. 
The seven year plan had to be extended to ten years and defense spending officially 
increased to one third of the national budget. (23) At the same time, the DPRK adopted the 
"Three Revolutions" policy: revolution in the North, revolution in South Korea, and world 
revolution, regarded as mutually interdependent. The socialist base in the North would be 
militarily and politically strengthened. Third World diplomacy would be aimed at 
facilitating conditions for the completion of the revolution in the South. Strengthening the 
forces of world revolution would weaken the US. (24)
Kim II Sung viewed material support for the Vietnamese struggle in the context of the three 
revolutions strategy. He told an international solidarity committee in June, 1965 that "...the 
heroic war of resistance of the Vietnamese people against the US imperialists is... a sacred 
struggle which contributes to the common cause of all the progressive peoples of the 
world... The Korean people, the Asian, African, and Latin American peoples, and all the 
progressive peoples of the world have the due right and obligation to support the just 
struggle of the Vietnamese people..." (25)
The DPRK sent material aid to Hanoi in 1965, including textiles, medicines and daily 
necessities to use in the struggle in South Vietnam. This support was acknowledged by the 
South Vietnamese National Liberation Front (SVNLF), whose leader Nguyen Huu Tho
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pledged to "side with the brotherly Korean people in the struggle against the US imperialist 
aggressors and the Pak Chung Hi clique..." (26) In June, 1965 the North Korean Supreme 
Peoples Assembly (SPA) approved a pledge to "give the Vietnamese people all forms of 
assistance, moral and material, including arms and would take when requested by the 
South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, actions to send volunteers to South 
Vietnam." (27)
On 8 July, 1965, the DPRK declared it would "supply arms and equipment to SVNFL" and 
would "equip as many men of the South Vietnamese liberation armed forces as the 
reinforcing South Korean troops". Kim II Sung telegrammed Nguyen Huu Tho directly 
after South Korea announced despatch of a whole combat division to South Vietnam, 
pledging to "give to the end every possible support." (28) On 17 January, 1966 the DPRK 
and DRV signed the "Korea-Vietnam Economic Agreement on Free Aid" providing free 
material assistance to Vietnam. Such an agreement was renewed every year during this 
period.
Kim II Sung pressed the Vietnamese to accept North Korean combat forces. For instance, 
Premier Kim II Sung cabled Ho Chi Minh on 21 July, 1966 to pledge willingness "to give 
the Vietnamese people more active support in all possible ways including the dispatch of 
volunteers..." When the US submitted the Vietnamese Question to the UN Security Council, 
the DPRK denounced this act as "illegal" and claimed that "The UN has no right 
whatsoever to interfere in the Vietnam Question." (29) Kim II Sung defended the extension 
of the equal emphasis policy by arguing that this was necessary "to cope with the enemy's 
aggressive manoeuvres." (30)
In October, 1966, Kim U Sung characterised the international situation as "a bitter 
struggle...between socialism and imperialism, between the forces of revolution and the 
forces of counter-revolution". He emphasised the world-wide growth of socialist forces and 
national liberation movements, which had "markedly weakened the forces of imperialism." 
Therefore, he concluded that "Victory of socialism and downfall of imperialism are the 
main trend of our times that no force can check." (31)
Echoing Che Guevara, Kim U Sung concluded that "In the present situation, the US 
imperialists should be dealt blows and their forces dispersed to the maximum in all parts 
and on every front in the world - in Asia and Europe, Africa and Latin America." He called 
on all socialist countries to pool their strength to aid the Vietnamese and the Cuban 
revolution. (32)
North Korea's confrontational stance was not mere rhetoric. For example, a US Guard
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Boat was sunk off the DPRK coast on 19 January, 1967. The US estimated that there were 
25-50 DPRK combat pilots in Vietnam in 1968. (33) The Tet offensive in January 1968 was 
praised by Kim U Sung as a "fatal blow" to the US and South Vietnam. (34) A special 
commando unit was sent to Seoul on 21-22 January, 1968, attempting to assassinate 
President Park Chung Hee. The DPRK seized the USS Pueblo, a naval intelligence vessel, 
and its entire crew on 23 January, 1968.
The DPRK greatly stepped up the infiltration of commando units into the South on 
missions intended to foment communist partisan uprisings, reported in Northern media as 
"spontaneous" guerrilla activity. Pyongyang claimed that a "Peoples Committees" and a 
"revolutionary party" had been establsihed in South Korea. At the 20th anniversary 
celebrations of the DPRK in 1968, Kim II Sung called openly for armed struggle in South 
Korea. Reeling from Tet and fearing a second war in Asia, the US secretly negotiated with 
the DPRK for release of the Pueblo's crew and accepted the DPRK's demand for an 
apology on the affair.
The danger of war in Korea persisted into 1969. On 15 April, 1969 the DPRK shot down a 
US reconnaissance plane and on 17 August a US helicopter. In June, 1969, the DPRK 
provocatively established diplomatic relations with the newly proclaimed "Provisional 
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam."
III. B. Anti-ROK Propaganda
The DPRK took full advantage of the general unpopularity of the Vietnam war to launch an 
effective anti-ROK propaganda campaign. South Korea's decision to despatch combat 
troops to South Vietnam on 4 June, 1965, was denounced from the outset and presented as 
the act of a pathetic puppet of US imperialism. Every subsequent escalation by the ROK 
was denounced.
Not only was Park Chung Hee criticised for fighting in Vietnam but was also on a range of 
other Third World conflicts. For example, the ROK was condemned for establishing 
diplomatic relations with Israel and South Africa, for allegedly offering to send 
"volunteers" to Malaysia in its conflict with Indonesia, and for opposing Indonesian control 
of West Irian.
The DPRK ridiculed President Park's new outreach policy to Africa and Asia, painting 
Seoul as an "enemy" of the African people. In 1966 the DPRK ridiculed an ROK special 
mission to the Middle East and Africa by decrying Seoul's "unbearable mockery and 
contempt for neutral nations in Asia and Africa", resulting from ROK allegiance to the US. 
ROK "goodwill" diplomacy toward neutral Afro-Asian states and Latin America was 
condemned as a cynical attempt at "softening up the neutral nations opposition to the Seoul
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regime for its troop dispatch to South Vietnam, persuading them into establishing friendly 
relations with South Korea, and then winning their support at the 21st UN General 
Assembly." (35) Similarly, the DPRK lambasted ROK plans to send a goodwill mission to 
11 states in Africa in 1967, explicitly targeted because they had not voted in favour of the 
ROK in the 21st UNGA session. This was dubbed "Soap and Match diplomacy", and ROK 
policy was depicted as patronising and racist.
DPRK propaganda specifically exploited the ROK's anti-communist policy. South Korea's 
efforts to organise a pan-Asian collective security organisation were especially condemned. 
The "South East Asian Foreign Ministers Conference", better known as ASP AC, (discussed 
in the next chapter) was presented as evidence of the ROK's aggressive and reactionary 
character. ASPAC was denounced as a "challenge to Asian, African, and Latin American 
peoples...who are fighting for liberation, national independence, peace, and social 
progress." This was effective. For example, the Tricontinental Peoples Solidarity 
Organisation accepted this line and condemned ASPAC. (36)
DPRK propaganda was supported by efforts to translate opposition to the Vietnam war 
into concrete demonstrations of criticism of the ROK. For instance, on 16 June, 1965 a 
meeting of liberation movements in Cairo issued a statement appealing to the Foreign 
Ministers of the second Afro-Asian conference to prevent the admission of the "puppet 
regimes of South Korea, Tshombe, Israel, Malaysia and Saigon" into the Afro-Asian 
conference. South Korea came first on the list of "enemies who have been entrusted by the 
imperialists with the infamous task of sabotaging Afro-Asian solidarity from within our 
ranks." (37) Later, SWAPO's leader Sam Nujoma visited Pyongyang (summer, 1965) and 
referred to SWAPO-DPRK relations as a symbol of the "indestructible friendship of Afro- 
Asian peoples" in the face of imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism.
The AAPSO secretariat called for US troop withdrawal from South Korea on 24 June, 
1965. A particular triumph for the DPRK was AAPSO's decision in 1965 to declare August 
the annual "month of struggle for withdrawal of US troops from South Korea", observed 
annually for the next several years. Similarly, the Havana Tricontinental Solidarity 
Conference in January, 1966, passed a resolution on Korea denouncing US occupation and 
demanding its withdrawal. It designated 25 June-25 July the "month of solidarity with the 
Korean people" and condemned the ROK-Japan treaty, associated with the intervention in 
Vietnam. The AAPSO permanent secretariat issued a demand for US withdrawal from 
South Korea on 25 June, 1966. Later in 1966 both AAPSO and the Tricontinental Solidarity 
Organisation condemned the US for alleged provocations intended to start a new war in 
Korea.
103
Liberation movements in Africa were particularly supportive of the DPRK, reciprocating 
its consistent support for them. For instance, on 24 June, 1966, African liberation 
movements meeting in Cairo again issued a joint demand for US withdrawal from Korea. 
(38)
Kim II Sung felt the Tricontinental organisation in Havana was important enough to merit 
a theoretical piece in the first issue of its journal. Kim II Sung's treatise, published on 12 
August, 1967, was entitled "Let Us Intensify the Anti-Imperialist, Anti-US Struggle", in 
which he attacked the idea of putting peaceful relations with the Western powers before the 
needs of the struggle against colonialism and imperialism in the Third World.
The Tricontinental organisation called a week of international solidarity for national 
liberation struggles in 1968. Kim U Sung took the opportunity to emphasise the 
interrelatedness of the Third World's anti-colonial struggle and the struggle of the 
international working class for socialism, which according to Kim would "carry 
imperialism to its grave." (39)
Before his fall from power, Sukarno declared that Indonesia did not recognise the ROK nor 
the ROK-Japan treaty. Sukarno depicted the Korean war as a turning point in history: 
"since then there has been no holding back the decline of the imperialists. The Asian, 
African, and Latin American people take the Korean peoples' heroism as an example...the 
victory of the Korean people indeed constituted one of the bases for the success of the first 
Asian-African Conference." (40)
On the 8th anniversary of the death of Che Guevara, Kim II Sung again published a major 
treatise on world revolution in "Tricontinental", based in Havana. In Kim's analysis it was 
a period in which proletarian regimes that had seized power were still not free from 
imperialist aggression and attempts to restore capitalism. The success of each revolution, 
therefore, depended on the support of "other detachments of the world socialist 
revolution." He advocated a grand strategy in which "revolutions should take place 
consecutively in the majority of countries of the world, in several adjacent countries at the 
least, to replace imperialist encirclement with socialist encirclement." (41)
Nevertheless, the relatively non-dogmatic approach of North Korea's policy on Third 
World solidarity is illustrated in Kim II Sung's statement that: "In Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America there are socialist and neutral countries, big and small countries. All of these 
countries, except the puppet regime of the imperialists and their satellite states, constitute 
anti-imperialist anti-US forces. Despite the differences of state socio-political systems, 
political views, and religious beliefs, the peoples of the countries in these areas, as the
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oppressed nations who were suppressed and exploited by the imperialists and colonialists, 
have the common goal and aspiration to achieve national independence and national 
prosperity against imperialism and old and new colonialism. The differences of state socio­
political systems, political views or religious beliefs can by no means be an obstacle in the 
way of joint struggle against US imperialism." (42)
Kim II Sung's support for a broad coalition was in harmony with the main political trend of 
the time. The NAM had made the transition from a small group of radical and socialist 
regimes in 1961, to a broad inclusive membership by the late 1960s, with a platform 
resembling the Group of 77. Kim U Sung directly related the role of the Korean revolution 
to the greater aims of the Third World movement. He maintained that "The revolutionary 
struggle of the Korean people is developing amid the joint struggle of the peoples of the 
whole world for peace and democracy for national independence and socialism... Our 
people unite with all the forces opposing US imperialism... We regard it as an important 
factor in bringing victory to the Korean Revolution." (43)
As the Vietnam war expanded into an Indochinese war, North Korea maintained a 
consistent line in support of the revolutionary forces in the region, pledging to "do 
everything necessary to assist the fraternal Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian people," 
demanding US withdrawal from the entire region. (44)
After the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk and US invasion of Cambodia in 1970, the DPRK 
gave full support to Sihanouk's Royal Government of National Union as the "only 
legitimate government" of Cambodia. It severed relations with the new Lon Nol regime and 
provided military assistance to Sihanouk's National Liberation Peoples Armed Forces. 
Sihanouk began a series of trips to Pyongyang. Under Lon Nol, Cambodia established 
diplomatic relations with the ROK.
In October, 1971, President Ton Due Thang, First Secretary Le Duan and Premier Pham 
Van Dong headed the annual DRV delegation to the DPRK to sign the agreement on free 
aid for 1972. They fully backed the North Korean SPA's new 8 Point programme for 
reunification. (45)
The DPRK fully supported Egypt and Syria during the war with Israel in late 1973 and was 
delighted with the Arab oil embargo. North Korea viewed the breaking of diplomatic 
relations with Israel by 19 African states as a sign of the rising tide of anti-imperialist 
forces. When the ROK suddenly reversed its line on the Middle East, to a pro-Arab 
position, in December, 1973, the DPRK denounced this as a "ridiculous farce"; a device to 
extricate itself "from the economic crisis into which they have been driven deeper by the
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just oil embargo of the Arab peoples." (46)
The DPRK benefited by the new revolutionary wave in Africa and Indochina. For instance, 
the revolution in Portugal in 1974 and the victory of liberation forces in Guinea-Bissau, 
Mozambique and Angola brought new regimes into power, friendly to North Korea. The 
victory of the communist forces in Indochina in 1975 brought about a dramatic change in 
the regional balance of forces and caused even moderate regimes to consider establishing 
diplomatic relations with North Korea.
III. C. Widening Diplomacy Outside Asia
The fall of Sukarno and the escalation of the Indochina war contributed to a shift in DPRK 
policy, toward widening relations outside Asia. Pyongyang denounced the "outrages of 
Indonesian reactionary forces" and the death of tens of thousands in pogroms against the 
PKI. The DPRK saw these events as part of a US strategy in the region "to turn the 
Indonesian revolution to the right and undermine the anti-imperialist forces of Asia." (47) 
Nevertheless, the new government of Indonesia, led by General Suharto, did not break off 
diplomatic relations with the DPRK and even continued to be sympathetic in the UNGA; 
but it did establish consular relations with South Korea in 1967.
Summit diplomacy was important in image building, to present the DPRK as a model and 
enhance its prestige. For example, Massamba-Debat, leader of Congo(Brazzaville) visited 
Pyongyang in 1965 and was greeted by a crowd of 200,000 cheering North Koreans along 
the route from the airport. This "star treatment" of visiting Third World leaders was 
repeated many times over the years to follow. Congo(B)-DPRK solidarity stressed the 
mutual "divided nation" problem and opposition to US interference. Massamba-Debat 
accused the US of erecting a "curtain of hatred" between Brazzaville and Leopoldville. (48)
The Third World solidarity movement itself went through something of a watershed in 
1965. The holding of the GANEFO games In Pyongyang in August, initiated by Sukarno for 
the New Emerging Forces, was one of the last fruits of DPRK-Indonesian ties. The fall of 
Sukarno ended the role of the New Emerging Forces as an organising focus. In the autumn 
of 1965 there was a decision to postpone to second Afro-Asian conference originally 
planned for Algiers. The DPRK supported this postponement and advised waiting until a 
new consensus could be reached, reflecting its broad approach to Third World solidarity. 
Thereafter, the NAM and the G-77 eventually emerged as the key organisations.
The DPRK had particularly fertile conditions for a new focus on the Middle East, given 
pan-Arabism and the struggle with Israel. The strengthening of ties began with
106
consolidation of trade relations. For instance, in 1966 a trade mission visited Iraq, Kuwait, 
Jordan and the UAR, opening trade with the first three and signing a new accord with 
UAR. Another trade agreement was reached with the Syrian Arab Republic. The DPRK 
promoted an image of the ROK as pro-Israel and anti-Arab, whereas North Korea was a 
militant supporter of the Arab revolution and the struggle for Palestinian self- 
determination. The PLO was allowed diplomatic representation in Pyongyang in 1966. In 
the summer of 1966, Kang Ryang-uk and Ho Dam went on a tour of the Middle East. They 
met Nasser on 10 July, agreed to open consular relations with Iraq, and full diplomatic 
relations with Syria. (49)
In mid-1967 a DPRK tour with Kang and Ho Dam went to both Africa and the Middle 
East. Tanzania had recently promulgated the Arusha Declaration and nationalised its 
banks. Kim II Sung applauded these acts as adhering to the principle of self-reliance and 
anti-imperialism. Kang and Ho Dam met with President Nyerere in Dar-es-Salaam on 23 
March, 1967. In the same tour they established diplomatic relations with Burundi, under 
President Michel Micombero, met President Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia, established 
diplomatic relations with Somalia, and visited the Yemen Arab Republic. In their report on 
the tour to the SPA, Kang and Ho Dam stressed that Somalia and Yemen were ’’divided 
nations" and claimed that the DPRK's juche philosophy was inspiring Afro-Asians to 
emulate North Korea. (50)
The Arab-Israeli war in 1967 was seized upon by the DPRK as an opportunity to promote 
its ties of solidarity with Arab governments. As the war opened, mass solidarity rallies were 
held in Pyongyang. The DPRK took an unequivocal position on the war: "All actions of the 
Arab countries against the aggression of the American imperialists and Israeli Zionists are 
entirely just." The DPRK grouped together "The Israeli Zionists, South Korea's Pak Jung 
Hi clique, and South Vietnam's Cao Ky clique" as "US lackeys". (51) Kim U Sung 
contacted all Arab heads of state, and the PLO, saying that the Korean people regarded US 
aggression against the Arab people as aggression against themselves. The DPRK sent food 
aid to the UAR and free military aid to Syria.
DPRK follow-up diplomacy after the Arab-Israeli war was very effective. At the end of 
1967 the DPRK recognised the new Republic of South Yemen and hosted a visit by 
President Moktar Ould Daddah of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, who had broken off 
relations with the US and UK. In early 1968, Kang Ryang-uk again led a mission to the 
Middle East. Full diplomatic relations were established with Iraq, which the DPRK praised 
for leaving the Baghdad Pact and breaking off relations with the US. Consular relations 
were opened with Pakistan, and trade offices in Beirut and Kuwait. (52)
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Diplomatic relations were opened with Yemen (Aden). Yemen's leader, President A1 
Shaabi, pledged "mutual support in the struggle against imperialism and colonialism." An 
economic agreement was signed providing DPRK technical assistance to Yemen, mainly 
farm machinery and training. President Al-Shaabi made a state visit to the DPRK 27 May- 
6 June, 1969 and proclaimed that "the entire Arab working people are standing foresquare 
behind the people of the DPRK." The DPRK signed an agreement to provide free financial 
and economic aid to South Yemen. Al-Shaabi reciprocated with a call for US withdrawal 
from Korea. (53)
Iraq and Syria became important North Korean diplomatic partners in the Middle East. 
President Nureddin Attassi of the Syrian Arab Republic visited Pyongyang in September, 
1969 and pledged "absolute support" to the DPRK in its struggle against the US and for the 
liberation of South Korea. Kim II Sung set a new precedent by conferring the DPRK Order 
of National Flag First Class on President Al-Attassi. Kim II Sung pointedly praised the 
socio-economic reforms in Syria since the revolution of 8 March, 1963 and pledged DPRK 
support for Syria's resistance to Israel and the US. Finally, the DPRK was one of the first 
states to recognise the new Libyan Arab Republic established by the Revolutionary 
Command Council in 1969, soon to play a pivotal role in changing the region's relationship 
with the major oil companies. The theme of land reform and nationalisation of industry, 
mines, and foreign assets figures very prominently in DPRK diplomacy in this period, 
during which nationalisation became a major trend in Third World politics.
Africa likewise became more prominent in DPRK diplomacy. On 13 January, 1965, the 
DPRK established full diplomatic relations with Tanzania. This relationship became an 
important asset of the DPRK's diplomacy in Africa. President Nyerere was an open 
admirer of the policy of self-reliance, and this fact enhanced the DPRK's image. Tanzania's 
position as a leader of the group of Frontline States and its links to southern African 
liberation movements was another key reason for the DPRK's keen interest.
Nyerere visited Pyongyang 22-25 June, 1968, and praised the DPRK as a model of economic 
development which Tanzania could follow. Nyerere said Tanzania's pursuit of self-reliance 
was "paralleled in Korea." He also made an analogy between Korea's struggle for 
unification free from foreign interference and the struggle of African liberation movements. 
Kim II Sung praised the Arusha Declaration and the policy of building an independent 
national economy as the way to transform a poor and backward country into a fully 
sovereign and independent state. (54)
DPRK diplomacy in Africa made steady gains in this period, expanding beyond the radical 
regimes. In 1969 a delegation lead by Kim, Gyong Ryon, Chairman of the Committee for
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Foreign Economic Relations, toured Africa. Diplomatic relations were established with 
Equatorial Guinea, Chad, Zambia, Sudan, and the Central African Republic. During the 
tour Kim, Gyong Ryon met with a series of heads of state, e.g. President Francois 
Tombalbaye of Chad, President Hamani Diori of Niger, President Sangoule Lamizana of 
Upper Volta, President Sekou Toure in Guinea, Prime Minister Siaka Stevens in Sierra 
Leone, and the President of Sudan, Numieri. (55) Kim U Sung welcomed the new 
Revolutionary Council of Sudan, which reciprocated by a call for US withdrawal from 
Korea and dissolution of UNCURK. The relationship established with the C.A.R. and 
President Jean Bokassa is particularly interesting, since it indicates that relations could 
encompass even the "idiosyncratic”.
In its own region, Asia, the DPRK's main relationship after the fall of Sukarno was with 
North Vietnam, but Cambodia under Prince Sihanouk became increasingly important. The 
DPRK consistently supported Cambodian neutrality and Sihanouk's resistance to US 
pressure. Cambodia broke off diplomatic relations with the ROK in 1966, expelling its 
consulate from Phnom Penh.
Likewise, Burma moved closer to the DPRK in the "common anti-imperialist and anti­
colonial struggle." A channel was opened to capitalist Singapore, and Kang met Prime 
Minister Lee Kuan Yew on 29 June, 1968. Consular relations were established with 
Singapore on 28 November, 1969, and also with Nepal in 1969. (56)
Relations with Latin America were, as previously, the weakest of any region. The primary 
relationship was with Cuba, which was further strengthened. For instance, President 
Osvaldo Torrado visited the DPRK 26-29 October, 1966, pledging Cuba's willingness to 
"shed blood" for the Korean people. Cuba and the DPRK called for a global anti­
imperialist front among tri-continental peoples.
Outside Cuba, however, progress in Latin America was very slow. The main exception was 
Chile, a democracy in which the left had considerable and growing influence. Salvador 
Allende Gossens, as President of the Senate, visited Pyongyang in April-May 1969, and met 
with Kim U Sung. Chilean and Korean delegations were regularly exchanged for several 
years and relations became very close, especially after Allende was inaugurated as 
President of Chile.
IV. North-South Dialogue
The period from the end of the 1960s into the mid 1970s was one in which dramatic changes 
took place both in the international system and in North Korea's international standing. 
The international context was one of hegemonic transition, as bipolarity gave way to
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multipolarity and as US power underwent a relative decline. There were profound changes 
in global relations of power, both between the great powers and between them and the 
Third World. The United States finally embraced communist China, leading to China's 
membership in the UN Security Council. Detente was initiated with the Soviet Union.
This new atmosphere among the great powers facilitated an understanding that the 
Koreans themselves should take the initiative to resolve their differences, without foreign 
interference. This was extended to the UN and the way was cleared for a North-South 
dialogue on the Korean peninsula. This opening also facilitated a shift by the majority of 
UN member states toward recognition of both Korean regimes, and the acceptance of the 
DPRK into a wide range of international organisations.
The DPRK adapted its policy to exploit these trends. It cultivated a new image of a peace- 
loving state seeking international cooperation. The ultra-militancy of the preceding period 
was toned down. The expansion of DPRK diplomacy in the Third World not only 
continued, but was broadened to include moderate and conservative regimes, and even 
some Western European countries. Most importantly, the DPRK won the full support of 
the Non-aligned Movement. Together they campaigned for DPRK reunification proposals 
in the UNGA.
These systematic global campaigns were made at a time of rapidly accelerating Third 
World political activism in world politics. The end of the Vietnam War, and the victory of 
communist movements throughout Indochina, coincided with the victory of a number of 
African liberation movements. The NAM and the G-77 championed the New International 
Economic Order via special sessions of the UNGA and a new agenda of "North-South" 
relations.
The change in China's situation in 1971 was a major breakthrough for North Korea. In 
1970 Premier Zhou Enlai visited Pyongyang from 5-7 April and put Sino-Korean relations 
back on a friendly footing, ending a period of strain during the Cultural Revolution. China 
renewed its call for US troop withdrawal from South Korea, denounced ROK "fascist 
suppression", and pledged support to the DPRK's "struggle against aggression by US 
imperialism and its accomplices." (57)
The DPRK was exultant over the "great Victory of Chinese People" in the vote on 25 
October, 1971 at the 26th UNGA session (76 to 35) restoring China's rights in the UN. 
Pyongyang described this precedent as a "bolt from the blue for the Pak Jung Hi clique." 
(57) The entry of China into the UN, and the expulsion of Nationalist China, changed the 
atmosphere on the Korean Question dramatically.
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Kim II Sung, in an interview with Harrison Salisbury for the New York Times on 26 May, 
1972, revealed his readiness to adapt to the new international conditions. He renounced any 
intention to "impose our socialist system on South Korea" or to militarily attack South 
Korea. (59) He implied that the two social systems of North and South could co-exist and 
Korean unification would be peaceful.
One DPRK historian sums up this transitional period as follows: "Entering the 1970s the 
internal and external situations changed more favourably for the cause of national 
reunification of the Korean people." (60) This was due to the following factors: the success 
of Northern industrialisation; the increase in the prestige of the DPRK and its international 
dignity - due to its independent foreign policy and the juche idea; growing international 
support for the independent peaceful reunification of Korea; a "string of defeats" of the US 
in Asia; the anti-war movement and economic contradictions; and intensifying "fascist 
repression" by Park Chung Hee in South Korea. (61)
In August, 1971, Kim II Sung offered to establish personal contact at any time with any 
political party, organisation, or personage in South Korea. He responded to similar peace 
feelers by Park Chung Hee in early 1972, leading to a series of secret meetings between Kim 
Yong-ju, Director of the Organisation and Guidance Department of the KWP (Kim U 
Sung's brother), and Lee Hu-rak, Director of the KCIA in South Korea. This was followed 
by a visit by DPRK Vice-Premier Park Sung Chul to Seoul 29 May-1 June, 1972.
The result was the path-breaking Joint Statement on the North-South Dialogue on 4 July, 
1972. This statement embodied the basic principles of reunification: to solve the problem 
independently without foreign interference; to achieve reunification peacefully without use 
of armed force; and to put the principle of "grand national unity" above differences in 
social system and ideology.
The North-South Coordination Commission was established a vehicle for future 
negotiations, with Lee Hu Rak and Kim Yong-ju its chairmen. A series of commission 
meetings were held until the tenth meeting in March, 1975. Parallel Red Cross talks began 
on 20 August, 1971, but ended in deadlock in July, 1973 on the issue of reuniting separated 
families.
Unfortunately, the North-South Dialogue fell victim to political events on the Korean 
peninsula. In particular, the imposition of a new personal dictatorship in South Korea in 
October, 1972, spoiled the atmosphere of the negotiations. Park Chung Hee declared 
Martial Law, dissolved the National Assembly, and banned all political activity from 17
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October, 1972, inaugurating the authoritarian era known as "Yushin.11
Nevertheless, even in the absence of Yushin, Korean reunification might not have been 
achieved at this time. The general atmosphere favoured detente and reconciliation, but 
enormous difficulties remained over the issue of concrete steps to reunification.
As a result of the dissipation of good faith there was a hiatus in North-South talks until 
March, 1973. The DPRK used the impasse to launch a global diplomatic campaign to 
outflank the ROK in the UN. The atmosphere was ripe for such a campaign, given US 
defeat in Vietnam. On 27 January, 1973 the Paris Peace Agreement on Vietnam was signed, 
providing for the final withdrawal of remaining US forces in South Vietnam.
The DPRK saw US withdrawal from Vietnam as a great victory for it own cause; a clear 
precedent for Korea. The US had admitted that Vietnam was one country, but had two 
governments. The political future of Vietnam was to be decided by national elections. 
Unification would be step by step without foreign interference. Furthermore, the US had 
pledged to cease all military intervention.
North Korea's global campaign included an effort to enter as many international 
organisations as possible. This campaign was very successful. On 5 May, 1973, the DPRK 
was admitted to the Inter-Parliamentary Union in a vote of 57 to 28, and to the World 
Health organisation later that month by a vote of 66 to 41 with 22 abstentions. The 
resolution supporting DPRK admission to WHO was co-sponsored by 35 states. This was a 
significant breakthrough because it allowed the DPRK for the first time to establish a 
Permanent Observer Mission at UN headquarters in New York, and thus to take part in the 
UNGA debate on the Korean Question - for the first time since it began in 1947. This 
success was followed by admittance to UNCTAD, where the DPRK avidly supported the 
NIEO.
While this campaign proceeded the DPRK pressed the ROK to accept mutual troop 
reductions, a moratorium on the introduction of new weapons into Korea, withdrawal of all 
foreign forces, and a mutual guarantee of the non-use of force. South Korea responded with 
a proposal for simultaneous entry into the UN. North Korea rejected this proposal as a 
"Two Koreas Plot", designed to perpetuate national division, and accused the US of being 
its true author. (62) The US proposal of "cross-recognition" that accompanied the UN 
membership proposal called for recognition of both Koreas by the major powers, as well as 
their simultaneous UN membership, modeled on the German situation. (63)
The kidnapping by the KCIA of Southern opposition leader Kim, Dae Jung in Tokyo on 8
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August, 1973, gave the DPRK the opportunity to launch a propaganda offensive. Kim, 
Yong-ju declared on 28 August, 1973, that the "anti-communist fascist policy" in the South 
totally contravened the spirit of the 4 July Joint Statement, as did the new "Two Korea" 
policy. The DPRK demanded that Lee, Hu Rak and other KCIA personnel no longer be 
allowed to participate in the talks, but did not call for suspending the talks themselves. (64)
Despite bitterness in Korea itself, the great powers moved ahead with a framework for 
Korean reconciliation. In November, 1973, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and 
Zhou Enlai, meeting in Beijing, reached a new understanding on the Korean Question. The 
US agreed that UNCURK would be dissolved, in exchange for moderation on the demand 
for immediate dissolution of the UNC. This was a refinement of the basic agreement in the 
Shanghai Communique of 27 February, 1972, in which the US and China agreed that the 
Korean Question should be settled by the Koreans themselves. As in the past, the great 
powers could negotiate "over the heads" of the Koreans.
North Korea itself decided in 1974 to negotiate "over the head" of the ROK. The SPA 
addressed a letter directly to the US Congress on 25 March, seeking a direct dialogue to 
replace the Korean Armistice with a Peace treaty, including withdrawal of foreign troops. 
(65) At the same time, the DPRK intensified propaganda against the ROK, denouncing the 
Park regime for repression intended to "check the trend toward democratization of society 
and national reunification....by resorting to fascist tyranny..." (66)
The fall of the Saigon regime in 1975 produced final impasse in the North-South dialogue. 
Kim, Yong-ju announced conditions under which the aborted talks could be resumed: the 
ROK must reject US influence and all US troops must be withdrawn. The anti-communist 
and fascist policy of the ROK had to stop. The state of military tension must cease and both 
regimes return to the policy of great national unity. Kim, Yong-ju said that, "Only when a 
patriotic, democratic figure who truly aspires after national reunification comes to power, 
is it possible to hold genuine dialogue between the north and the south." (67)
V. Achievement of Diplomatic Parity with South Korea
The new international environment in the 1970s, with its acceptance of the principle of 
settlement of the Korean Question by the Koreans themselves, facilitated a spectacular 
increase in the DPRK's international support. The DPRK increased the number of its 
diplomatic partners more substantially in the early 1970s than any other period in its 
history. In total, from January 1972 to July, 1973, 21 countries opened diplomatic relations 
with the DPRK. In 1974, a further 15 states opened diplomatic relations with Pyongyang. 
Altogether, during the three year period preceding the crucial vote on the Korean Question 
at the 30th session of the UNGA in 1975, over 40 countries established diplomatic relations
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with the DPRK. The DPRK also consolidated a decisive advantage over the ROK in the 
NAM. In 1973-1974 alone, 20 non-aligned states opened relations with North Korea, 
compared to only 7 with South Korea.
Thus, the ratio of diplomatic partners between the ROK and DPRK steadily approached 
parity. For example, in 1970 the ROK had 82 full diplomatic partners compared to the 
DPRK's mere 34. This gap narrowed to 84 to 36 in 1971; 85 to 45 in 1972; 90 to 60 in 1974; 
and 92 to 87 in 1975. By the end of 1974 the regional distribution of partners (outside of the 
Soviet sphere in Europe) was as follows: 28 in Africa, 14 in Asia, 10 in the Middle East, 8 in 
Latin America, 7 in Europe, and 1 in Oceania, clearly demonstrating the significance of 
Third World support.
These advances were achieved through extensive diplomacy.
In early 1970, Kang, Ryang-uk, Vice President of the Presidium of the SPA, led a mission 
touring Africa and the Middle East. He met Chairman Numieri in Sudan, President Nasser 
in the UAR, President Daddah in Mauritania and President Helou in Lebanon. (68) The 
DPRK campaigned for dissolution of UNCURK and US withdrawal from South Korea. 
Leaders were encouraged to express explicit support for these proposals.
At one point, the inauguration of Salvador Allende as President of Chile in 1970 seemed to 
open a new era in Latin America. On 10 November, 1970 the DPRK opened a trade mission 
in Santiago. The DPRK was an enthusiastic supporter of the reforms undertaken under 
Allende by 1971, such as nationalisation of banks, coal companies and US interests, the land 
reform, and Chile's establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba. Chile's Socialist Party 
fully supported the DPRK's reunification proposals and condemned Park Chung Hee for 
"fascist repression" in South Korea. (69) Full diplomatic relations were established with 
Chile on 1 June, 1972.
However, it was a short-lived victory. By November of the same year the DPRK was 
denouncing the US for organising rightists to destabilise Allende, and for aiding the 
crippling Chilean truckers strike. Nevertheless, the DPRK hailed the victory of the Popular 
Unity movement in parliamentary elections in March, 1973 and Allende endorsed the SPA's 
stand on Korean reunification.
In mid-1973, with full diplomatic relations with Cuba, Chile, and Argentina, the DPRK 
seemed to be breaking out of its relative isolation in Latin America. However, the death of 
Allende and the overthrow of his government in the bloody military coup d'etat in 
September, 1973, was a tremendous set-back to the DPRK. The DPRK cut off all diplomatic 
relations with the military junta led by General Pinochet that replaced Allende's
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government.
Steady progress was made initially with President Juan Velasco Alvarado in Peru, who the 
DPRK praised for nationalisation and land reform policies. Trade relations with Peru were 
opened in April, 1974. The victory of Hector Campora and the Peronists in Argentina's 
presidential elections in March, 1973, was followed by establishment of diplomatic relations 
with the DPRK after a visit by Isabel Peron to Pyongyang. However, by late 1974, following 
the death of Juan Peron, there were rumours of an impending coup in Argentina. Newly 
independent Guyana, under Prime Minister Forbes Burnham, established relations with 
North Korea in 1974, as did Jamaica under Michael Manley's leadership. Diplomatic 
relations were also established with Venezuela, an important moderate regime, late in 1974.
DPRK partners increasingly included moderate non-aligned regimes. For example, in 1972 
the DPRK won the endorsement of the Arab Republic of Yemen for US withdrawal from 
Korea and dissolution of UNCURK, in exchange for DPRK condemnation of "Israeli 
aggression". (70) North Korea thus accepted relations with both Yemens, rather than 
supporting only one regime. Another breakthrough in the Islamic world occurred by 
achieving diplomatic relations with Pakistan on 9 November, 1972. President Bhutto 
withdrew Pakistan from UNCURK, following Chile's withdrawal. This was a considerable 
boost to the DPRK's campaign to delegitimise UNCURK.
More curious was the opening of diplomatic relations with Zaire in November, 1972, since 
the DPRK had previously denounced President Mobutu. The ROK reacted badly, and 
Zaire decided to expel the ROK ambassador for interference in internal affairs! In late 
1974 Mobutu made a state visit to Pyongyang and pledged support for North Korea in the 
UN. Mobutu stressed the importance of the advance of the anti-colonial movement in Africa 
and the collapse of the Portuguese empire. Perhaps this trend explains his decision to open 
relations with the DPRK.
Among other key breakthroughs in 1974 was the re-establishment of close relations with 
Indonesia. In July, Foreign Minister Adam Malik met Kim II Sung and Ho Dam in 
Pyongyang. Even more significantly, Australia established diplomatic relations on 31 July; 
hailed by the DPRK as a "momentous event". Yet another reversal in the DPRK's favour 
was that by Togo. President Eyadema visited Pyongyang and thereafter broke off 
diplomatic relations with the ROK on 17 September, 1974. Eyadema defended the 
expulsion of the ROK embassy from Togo by saying he would not maintain relations with 
South Korea while foreign troops remained there as an obstacle to a peaceful settlement. 
(71)
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Undoubtedly, however, the breakthroughs in Europe were the most spectacular. In 1973 a 
Foreign Ministers conference of five North European governments reached a joint decision 
to open diplomatic relations with North Korea, thus ending its diplomatic isolation in 
Western Europe. Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway established diplomatic 
relations with the DPRK between April and November, 1973. They thereby reinforced the 
trend to a non-partisan position on the Korean Question. In December, 1974, Austria and 
Switzerland also established diplomatic relations with the DPRK, and Portugal did so in 
1975.
In the same year another significant breakthrough occurred with the opening of diplomatic 
relations with Iran. The Shah, a close ally of the United States, had previously recognised 
only the ROK. Malaysia was another significant success, which established diplomatic 
relations with the DPRK after leaving ASPAC. The DPRK even recognised the regime of 
Idi Amin in Uganda, which was made easier by his anti-imperialist rhetoric and the fact 
that Amin condemned US military involvement in Korea. (72) India at last established full 
diplomatic relations with the DPRK on 10 December, 1973.
The success of several African liberation movements in 1974-75 was very significant. North 
Korea quickly recognised Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, and Sao Tome and Principe. 
Samora Machel of Mozambique visited Pyongyang in March, 1975, and was given the 
Order of National Flag First Class. Mozambique and North Korea established diplomatic 
relations on 25 June, 1975. Machel denounced the "Two Korea's Plot" and called for US 
withdrawal from South Korea. The DPRK praised Mozambique's "people's democratic 
power". (73) In Dahomey, the new Peoples Republic of Benin, was immediately recognised 
by the DPRK. President Mathieu Kerekou severed diplomatic relations with the ROK in 
1975.
An even greater impact was made by the victories of the communist forces in Indochina. As 
a result, Thailand opened relations with the DPRK on 8 May, 1975, followed by Burma on 
16 May, both to the dismay of South Korea. Relations were re-established with Cambodia, 
and Prince Sihanouk visited Pyongyang on 19 May, 1975, as head of state. Given the close 
personal friendship between Sihanouk and Kim U Sung, Cambodia took a strong pro- 
DPRK position in both the UN and the NAM. Laos, under the regime of Premier Souvanna 
Phouma, broke off relations with the ROK, denouncing it as a "fascist dictatorial regime" 
and endorsed the DPRK's reunification proposals. Later in 1975, Thailand decided to 
withdraw its contingent of troops from South Korea, thus adding momentum to the 
DPRK's campaign for dissolution of the UNC.
All the examples reviewed above attest to the rapid "rehabilitation" of North Korea in the
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international community. North Korea benefited far more from the new international 
atmosphere than did South Korea. The new consensus in the international community was 
for a non-partisan approach to the problem of Korean reunification. As early as January, 
1966, the ROK decided to officially announce a "retreat" from the Hallstein Doctrine. Its 
new position was to maintain economic and cultural relations with governments that 
established diplomatic relations with the DPRK. In May, 1969, when Chad and the C.A.R. 
established diplomatic relations with the DPRK, having previously had relations only with 
the ROK, South Korea did not break off full diplomatic relations with either of them. This 
precedent allowed many governments to opt for a non-partisan approach, greatly 
benefiting North Korea.
At the Fifth Congress of the KWP in November, 1970, Kim II Sung reaffirmed the 
importance of Third World solidarity in North Korea's foreign policy. He argued that 
"solidarity with the international revolutionary forces is one of the important factors at 
present in forcing the US imperialist aggressors out of South Korea" and thus for 
accomplishing the "national liberation revolution" and reunification. (74)
The DPRK shifted diplomatic emphasis to the NAM. The Korean Question was discussed at 
the Third NAM summit conference in Lusaka in 1970. Article six of the final declaration of 
the Lusaka conference described the presence of US troops in South Korea as a threat to 
national independence and to international peace.
In April, 1971, the SPA released an 8 Point proposal for peaceful reunification, at the centre 
of which was a demand for US forces to withdraw from South Korea. DPRK missions 
toured the Third World to garner endorsements. Pak, Sung Chul's delegation to Africa and 
the Middle East in May, 1971, collected Sudanese President Nimeri's endorsement (in 
exchange for DPRK support for resolving the conflict in southern Sudan without foreign 
interference); (75) President Assad of Syria's on 23 May (for DPRK support for Syria's 
efforts to restore the occupied Arab territories); and Iraq's Hassan Al-Bakr and Saddam 
Hussein (for support for Iraq in its territorial dispute with Iran). (76)
Other endorsements for the SPA 8 point proposal included Nicolae Ceausescu of Rumania, 
and Ieng Sary of Cambodia. Augostino Neto, Chairman of the Angolan Peoples Liberation 
Movement, Samora Michel, leader of the Liberation Front of Mozambique, and Algerian 
Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika all visited Pyongyang in 1971 and endorsed the 8 
point proposal.
In early 1972 the DPRK launched a campaign for a North-South peace treaty and North- 
South political negotiations. Foreign Minister Ho Dam went to Romania and Yugoslavia,
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receiving the coveted endorsements. Pak, Sung Chul went to Cuba, while Vice Premier 
Chong, Jun Taek toured Sudan and Syria, garnering the personal endorsement of 
Presidents Nimeri and Assad, respectively. Kim, Gyong Ryun led a delegation to the 
Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen and won endorsement from Chairman Salem 
Rubaya Ali, while the DPRK supported the Yemen's struggle against "Saudi Arabian 
reactionaries and mercenaries". (77) President Al-Bakr of Iraq endorsed the new proposals 
in October. President Barre of Somalia endorsed both the 8 point proposal and the new 
proposals. When Barre later visited Pyongyang, Kim II Sung called for Somalia's 
unification.
Chong, Jun Taek visited Egypt in March and met President Sadat. They exchanged calls 
for US troop withdrawal from Korea and Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab lands. 
Kang, Ryang-uk went to Sierra Leone, where President Siaka Stevens endorsed all the 
DPRK proposals. Kang also visited Mali, Guinea and Mauritania. Kim, Gyong Ryon, 
Finance Minister, met President Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia and received his endorsemeht. 
He also visited Tanzania and Burundi and met Presidents Nyerere and Micombero, 
respectively. Kim, Ryong Taek toured Burma, Indonesia, Singapore, and Nepal; meeting 
President Suharto in Indonesia, Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew in Singapore, and Prime 
Minister Birta in Nepal.
This frenetic high level diplomacy paid handsome dividends in the NAM. The NAM 
Foreign Ministers Conference in Georgetown, Guyana, in September, 1972, again took up 
the question of Korea. In Article 26 of the Georgetown Declaration the conference called 
for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea and an end to all foreign intervention in 
Korea's affairs.
These campaigns accelerated in 1973, by which time the DPRK felt the tide had turned in 
its favour. The SPA released a Letter to Parliaments and Governments of all Countries of 
the World on 6 April, 1973, calling for termination of all foreign intervention in the internal 
affairs of Korea. This letter made mention of all recent DPRK reunification proposals, 
including the new 5 Point proposal (including a halt to the arms race in Korea, withdrawal 
of all foreign forces, reduction of each side's armed forces to 100,000 men, no introduction 
of new weapons from abroad, and a peace treaty to replace the armistice). The new 5 Point 
proposal called for creation of a North-South Korean confederation, under the name of a 
single country, "many-sided exchanges", reduction of military tension, and convocation of a 
"Great National Congress" representing all social groups from both sides, to discuss 
reunification. This was North Korea's counter-proposal to the idea of "two Koreas" joining 
the UN. (78)
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The SPA declared that "...this year the UNGA should take steps to take the cap of the "UN 
forces" off the heads of US troops stationed in south Korea, make them withdraw and 
disband "UNCURK", and that the representative of the DPRK must certainly be invited to 
the UN when a question on Korea is discussed there." (79) A similar letter was sent to the 
US Congress on the same day.
On 9 September, 1973, a watershed in the DPRK's campaigns on the Korean Question was 
reached in the Fourth NAM summit conference in Algiers, representing over 100 Third 
World governments. Algeria emerged as a champion of the DPRK's reunification 
proposals. A resolution was passed on the Korean Question characterising the division of 
Korea as a threat to Asian and world peace and demanding an end to foreign intervention 
in Korea. NAM went on record to oppose the simultaneous admission of two Koreas into 
the UN, on the grounds that this might perpetuate national division. NAM declared that 
Korea should only enter the UN under the name of a single state, after a confederal form of 
unification had taken place. They called for withdrawal of all foreign forces. Finally, NAM 
called directly upon the UNGA to consider the Korean Question at the upcoming 28th 
session and to decide on withdrawal of US troops and dissolution of UNCURK. (80) The 
Algiers Political Declaration called for withdrawal of all foreign forces from South Korea 
and settlement of the Korean Question without foreign interference.
Algeria continued to press for support of DPRK proposals. Thus, the DPRK reaped a huge 
benefit from its friendship. For example, Houari Boumedienne, Premier of Algeria and 
Chairman of the NAM, sent messages on behalf of the NAM to the heads of state of all non- 
aligned countries on 12 November, 1973, appealing to them to take efforts to settle the 
Korean Question in the UNGA. Algeria's foreign minister, Abdelaziz Bouteflika sent a 
similar message to the NAM foreign ministers throughout the world.
In 1974, Boumedienne and Bouteflika visited Pyongyang from 2-5 March, and met with 
Kim II Sung. Kim II Sung praised Boumedienne's recent call for a Special Session of the 
UNGA on the international economic order. In their Joint Communique of 5 March, 1974, 
Kim and Boumedienne noted that there had been "a change in the balance of forces in the 
world arena...reflected in the UN where big powers had dominated." Algeria reaffirmed its 
support for DPRK reunification proposals and expressed solidarity with the struggle 
against "fascist dictatorship" in South Korea. (81) Boumedienne and Bouteflika again sent 
out letters to the NAM heads of state and government, and to foreign ministers, in late 
1974, calling upon non-aligned governments to support the withdrawal of foreign forces in 
the "southern half of Korea."
The DPRK enthusiastically greeted new initiatives in Third World solidarity, for instance
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the Sixth Special Session of the UNGA convened from 9 April to 2 May 1974, and the 
adoption of the "Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic 
Order" and Action Programme. Kim U Sung held that these events reflected the growing 
"struggle to destroy the economic foothold of the imperialist monopolies and regain the 
usurped natural resources of their countries..." (82) The DPRK scathingly denounced the 
role of US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who argued for cooperation between the rich 
and poor countries, but in practice sharpened the conflict and formulated a policy of 
dividing the ranks of the Third World coalition to prevent "bloc voting" on the NIEO. (83)
North Korea enthusiastically supported the Conference on Raw Materials of Developing 
Countries held in Dakar, Senegal, in February, 1975. North Korea happily postured as a 
champion of increased economic and technical ties among developing countries, as a 
guarantee of national independence and juche. Similarly, the DPRK applauded OPEC's 
summit in Algiers in March as a contribution to the Third World peoples' struggle against 
imperialism and for independence. Finally, it endorsed the Panama Declaration of Central 
American leaders in March, 1975, calling for US withdrawal from the Canal Zone.
When the DPRK at last applied for NAM membership, its support was overwhelming. A 
motion to recommend DPRK admission was approved unanimously at the third meeting of 
the NAM Coordinating Committee in March, 1975. Pyongyang hailed this as a "brilliant 
victory of the anti-imperialist independent foreign policy" of North Korea. Entry into NAM 
was indeed "an epochal turn in the development of (DPRK) relations with foreign 
countries." (84)
The highest ranking tour of this entire period was that by Kim U Sung himself, in 1975, 
launched to consolidate support for DPRK entry into NAM and for North Korean 
proposals at the decisive 30th UNGA session. Kim U Sung also went to China, where he met 
Mao and Deng Xiaoping on 18 April, 1975, the day after Phnom Penh was captured by 
Khmer Rouge forces, while the Thieu regime in South Vietnam teetered on the brink of 
collapse as Danang and Hue fell to revolutionary forces. China made clear its position by 
declaring that the DPRK was "the sole legitimate sovereign state of the Korean nation". 
(85) China backed the dissolution of the UNC and withdrawal of all foreign troops from 
South Korea.
With China's support secured, Kim U Sung left Korea to gather endorsements from heads 
of governments for the 5 Point proposal, opposition to the "two Koreas" proposal, and 
withdrawal of all foreign forces from South Korea under the UN flag. The tour began in 
Romania, continued in Algeria (where Kim reminded them that the DPRK was the first 
government to have officially recognised the Algerian Provisional Government),
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Mauritania on 30 May, 1975, (Daddah's endorsement was reciprocated by DPRK support 
for the decolonisation of Western Sahara), Bulgaria, and the crowning achievement, a 
summit with Josip Broz Tito in Jugoslavia, from 6-7 June. Tito’s stature in the NAM was 
enormous and therefore his strongly worded statements of support for North Korean 
reunification policy were very valuable. Tito characterised the Korean situation as one in 
which the country had been divided by imperialism and was still fighting, thirty years later, 
for national reunification. Tito promised full support for North Korea, internationally. 
Their Joint Communique explicitly referred to the harmony between North Korea’s 
independent foreign policy and the principle of non-alignment. (86)
With Tito's blessing, the entry of North Korea into the NAM was unanimously approved at 
the Foreign Ministers meeting in Lima, Peru, August, 1975. In Article 60 of the Lima 
Declaration the NAM called for withdrawal of all foreign forces from South Korea under 
the UN flag and replacement of the armistice with a peace treaty. DPRK Foreign Minister 
Ho Dam's speech at Lima reflected the fundamentals of DPRK policy, i.e. the theme‘of 
achieving complete economic independence, south-south cooperation, collective self- 
reliance, and the NIEO. (87)
The ROK's simultaneous application for admission to NAM failed, and was attacked by 
Algeria, Yugoslavia, Cuba, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and other governments that had 
fought bitter anti-colonial wars. The DPRK hailed NAM's rejection of the ROK's 
membership application as a great victory, and an indication of South Korea's international 
isolation.
The DPRK then achieved its long sought victory in the 30th UNGA session (discussed 
below). Immediately thereafter, Kim U Sung published a treatise entitled "The Non-aligned 
Movement Is A Mighty Anti-Imperialist Revolutionary Force of Our Times". He argued 
that NAM had "decisively strengthened the revolutionary forces of the world and greatly 
weakened the reactionary forces of imperialism." (88) Kim reiterated fundamental themes 
of DPRK foreign policy: anti-imperialist struggle was the main trend in world politics; 
NAM should intensify its struggle against imperialism and colonialism; self-reliance was 
the basis of independence; non-aligned countries should cooperate economically and unite 
politically. (89)
VI. DPRK Success in the UNGA
The final fruit of DPRK Third World diplomacy was the steady improvement in its position 
in the UN debate on the Korean Question. The UNGA debate originated from the decision 
of the Fifth UNGA session to require an annual report from UNCURK. With the changes in 
the UNGA from 1961 onward, the US and ROK found it increasingly difficult to exclude
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the DPRK. Between 1961, when Indonesia proposed to invite North Korea to participate 
(90), and 1975, when the UNGA passed a resolution fully endorsing standard DPRK 
reunification proposals, support for the DPRK steadily increased.
Table 1. UNGA Voting Patterns on the Korean Question 1965-75
1965 61 yes 13 no 34 abstentions (pro ROK resolution)*
28 yes 39 no 22 abstentions (invite the DPRK)
1966 67 yes 19 no 32 abstentions (pro-ROK resolution)
34 yes 53 no (invite the DPRK)
1967 68 yes 23 no 26 abstentions (pro ROK resolution)
40 yes 55 no (invite the DPRK)
50 yes 37 no 24 abstentions (invite DPRK unconditional)
24 yes 60 no 29 abstentions (dissolve UNCURK)
1968 72 yes 23 no 26 abstentions (pro ROK resolution)
40 yes 55 no 28 abstentions (invite DPRK unconditional) 
67 yes 28 no 28 abstentions (invite DPRK conditional) **
25 yes 67 no 29 abstentions (dissolve UNCURK)
24 yes 70 no 28 abstentions (cancel UN Korea debate)
1969 70 yes 26 no 21 abstentions (pro ROK resolution)
40 yes 55 no 27 abstentions (invite DPRK unconditional) 
30 yes 65 no 27 abstentions (dissolve UNCURK)
29 yes 61 no 32 abstentions (UNC/US withdrawal)
1970 67 yes 28 no 22 abstentions (pro ROK resolution)
40 yes 54 no 25 abstentions (invite DPRK unconditional) 
32 yes 64 no 26 abstentions (dissolve UNCURK)
32 yes 60 no 30 abstentions (withdraw UNC/US troops)
1971 68 yes 28 no 22 abstentions (postpone Korea debate)
1972 70 yes 35 no 21 abstentions (postpone Korea debate)
1973 Unanimous Decision (1st Committee) (Invite DPRK)
Unanimous Decision (UNGA) (dissolve UNCURK)
1974 61 yes 43 no 31 abstentions (pro-ROK resolution)
48 yes 48 no 38 abstentions (dissolve UNC)
1975 59 yes 51 no 29 abstentions (pro ROK resolution)
54 yes 43 no 42 abstentions (dissolve UNC)
Source: United Nations Records, 1965-1975.
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* Standard pro ROK resolutions called for the intensification of UNCURK's role, free 
elections in North Korea, and reiterated the UN position on the ROK as the legitimate 
government of Korea.
* *  The US response to Indonesia in 1961 was the Stephenson amendment, requiring the 
DPRK to unequivocally accept the authority of the UN. In 1962 the DPRK responded to the 
Stephenson amendment by issuing a strident statement rejecting UN competence. (91)
The steady increase in support for the DPRK led to several significant watersheds. First, 
the UNGA unanimously endorsed the agreed to remove the Korean Question from the 
UNGA agenda (1971,1972). Secondly, the DPRK was finally admitted to the UNGA debate 
in 1973 with unanimous approval in the First Committee. Thirdly, the UNGA unanimously 
decided to dissolve UNCURK, which the DPRK had attacked for being biased in favour of 
the ROK. Finally, the UNGA passed a resolution endorsing DPRK reunification proposals, 
calling for withdrawal of all foreign troops and dissolution of the UNC.
The table reveals a steady increase in the number of votes against the annual pro ROK 
resolution, i.e. approval of UNCURK's annual report. The number of votes against the 
standard pro-ROK resolution on the Korean Question was only 9 in 1959, increasing to 11 
in 1961, 1962, and 1963. Radical and socialist regimes made up most of the DPRK’s overt 
supporters, casting No votes on the pro-ROK resolutions. The number of abstentions on 
these same resolutions also steadily increased. Many of those who regularly abstained were 
non-aligned governments in the Third World.
In 1959, only 17 states abstained on the pro ROK resolution. In 1961 this rose to 27. The 
table reveals the sharp increase in no votes and abstentions up to 1975.
Chile's withdrawal from UNCURK in August, 1966, was a crucial watershed, damaging the 
image of UNCURK's impartiality. In 1968, after consultations with supportive 
governments, the ROK recommended that UNCURK's annual report not automatically be 
submitted to the UNGA. This decision "reflected the awareness by the Western nations that 
efforts to adopt the report at the General Assembly would be increasingly difficult, would 
outweigh the benefits, and would prove divisive for Western unity." (92)
The DPRK, which had long argued that the Korean Question should not be discussed at the 
UN, was actually angry at the decision to delete the Korean Question in 1971. This is 
because the situation had changed. The DPRK sensed that its own victory in the debate was 
approaching. The US and ROK, however, preferred to avoid the debate altogether, thus 
minimising public damage to the ROK. When this was again approved in 1972, the DPRK 
Foreign Ministry denounced the decision as "illegal". The breakdown of the North-South 
dialogue in 1973 resulted in a resumption of the UN debate. The DPRK's entry into WHO
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and the opening of its permanent mission to the UN in New York guaranteed that North 
Korea could participate in the debate on the Korean Question for the first time.
On 14 November, 1973, Lee, Yong Mok, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, made the 
DPRK’s maiden speech in the UN. He reviewed the entire course of the Korean Question 
since the Second World War. This historic speech includes the charges that the US was 
responsible for the original division of the country; the US had unleashed a war of 
aggression in 1950; and that the "root cause" of the failure of reunification was the 
"occupation of South Korea by the foreign troops and continued interference in our 
internal affairs by the foreign countries." (93)
Lee argued that the original US submission of the Korean Question to the UN in 1947 
violated Article 107, Chapter 17 of the UN Charter which excludes debate on questions of 
postwar settlement and prohibits discussion of the internal affairs of any country. US troop 
occupation was in violation of the Armistice Agreement and the 4 July Joint Statement. UN 
forces were not under the jurisdiction of the Secretary General, acted without any relation 
to the UN, and no other country kept troop contingents under the UN flag any longer except 
the US. Finally, the US resolution proposing simultaneous entry of both Koreas into the UN 
was an "abnormal question" which if implemented would result in Korea being 
"recognised internationally as two states and its division be perpetuated." (94)
There were two rival draft resolutions on the Korean Question submitted to the 28th 
UNGA. The DPRK backed the resolution submitted by Algeria and 34 other countries, 
which Lee, Yong Muk said "coincides with the resolution of the Summit Conference of the 
Nonaligned States", whereas the pro-ROK resolution was backed by "past and present 
colonialist powers." Lee rejected the rival draft as one which called for continuation of an 
unstable armistice, foreign troops in South Korea, and continued national division. He 
argued that the UNGA debate on Korea was "characterised by the struggle between the 
newly-emerging forces...and the old forces of colonial domination which attempt to block 
the former." (95) The DPRK regarded the 28th UNGA session as being the first "fair 
debate" in 25 years, a "shameful defeat" for the US and its "separatist" line, and a 
demonstration of the growing power of the Third World and socialist states in world 
politics.
The DPRK was careful to express gratitude that so many states would be willing to support 
its entry into the UN. However, it insisted that entry into the UN should not take place 
before the reunification of Korea, or at least a North-South confederation. Lee concluded 
that simultaneous UN entry was a tactic of "divide and rule". His final argument was based 
on invoking the Fourth NAM summit declaration: calling for withdrawal of all foreign
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troops, an end to all forms of foreign interference in Korea's domestic affairs, the 
dissolution of UNCURK, and Korean membership in the UN under the name of a single 
state.
According to one source, the ROK, in consultation with its allies, "decided voluntarily to 
dissolve UNCURK, thereby avoiding another round of unnecessary and perhaps 
counterproductive battles for competitive legitimacy.” (96) The ultimate source of this 
decision was not the ROK, however, but understandings reached between Zhou Enlai and 
Henry Kissinger, particularly in November, 1973, where the US accepted dissolution of 
UNCURK if the demand for dissolution of the UNC could be dropped.
In the 1974 UNGA debate on foreign troop withdrawal and dissolution of the UNC (the 
resolution being co-sponsored by 40 Third World and socialist states), of some 73 speeches 
delivered on Korea at the 29th UNGA session, the DPRK regarded 42 as supportive, 25 
were adversaries, and 6 neutral. (97) In comparison to 1970, the DPRK had gained 16 more 
solid supporters, and 12 fewer states voted openly against the DPRK. (98)
On 8 August, 1975, a resolution co-sponsored by 35 states (later increased to 42) calling for 
dissolution of the UN Command, withdrawal of all foreign forces under the UN flag, and 
replacement of the armistice by a peace treaty, was submitted to the UNGA. The resolution 
also called upon both Korean regimes to observe the principles of the 4 July Joint 
Statement, to take practical measures to reduce armed forces, cease military reinforcement, 
and make guarantees against the use of force against each other.
The US and supporters of the ROK again submitted a rival resolution; a defensive, 
compromise device whereby the UNC would officially be dissolved, but officers of the US 
and ROK would be allowed to ensure enforcement of the armistice. The DPRK denounced 
this proposal as one intended to perpetuate US occupation of South Korea under the US- 
ROK Mutual Defense Pact. However, if the UNC was dissolved, a signatory to the 
armistice, then the armistice too would cease to exist. A US effort to propose ROK entry 
into the UN (1975) was defeated in the Security Council.
In the course of this debate the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs defended the need for 
replacing the armistice with a peace treaty by implying there was a danger of nuclear war 
in Korea. The DPRK cited retired US Admiral Gene Laroque of the Centre for Defence 
Information in Washington, D.C., claiming that there were nuclear weapons in South 
Korea, including missiles, guns and mines. The DPRK accused the US of having unilaterally 
suspended the activities of the Neutral Nations Inspection Teams (of the NNSC) in June 
1956 and unilaterally abrogating Sub-paragraph 13-D of the Armistice in June 1957, which
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banned the introduction of new weapons and combat materials into Korea.
In addition to these charges, the DPRK implied that the higher level political conference 
called for by Paragraph 60, Article 4 of the Armistice had not taken place. North Korea 
argued that the perpetuation of the state of armistice for so long was itself a violation of its 
basic spirit and "extremely abnormal". It reminded governments that all Chinese troops 
had left North Korea by the end of 1958. The DPRK thereby defended its argument for a 
new peace treaty to be signed by the US, DPRK and other "real parties concerned", 
pointedly not mentioning the UNC.
On 21 October, Lee, Yong Mok delivered a speech to the First Committee in which he 
argued that "The key to the solution of the question of Korea is to withdraw the US troops 
from south Korea." He accused the US of attempting to shore up the Park, Chung Hee 
regime in the wake of the collapse of the Lon Nol and Thieu regimes in Indochina. He 
pointed out that the US draft made no mention of troop withdrawal. He contrasted the rival 
drafts as one "to completely liquidate the root causes of national division" while the other 
was designed "to maintain the division of Korea and dangerous tension indefinitely." (99)
In the 30th UNGA debate from 21-29 October, 1975, a very large number of Third World 
governments made speeches supporting the pro-DPRK proposals. On 29 October the First 
Committee passed the pro-DPRK draft resolution by 51 to 38. Immediately thereafter the 
DPRK reiterated its readiness to sign a peace agreement with the US at any time, provided 
all foreign troops withdrew from South Korea. The DPRK refers to this vote as an "epochal 
event which put an end to the old mechanism of the United Nations that had allowed the 
United States to arbitrarily fabricate illegal resolutions on the Korean Question every year 
by setting its voting machine in motion, and which made this resolution the first fair one 
ever adopted on the Korean issue." (100) When the issue was voted on in the plenary 
session the DPRK picked up 3 more votes, making the total 54 in favour, to 43 opposed, 
with 42 abstentions. (101) Among NAM members, 41 voted in favour of the pro-DPRK 
resolution, 10 opposed it and 25 abstained. On the pro-ROK resolution, only 14 NAM 
members voted for it, with 39 opposed, and 24 abstaining. DPRK support was strongest in 
Africa where 26 states voted in favour of the pro-DPRK resolution and 25 African states 
voted against the pro-ROK resolution.
This was truly a historic vote, since a majority of UN member states supported DPRK 
reunification proposals. However, in reality, the "victory" of the DPRK at the 30th UNGA 
session was far from clear-cut. This is because the pro-ROK resolution also passed. The 
anomaly of two contradictory resolutions both passing in the same session illustrated the 
reality of the situation, i.e. parity in diplomatic support, and the inherent limitations of the
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UN forum to bring about change. This unprecedented passage of two contrary resolutions 
led the DPRK to suggest afterwards that "It was high time for the UN to put an end to the 
debate of the Korean Question at its sessions." (102)
VII. Conclusion
As discussed in the introduction, the advantages that North Korea had developed during 
the reconstruction period, in terms of its ability to appeal to the emerging Third World for 
diplomatic support, were further amplified and expanded throughout this period. On this 
basis, the DPRK developed a powerful diplomatic momentum that accelerated in tandem 
with the increasing importance of the Third World in international relations. As a 
consequence, North Korea significantly improved its international support during this 
period, eventually reaching diplomatic parity with South Korea.
North Korea's domestic policies were an asset to its Third World diplomacy. There was 
clear symmetry between its self-reliant economic policies and its independent line in foreign 
affairs. These policies were extremely well suited to a period of transformation in the 
international system marked by decolonisation, national liberation, and Third World 
solidarity. US and ROK involvement in the Vietnam war also worked to North Korea's 
advantage. The DPRK benefited from the mood of international solidarity extended to the 
Vietnamese resistance. Finally, mounting challenges to global US hegemony created a new 
atmosphere of revolutionary momentum that aided North Korea to advance its own cause. 
North Korea had a ready audience for its militant anti-imperialist message. Third World 
governments, socialist states, and national liberation movements seemed to be challenging 
the power structure of US hegemony on many fronts.
North Korea was never "isolated" internationally during the period 1960-1975, as has 
sometimes been claimed. On the contrary, North Korea very successfully cultivated the 
support of the majority of Third World governments and mounted a successful challenge to 
US hegemonic influence in the UN on the Korean Question. In fact, the period culminated 
in the almost full international "rehabilitation" of North Korea. But its momentum was not 
great enough to overturn the international status of South Korea.
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Chapter Five: South Korea's Outward Orientation 1960-1975: Economic Development and
the Retreat from Anti-Communism
I. Introduction
The Republic of Korea concluded the reconstruction period with a foreign policy still 
largely defined by its anti-communism, and an economic policy emphasising dependence on 
the United States. However, the ROK gradually retreated from anti-communism as the 
cardinal principle of foreign policy and adopted a new outward-looking economic policy.
As time passed, the new economic policy significantly influenced the adjustment of foreign 
policy. New found pragmatism reflected South Korea's recognition of the need for 
flexibility in order to increase international support and expand its economic interests. It 
proved to be a successful policy in the long term, but in the medium term South Korea's 
diplomacy was on the defensive, being out of tune with the radical political tenor of the era 
in much of the Third World.
Major changes in the international system in the early 1970s again precipitated adjustment 
in ROK policy - toward increased domestic repression, increased military and industrial 
self-reliance, and even greater flexibility in foreign policy. As the international system 
moved from a bipolar to a multipolar configuration, the ideological rigidities of early Cold 
War geopolitics were eroded. As challenges to US hegemony brought US retrenchment in 
Asia, the ROK sought self-reliance as a guarantee of security in an uncertain world. 
Nevertheless, the close identification of ROK policy with US interests in this period, and 
especially its combat involvement in the Vietnam War, seriously undermined its diplomacy 
in the Third World.
Nevertheless, the consistent expansion of South Korean industry and exports led it to seek 
diversification of markets and secure sources of raw materials. This in turn encouraged 
South Korea to gradually abandon anti-communism in its foreign policy and seek economic 
ties first, and expanded diplomatic contacts, regardless of ideology.
H. Origins of the Outward Oriented Policy
The transition toward an outward oriented economic policy and a more flexible foreign 
policy was accompanied by several regime (government) changes. These occurred in 1960, 
1961,1964, and 1972. The regime changed from a strong Presidential system (1948-60), to a 
parliamentary system (1960-61), to a military junta (1961-64), back to a strong Presidential 
system (1964-71), and finally to an authoritarian dictatorship (1972-79).
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Three key factors in the regional and global constellation of forces conditioned the early 
shift toward more pragmatism. First, there was a change in the balance of power on the 
Korean peninsula itself. North Korea's industrial and political strength contrasted sharply 
in 1960 with South Korea's economic and political weakness. Secondly, there was a change 
in the nature of dependence on the US, reflecting the US desire to reduce the direct cost of 
subsidising the ROK. Thirdly, there was a change in the political composition of the UNGA, 
reflecting the process of decolonisation.
The adjustment began as early as 1958. Therefore, it is not accurate to portray the policy 
shift merely as a product of the establishment of a military regime in 1961. The salience of 
deeper international trends can be demonstrated by the continuity of the ROK's 
adjustment polices across all three regimes from 1958-1964. The broadening of relations 
with the (non-aligned) Third World began in the late 1950s under Rhee, was promoted by 
the Democratic Party government in 1960-61, and continued by the military regime 
thereafter. Likewise, economic policy change, i.e. toward stable macro-econoiQic 
management, re-integration with Japan, economic planning, and an export orientation, 
began in the late 1950s, was supported by the Democratic Party regime, and continued and 
consolidated by the military regime.
Massive fraud in the 1960 Presidential election led to Rhee's downfall (1), but the 
underlying cause was mal-administration. For this reason, the US facilitated Rhee's 
removal. As his American adviser Robert Oliver put it "The time had come for "Operation 
Ever-ready" to be put into effect." (2) Rhee had obstructed American guidelines on fiscal 
policy and ignored American fears of inflation. US Ambassador Walter P. McConaughy 
demanded from Rhee the resumption of "full democratic practices", removal of the army 
and police from politics, and repeal of the controversial draconian articles of the National 
Security Law passed in December, 1958. (3)
The opposition Democratic party formed a new government after winning parliamentary 
elections on 29 July, 1960. The new Prime Minister, Chang Myun, recognised the ROK's 
weaknesses and promoted new policies to redress the situation. First, the new government 
took an important step in relations with the Third World by announcing a policy of
"Friendly Relations with the Neutralist Camp." (4)
Reunification policy was also immediately affected by a retreat from strident anti­
communism. On 24 August, 1960, the ROK issued a statement stressing the role of UN
supervised elections and abandoning the "reckless policy of trying to reunify Korea by
force as advocated by the past Liberal Government." (5) The new Foreign Minister, Chung, 
Il-hyung, declared that the ROK would "strive to elevate Korea's international status
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through reinforced diplomatic activities within the UN and its various organizations", thus 
repudiating Rhee's isolationism. (6)
Nevertheless, Chang Myun sought to combine diplomacy with neutralist governments with 
a policy of "strengthening of ties among anti-communist allies." (7) The ROK participated 
in consultations with Nationalist China, South Vietnam, and the Philippines in Quezon 
City, 18-19 January, 1961 (8), seeking closer economic ties. South Korea was supportive of a 
North East Asian Treaty Organisation for collective security. Finally, the ROK favoured 
closer ties to the US and completion of a status of forces agreement.
President Eisenhower visited Korea in June, 1960, to demonstrate US support for the 
democratic revolution. US economic assistance to the ROK, which had been decreasing for 
each of the three years prior to this, was increased, and the ROK pledged itself to economic 
reform and normalisation with Japan, both long standing US demands. A new agreement 
on economic assistance was signed on 8 February, 1961, giving the US unilateral powers’of 
supervision over the uses of US aid. This agreement caused a storm of protest in South 
Korea. In fact, the ROK National Assembly passed a resolution on 13 March, 1961, urging 
the US to respect Korea's independence in the implementation of US aid programmes.
The Chang Myun regime was under domestic pressure to move toward a political 
settlement with the North. Left wing forces in South Korea called for national elections 
supervised by neutral nations. (9) The Chang Myun government, however, opposed cross­
contacts between North and South at non-governmental level prior to any elections. (10) In 
this regard, the Chang Myun government's policy on reunification differed little from 
Rhee’s. (11)
The Democratic government did not survive to implement its new policies. It was 
overthrown in a military coup d'etat on 16 May, 1961 and replaced by the Supreme Council 
for National Reconstruction (SCNR), a military junta led by Park Chung Hee. According to 
Han, Sung-joo, the fall of the Democratic government was caused by acute ideological and 
political polarisation between pro-Rhee and anti-Rhee social forces, and between radicals 
and conservatives in general. (12) The first principle of the new regime was anti­
communism, and it swiftly suppressed the popular movement for reunification.
However, in terms of economic policy and foreign policy the new military regime was 
remarkably consistent with its predecessor.
For example, the military junta immediately set about expanding the ROK's diplomatic 
contacts. It explicitly abandoned isolationism, based on consideration "of the effect of the 
non-aligned, neutralist camp on our diplomacy in the United Nations." (13) Nor did it
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revert to Rhee's bellicose reunification policy. On the contrary, it adopted Chang Myun's 
policy of upholding the Geneva principles and eschewing violence.
Nor did the military regime revert to Rhee's economic policies, which had emphasised aid 
dependence. They accepted the Chang Myun government's commitment to stabilisation 
measures, expanding exports, and normalisation of relations with Japan. However, there 
was a very significant shift within the policy of export orientation. The Chang Myun 
government, dominated as it was mainly by landed interests, had advocated exports of 
primary materials and agricultural products. The military regime, in contrast, came to 
favour a clear emphasis on export of labour-intensive manufactures over primary products.
The Chang Myun regime's commitment to economic planning was accepted as a central 
aspect of economic management. The role of the state in guiding national economic 
development was greatly increased. This implied a new relationship between government 
and business, or state and private capital, in which the state was clearly in a position’of 
dominance over private business. This was later dubbed "guided capitalism" by the new 
regime. (14)
South Korea's adoption of an export oriented economic policy, tied to both Japan and the 
United States, set it on a path of rapid economic growth and industrialisation. This crucial 
policy shift reflected a special structural opportunity that was "made available" to South 
Korea by Japan and the United States, and reflected a restructuring process of the regional 
and global international division of labour, as well as unique geopolitical considerations. 
(15)
The commitment to normalise relations with Japan was very unpopular (16), but an 
integral part of American designs for the economic future of South Korea. (17) Despite US 
approval of the junta, US aid to the ROK decreased from 1961 to 1964, dropping from $154 
million in 1961 to $88 million in 1964, excluding agricultural surplus under Public Law 480. 
Even aid under the Military Assistance Program (MAP) decreased in this period. Higher 
aid levels were restored only when the ROK completed normalisation with Japan and 
entered the Vietnam War in 1965. (18)
The junta laid the foundation for a subsequent period of rapid economic growth by 
undertaking basic stabilisation measures on the one hand, such as a realistic exchange rate, 
anti-inflationary policy, and sound fiscal responsibility, and by creating new institutions for 
economic management on the other, such as the pivotal Economic Planning Board (EPB). 
Park Chung Hee personally supervised the national export promotion campaign.
Economic growth was subordinated to the overriding goal of "victory over communism"
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and national reunification.
ID. Third World Diplomacy in the 1960s
Cold War rigidities applied to South Korea's relations with the West, which were secure, 
and any relations with North Korea. Park Chung Hee refused to talk with the Northern 
authorities throughout the 1960s, until a change of policy in August, 1970. The DPRK was 
categorised as an "anti-state organisation", illegally occupying territory of the ROK. 
Outside this box, however, the ROK actively sought to expand diplomatic contacts.
The "revolutionary" SCNR immediately dispatched goodwill missions, from July to 
September, 1961, to various parts of the Third World, including Latin America, where 
ROK support was traditionally strong but where Rhee had been inactive. This was did 
specifically in order to "achieve the votes for our resolution at the UNGA." (19) The ROK 
ambassador to Turkey, Yoon, Jee Chang, led a mission to seven countries in the Middle 
East including Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Republic, Morocco, Libya, 
and Iraq. In Southeast Asia, the ambassador to the ROV, Choi, Duk Shin, led a mission to 
seven countries including India, Ceylon, Pakistan, Nepal, Cambodia, Laos, and Burma. In 
Africa, the ROK ambassador to France, Paik, Sun Hwa, led a mission to 16 countries 
including Senegal, Mauritania, Sierra leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, 
Togo, Dahomey, Nigeria, Chad, the Central African Republic, Cameroon, Gabon, Congo 
(Brazzaville), and Madagascar. (20)
In total, these missions visited over thirty Third World governments, many of them 
neutralist or non-aligned. The mission to Francophone Africa was considered a particular 
success, winning support for the ROK in the 1961 UNGA debate from thirteen former 
French colonies. With only a few exceptions, the choice of destinations for these missions 
reflected targeting of moderate, conservative, pro-Western governments, still a contrast to 
the earlier blinkered rejection of all neutralism. The ROK continued to resist relations with 
radical regimes. Via the Hallstein Doctrine, it rejected any regime having diplomatic 
relations with North Korea.
Much of the activity during the first two years of the junta was simply to establish 
diplomatic relations with governments already friendly to the ROK. In this way the junta 
capitalised on latent support that Rhee had left unexploited. For instance, in 1961 the ROK 
established diplomatic relations with eleven countries. After the coup, the ROK established 
diplomatic relations with five African countries: Ivory Coast, Niger, Benin, Chad and 
Cameroon.
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In 1962 the ROK achieved a spectacular one-off gain in diplomacy, establishing relations 
with over thirty governments, thereby more than doubling the number of its diplomatic 
partners in one stroke. Of these, seventeen were in Latin America, and seven in Africa: 
Upper Volta, Sierra Leone, Madagascar, Morocco, Gabon, Senegal, and Congo 
(Brazzaville). In the Middle East, relations were established with Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and 
Iran, each of which was ruled by a conservative, pro-Western monarchy. However, a 
consulate was set up in Cairo, capital of the radical nationalist UAR. In Asia, relations were 
established with Cambodia, the Federation of Malaya, and Laos, and consular relations 
were agreed upon with India and Burma. The ROK's rapprochement with India was quite 
significant, though it took many years to complete. The ROK supported India's cause in the 
conflict with China in October, 1962, and condemned Chinese aggression. Other states with 
which the ROK established relations in 1962 include Spain (under Franco), Israel, New 
Zealand, Iceland, and Switzerland. (21)
According to the official ROK Foreign Ministry diplomatic history of this period, the ROK 
continued to stress its policy of friendly relations toward neutral and non-aligned countries, 
particularly in the Third World. The official history explains that this was done for a dual 
purpose: that of strengthening the position of the ROK in the UNGA debates on the Korean 
Question, and to enhance the new economic policy of export orientation and economic 
profit. (22) For example, the goodwill missions sent to every region of the Third World in 
1962 had the dual purpose of canvassing support before the UNGA session and to establish 
new economic ties and conduct market research. (23)
However, the gains of diplomacy in 1961-1963 did not continue throughout the decade. On 
the contrary, the pace of diplomacy fell off sharply and reached a nadir in 1966-72, 
discussed further below. The pace was already tapering off in 1963, when new relations 
were established with several African states, including Rwanda, Uganda, Zaire, CAR, and 
Ethiopia, as well as Peru in South America. In the face of this slow-down, the ROK 
redoubled efforts to win new friends in the Third World in 1964. (24) The number of 
goodwill missions was increased, more foreign delegations were invited to South Korea, 
more non-aligned governments were recognised by the ROK, and trade and technological 
cooperation were expanded with the Third World.
In 1964, as the ROK returned to a "civilian" regime, though still dominated by Park Chung 
Hee and the military, the ROK launched its first development assistance programme, 
particularly in Africa. The first African state to receive such assistance was Uganda, to 
which the ROK sent a medical team. This was soon followed by doctors and medical 
supplies and other equipment to a number of African countries. The small size of this 
programme limited its effectiveness, but it had some symbolic value. (25)
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Strain on the Hallstein Doctrine was already apparent by 1964. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, Mauritania and Congo (Brazzaville), having previously maintained relations 
exclusively with the ROK, also established diplomatic relations with North Korea. The 
ROK was outraged, invoked the Hallstein Doctrine, and cut off all relations. In 1964-1965 
the pace of establishing new diplomatic relationships slowed considerably. Kenya and 
Liberia established relations with the ROK in 1964, and in 1965 two Latin American and 
two African states (Gambia and Malawi) established relations. The distribution of ROK 
embassies in 1965 is a good indicator of its strong areas of priority. Latin America and 
Southeast Asia were clearly the strong points in ROK Third World diplomacy, 
corresponding to the prevalence of conservative and pro-Western regimes in these regions 
at the time.
When the Non-aligned Movement was established at Belgrade in 1961 the DPRK had an 
initial advantage. However, the NAM broadened its membership criteria by the time of its 
second summit in Cairo in 1964. At this time the ROK actually succeeded in getting more 
diplomatic partners in the NAM than the DPRK, reversing the situation as of 1961. 
However, this trend is somewhat deceptive, since most of those states established diplomatic 
relations with the ROK before actually joining the NAM. The ROK established diplomatic 
relations with some 20 members of the NAM in the 1960s, but of these only five established 
relations with the ROK after they had joined the NAM. These five were Saudi Arabia, 
Morocco, Ethiopia, Malawi, and Tunisia, primarily conservative pro-Western regimes.
In the second half of the 1960s the ROK increasingly emphasised economic cooperation as a 
theme of Third World diplomacy, but it had little to offer many non-aligned governments 
in political terms, since its close alliance with the US undermined its credibility. Despite 
careful ROK attention to Africa, the DPRK established a bloc of supporters there that 
rejected diplomatic relations with South Korean, including Algeria, Mali, Egypt, 
Congo(Brazzaville), Mauritania, Tanzania, Burundi, Somalia, and Zambia. Despite ROK 
successes in the Middle East among conservative regimes, even in that region many 
governments were reluctant to allow the ROK to establish an embassy because "In some 
cases there was clearly a fear that non-aligned status might be questioned by so blatantly 
choosing sides in the Korean conflict". (26)
The ROK's diplomatic weakness in the Middle East was mainly a result of its friendly 
relationship with Israel, and its generally anti-Arab positions in regard to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. The 1967 war was particularly costly for the ROK. Most Arab governments 
severed diplomatic relations with the US, while the ROK had close military and diplomatic 
ties with both the US and Israel. According to one analysis of ROK diplomacy in the Middle
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East, the ROK's diplomatic defeats in the region were "a function of Seoul's insensitivity to 
Middle East regional political dynamics. The political costs South Korea has paid for its 
pro-Israel policy have been substantial." (27)
Following the 1967 war it was difficult for the ROK to muster political support from 
Middle Eastern regimes. Therefore, the ROK reconsidered its Middle East policy in light of 
more pragmatic criteria and in August, 1970, announced that it supported implementation 
of UN Resolution 242, i.e. urging Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 
war.
However, one should not over-exaggerate the negative aspects of the diplomatic 
predicament of the ROK in this period. For instance, the balance sheet of diplomatic 
supporters between the ROK and DPRK in the 1960s reveals that the ROK remained 
predominant in overall, despite the gains made by North Korea. The following chart 
illustrates the total number of governments having relations exclusively with one side 'as 
opposed to the other:
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
ROK 27 57 67 69 74 75 76 79 80
DPRK 15 15 18 22 23 23 25 27 32
Nevertheless, the ROK was increasingly on the defensive.
The first clear indication that the ROK was aware of the danger is a statement by the 
Foreign Ministry on 13 January, 1966, announcing that, with a view to "countering north 
Korea's intensified diplomatic and commercial activities directed at nonaligned nations" 
the ROK would, if necessary, entertain commercial and cultural relations with countries 
which maintained diplomatic relations with North Korea. (28) This had in fact already been 
the case in practice, particularly with Egypt, where the ROK had a consulate. Nevertheless, 
it was not a repudiation of the Hallstein Doctrine.
By the late 1960s the ROK realised that it could not sustain the Hallstein Doctrine even in 
this diluted form, particularly in Africa. In 1967 the ROK cut off all economic ties with 
Southern Rhodesia, an attempt to establish new credentials as a supporter of the cause of 
Black African liberation. More significantly, Chad and the CAR were allowed to establish 
diplomatic relations with the DPRK in May, 1969, with impunity, having previously had 
such relations only with the ROK. This established a very important precedent, allowing 
governments to choose to recognise both Koreas. Paradoxically, for the ROK, this opened 
the door to a massive increase in DPRK diplomatic partners between 1970 and 1975, while
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they themselves made relatively little progress.
Even earlier, between 1966 and 1972, the ROK had a very lean season in terms of finding 
new diplomatic partners. To illustrate: in 1966 only Lesotho established diplomatic 
relations with the ROK; in 1967, only the Maldives; in 1968 Swaziland, Guyana, and 
Botswana; in 1969 only Tunisia; in 1970 only Tonga; in 1971 Fiji, and Mauritius; in 1972 
only Western Samoa. While the ROK relied mainly on micro-states for fresh support, the 
DPRK surged ahead on the tide of anti-colonialism in the Third World.
Nevertheless, the ROK was able to take advantage of its standing in the West to participate 
in important international organisations and fora, among them the Colombo plan, the 
ADB, the ECAFE conferences on Asian Economic Cooperation, and the GATT, which the 
ROK joined in 1967. Most importantly, in terms of the long term prospects of its Third 
World diplomacy, the ROK joined UNCTAD and the Group of 77, and attended the Algiers 
G-77 ministerial meeting. The ROK said that "Korea believes in international cooperation 
among developing countries". (29)
As a Newly Industrialising Country, the ROK had a self interest in Third World solidarity 
of this specific kind. The ROK's approach to Third World solidarity was based on 
economic common interests among less developed countries vis a vis the advanced OECD 
countries. The ROK became a standard bearer of better terms of trade, particularly of the 
general system of preferences, aimed at improving market access for manufactures from 
less developed countries. This contributed to the ROK's effort to convince its Third World 
partners in the G-77 that it was serious about Third World solidarity.
It was bilateral relations, however, that were a central in ROK foreign economic policy. 
This was assisted by promotion of South Korea as a model of Third World economic 
development. In the late 1960s the World Bank rated the ROK as being first among all 
developing countries in the rate of export growth. Even UNCTAD chose the ROK as a 
model of successful diversification of the economy and the development of overseas 
markets.
South Korea put a brave face on the unfavourable international trends of this period. 
President Park Chung Hee summarised the achievements of ROK policy in the 1960s by 
confidently asserting that "I believe that the Republic of Korea's position in the 
international community has incomparably improved since the 1950s, or early in the 
1960s", citing an increase in diplomatic partners from 22 to 93, membership in 
international organisations from 26 to 40, treaties and agreements from 127 to 365, and an 
increase in trade partners from 30 to 105. He even said that "I think because of the
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Republic of Korea's despatch of troops to Vietnam, the position of this country in the 
international community has been greatly improved, especially in Southeast Asia and the 
Far East." (30)
The ROK tried to appropriate the vocabulary of Third World solidarity. For instance, it 
began to refer regularly to "Afro-Asian solidarity" in a positive way. In 1970 Foreign 
Minister Choi, Kyu-Hah, for instance, used this phrase in the context of talks with the 
Gambia, and Liberia. (31) More significantly, the ROK began to use phrases such as 
"developing nations should strengthen their ties" in official communiques with Third 
World governments. In 1971, this phrase appeared in communiques with Trinidad and 
Tobago, and with Jamaica. (31)
From 1971, mirroring DPRK tactics, the ROK systematically canvassed Third World 
governments for explicit statements of support for Southern reunification proposals, or 
support in the UNGA. Parallel to this, the ROK began to make its own proposals on 
common Third World economic interests, and do so in the name of Third World solidarity. 
For example, at a G-77 Ministerial Conference in Lima, Peru, on 2 November, 1971, ROK 
Foreign Minister Kim, Yong-Shik outlined a 4 Point proposal, designed for the upcoming 
third UNCTAD conference. This proposal included support for a General Agreement on 
Commodity Arrangements, new terms of ODA, special measures for LLDCs, full 
implementation of the General System of Preferences (GSP), elimination of non-tariff 
barriers by developed countries, and reform of the international monetary system.
Kim's rhetoric reproduced the language of Third World solidarity. For instance, he said - 
in the name of the Third World - that "We cannot afford to falter in our solidarity...We 
must formulate a common platform consonant with the aspirations of the people of the 
Group of 77 developing countries". (32) In another instance, Ambassador Park, Tong Jin, 
at the GATT's 27th session of contracting parties in Geneva in late November, 1971, lodged 
a protest over the unilateral imposition by President Nixon of US surcharges on imports, 
expressed concern over special trading groups like the EEC, and supported the formation 
of special trade arrangements among developing countries (i.e. South-South cooperation). 
(34)
In 1972, at the UNCTAD meeting in Santiago, Chile (where the host was a diplomatic 
supporter of the DPRK) Kim, Yong Shik stressed the adverse effects on developing 
countries of the current economic and monetary situation in the world, and said the ROK 
supported the Lima Declaration and a Special Drawing Rights link for LDCs. When Kim, 
Yong Shik was in Mexico in August, 1973, he publicly endorsed President Luis Echeverria 
Alvarez's proposal for a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. Kim said that
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Mexico and Korea should "coordinate their efforts with a view to strengthening the 
precarious legal basis of the international economic relations between the developed and 
developing countries" (35) This line on "close cooperation among developing countries" 
was consistently pursued throughout this period, including the UNIDO conference in Lima, 
15 March, 1975.
The shift of ROK diplomacy toward more openness that accompanied the North-South 
Dialogue facilitated a more positive atmosphere in Third World diplomacy. For example, 
the President of the Republic of Cameroon, shortly after the 4 July, 1972 Joint 
Communique, told the new ROK ambassador that, since Cameroon's foreign policy was 
guided by the principle of non-alignment, "it is within the framework of ...this policy of 
non-alignment that we have decided to maintain diplomatic relations with the two states 
which represent the Korean people, the division of which we nonetheless deplore." (36) This 
formula became ever more common in the non-aligned Third World, and it strengthened 
the trend in the 1970s towards dual recognition of both Koreas by a growing number .of 
governments.
It was not for want of trying that the ROK did not reap a full diplomatic harvest during 
this period. In fact, the ROK responded to the new situation by very energetic diplomatic 
campaigning. In 1973 alone, the ROK sent 23 missions to 82 non-aligned countries. Of this 
total, 3 missions went to 12 Asian countries; 6 missions went to 19 Central and South 
American countries; 9 missions went to 34 African countries; and 5 missions went to 17 
Middle Eastern countries. In 1974 this pace was sustained: 23 missions went to 88 non- 
aligned countries. Of this total, 3 missions went to 6 Asian states; 7 missions visited a total 
of 22 American states; 10 missions covered 47 African countries; and 3 missions visited a 
total of 13 Middle Eastern countries (37).
All were characterised by extensive briefing on the ROK's new policies toward the Third 
World, canvassing of support in the UNGA, and keen emphasis on economic agreements.
There were some diplomatic gains from this energetic outreach. Indonesia established full 
diplomatic relations with the ROK in September, 1973, and India in December of the same 
year. This achievement was partly due to the personal diplomacy of the ROK ambassador 
to India, Lho, Shin Yong. Nevertheless, the breakthrough with India did not constitute a 
breakthrough with the NAM. In the same year (1973) diplomatic relations were established 
with Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Finland. Taken together, these gains represented an 
escape from the diplomatic doldrums of the preceding period 1969-72.
This new momentum was sustained in the Middle East. Indeed, the ROK's policy changes 
in the early 1970s led to a virtual diplomatic reversal in the Middle East. The immediate
138
stimulus was the Arab-Israeli War and the oil embargo imposed on supporters of Israel. 
This crisis served as a catalyst for a reversal of the ROK's line on the Arab-Israeli conflict; 
a reversal clearly dictated by South Korea's national interests.
On 15 December, 1973, the ROK Foreign Ministry issued a statement on the Middle 
Eastern situation in which it recognised that "The legitimate claims of the people of 
Palestine should be recognized and respected." (38) Seoul also called for Israeli withdrawal 
from the occupied territories.
South Korea's new domestic economic policies, based on oil-dependent Heavy and 
Chemical Industrialisation (HCI), made this policy an imperative. The reversal cleared the 
way for Seoul to enjoy expanded diplomatic relations with the region. For instance, Oman 
and Qatar established full diplomatic relations early in 1974. It also led to greatly expanded 
South Korean economic presence in the region, particularly in engineering and 
construction.
Saudi Arabia played a key role in brokering South Korea's entry into the Middle East. 
When the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia visited Seoul in July, 1974, ROK Foreign 
Minister Kim, Dong Jo thanked him for Saudi Arabia's support during the recent oil crisis 
of 1973. He appealed to Saudi Arabia to use its "great influence in the Arab world" to 
"convey ROK goodwill to Arab people" in order to counter "DPRK slander" that had been 
designed to "obstruct our establishment of friendly relations with the Arab countries" (39).
Though Saudi Arabia, given its pivotal weight in regional oil politics, played the key role, 
other moderate regimes were also enlisted to assist. Tunisia helped convey the goodwill of 
the ROK to Arab countries and assisted in establishing friendly relations with them. (40) 
Similarly, when the Moroccan Foreign Minister visited the ROK in September, 1974, ROK 
Foreign Minister Kim, Dong Jo thanked Morocco for helping to inform Arab countries of 
the ROK's support for the Arab cause. (41)
In Africa, the ROK suddenly embraced national liberation. President Park sent a message 
to the 11th OAU Heads of State meeting in June, 1974, asserting that the ROK had "given 
its firm support to and expressed its solidarity with Africa striving for national 
independence, freedom, justice and economic prosperity...and will continue to do its utmost 
effort in helping the African liberation movements and in strengthening cooperation with 
African countries" (42).
It was precisely at this time that the international tide of events was turning in favour of 
national liberation movements in much of southern Africa, particularly in the wake of the 
revolution in Portugal in 1974. Seoul recognised the new radical Portuguese government led
139
by President Antonio de Spinola on 16 May, 1974. Previously the ROK had conducted 
cordial relations with both fascist Spain and Portugal, sharing an anti-communist ideology.
South Korea likewise went out of its way to welcome the new marxist regimes of southern 
Africa. On 6 June, 1974, the ROK recognised the new Democratic Republic of Guinea- 
Bissau, declaring that the ROK had "always been sympathetic with and given support to 
the total liberation of African continent from colonial rule, and in particular to the 
independence of Guinea-Bissau." (43) Nevertheless, in this case the ROK's "solidarity" was 
too little too late. Guinea-Bissau chose to open diplomatic relations exclusively with North 
Korea, long a supporter of its revolutionary cause. Other ex-Portuguese colonial 
possessions, similarly approached by South Korea, such as Angola, Mozambique, and Sao 
Tome and Principe, all chose to open diplomatic relations exclusively with North Korea.
There were, however, some successes in Africa to compensate for such disappointments 
among the Lusophone group. For example, Liberia's ambassador said that the ROK and 
Liberia shared similar views on issues ranging from decolonisation, consolidation of 
economic and political independence, human rights, racial discrimination, and Southern 
Africa. (44) The ROK despatched a special envoy of President Park to Africa in 1974, Kim, 
Se Ryun, to give extensive briefings on the upcoming UNGA session and canvass support 
for postponing the Korea debate. His briefing of Liberia's President William R. Tolbert 
illustrates the new tactics. While giving very detailed accounts of the Korean Question, the 
ROK promised Liberia increased technical assistance. ROK sincerity was demonstrated 
through superseding mere medical assistance with more substantial economic assistance. 
(45) The Gambia similarly couched its friendship with the ROK, and search for economic 
assistance, in terms of "promoting the Afro-Asian solidarity". (46)
Despite economic advances, ROK diplomacy suffered from momentous political setbacks, 
especially in Asia. South Korea had long maintained a close relationship with the anti­
communist regimes of Southeast Asia. The fall of the anti-communist regimes of South 
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in 1975 was therefore a great blow to the ROK. The 
resultant trend in the region to seek accommodation with communist regimes, was met by 
strong ROK protests, but to no avail.
For instance, Thailand moved toward establishing diplomatic relations with the DPRK. The 
ROK issued an Aide Memoire to Thailand on 30 April, 1975, urging it to reconsider. In it, 
South Korea bemoaned the fact that since the 23 June, 1973 statement, (renouncing the 
Hallstein doctrine) the friends of the ROK had been establishing relations with North 
Korea, but the friends of the DPRK had not been doing so with South Korea. It was 
therefore a one-sided opening process. (47)
140
Anti-communism still played a role in ROK foreign policy. For instance, visiting President 
Fidel Sanchez Hernandez, of El Salvador, expressed support for the ROK's stand against 
communism in September, 1970. (48) Diplomatic contact with Spain prompted President 
Park to remark that both shared "agonizing sufferings of civil strife provoked by the enemy 
of peace and freedom", thus identifying the Korean and Spanish civil wars as struggles 
against communism. When the socialist government of Allende was overthrown in Chile in 
1973, the ROK immediately established friendly relations with the Pinochet regime. In his 
welcoming speech to the new Chilean ambassador, President Park said that their common 
ties were based on common ideals, antagonistic to international communism. Chile's 
ambassador spoke of the "common enemy," as "International Marxism". Finally, 
throughout this period the ROK maintained close relations with the nationalists on Taiwan, 
despite their expulsion from the UN. When President Chiang Kai Shek died in early 1975, 
President Park issued a special statement eulogising Chiang and his historic role against 
communism.
Another important aspect of ROK anti-communist policy was the propaganda campaign it 
launched against DPRK assistance to guerillas or other subversive forces in the Third 
World. In 1971, ROK Foreign Minister Choi, Kyu Hah, while in Washington D.C., referred 
to a "terrorist group trained and supported by the north Korean communists for guerrilla 
warfare to overthrow the Mexican Government" and to similar incidents in Ceylon and 
even in Rumania. Choi claimed that "The prime objective of the north Korea-trained 
guerrilla and terrorist elements is to overthrow legitimate governments in developing 
countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America." (49)
The states that were directly targeted in this campaign were often those abstaining in the 
UNGA Korea debate, or potential swing votes. The ROK published a document entitled 
"North Korea's Export of Guerrilla Warfare", in English, French, and Spanish, in which it 
detailed alleged DPRK subversive activities in states including: Mexico, Ceylon, India, 
Indonesia, Pakistan, Chad, the CAR, Lebanon, and Rumania. It accused the DPRK of 
giving military training to subversives or terrorists in 9 Latin American, 8 African, 7 Arab, 
and 4 Asian countries. This was an attempt to reverse the positive image of the DPRK as a 
supporter of national liberation struggles in the Third World, toward one of a subversive 
threat to established governments. (50)
However, the problems posed by such an anti-communist approach were apparent when 
the ROK decided to apply for membership in the NAM on 7 June, 1975, for decision at the 
Lima Foreign Ministers Conference in August. (51) This decision, in hindsight, was rather 
unwise, since it was always unlikely to succeed. ROK missions were sent across the Third
141
World to canvass support for NAM membership, and for ROK membership in the UN, for 
which an application was made on 29 July, 1975.
Despite the best efforts of the ROK to convince NAM governments that its policy was truly 
non-aligned, the application of the ROK was rejected and that of North Korea was 
accepted. This rebuff reflected the recentness of the ROK's policy shift on Third World 
liberation movements. The ROK Foreign Ministry lodged an official protest concerning the 
NAM decision, complaining that the Lima statement on the Korean Question referred only 
to North Korea on the question of reunification, thus demonstrating an "apparent lack of 
fairness and objectivity." The ROK noted that its application was rejected, "despite strong 
support by a great number of the members of the group." (52) This referred to a group of 
moderate governments, many of them Middle Eastern.
IV. The Vietnam War and Anti-Communist Policy
The ROK's normalisation of relations with Japan on 22 June, 1965 and its commitment' to 
send combat troops to Vietnam, together inaugurated a new role for South Korea in the 
region and in the international system. South Korean economic "take-off in the late 1960s 
cannot properly be understood without taking into account the very great importance of its 
involvement in the Vietnam War, and the new economic ties to Japan. There was, however, 
a diplomatic cost to South Korea for involvement in the Vietnam War as well, i.e. isolation 
from the mainstream Third World solidarity movement.
ROK involvement in the Vietnam War reflected the continued importance of anti­
communism in determining policy. South Korea
maintained close economic and security relations with fellow anti-communist governments, 
particularly the ROC and ROV, which were also divided nations. Even before entry into 
the Vietnam War, the founder of the KCIA and Chairman of the ruling Democratic 
Republican Party, Kim, Jong-pil, visited the ROC and ROV as President Park's Special 
Envoy, in March, 1964. (53)
Preparations for collaboration in the fight against communism were always a key concern. 
In 1965, Prime Minister Ky of South Vietnam paid a state visit to Seoul to discuss a new 
"Treaty of Amity" in the face of "communist aggression". (54) A treaty of amity was 
negotiated with the ROC as well. (55) In 1966 President Park embarked on summit 
diplomacy in the region to consolidate support for the ROK's role in the Vietnam war. (56) 
Park and Chiang Kai-shek issued a Joint Communique on 18 February, 1966 recognising 
communist China as the "source of all the troubles in Asia," and pledged full support to 
South Vietnam. (57)
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The ROK, ROC, and ROV also discussed mutual assistance to improve their international 
status, including a bid for executive positions in the IMF, IBRD, and ADB. In addition, the 
ROK and ROC discussed a "common market" plan in 1966. (58) They also agreed to 
obstruct trade between communist China and Southeast Asia, by diplomatic means and 
through trade competition.
The deployment of large numbers of ROK forces to South Vietnam, peaking at some 50,000 
troops by 1968, benefited the South Korean economy, (59) but associated the ROK with an 
American policy of interventionism that became increasingly unpopular in the Third 
World. Non-aligned Afro-Asian states were particularly critical of the US intervention in 
Vietnam, and thus also of the ROK's involvement.
The agreement in 1966 to send even more ROK more troops to Vietnam pledged the US to 
buy as much as possible from South Korea for the Vietnam war, modernise the ROK 
forces, pay for all costs of sending ROK troops to Vietnam, extend $150 million in new 
loans in addition to $150 million agreed in 1965, and temporarily cancel the MAP 
programme in order to assist the ROK to preserve its foreign exchange. (60)
The US was grateful for ROK support in the war. In 1966 both Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk and President Johnson praised the ROK for its role in Vietnam, normalisation of 
relations with Japan, its initiative on ASP AC, its new economic successes, and the new 
Status of forces agreement with the US. (61) Dependence on the US in the Vietnam war era 
brought positive results for economic development and in some ways enhanced the ROK's 
international standing.
The ROK took the initiative to found an anti-communist security organisation in Asia. This 
took the form of ASPAC, the Asian and Pacific Cooperation Conference, which held its first 
ministerial meeting in Seoul, 14-16 June, 1966. It was attended by Australia, the ROK, 
ROV, ROC, the Philippines, Thailand, and Japan (at Foreign Minister level), and also by 
Malaysia, New Zealand, and Laos. The common denominator was their support for the 
ROV in the Vietnam war. (62) This was followed by the Summit of Seven Asian Nations, in 
Manila, 24-25 October, 1966, again focused on support for the ROV in the war. The seven 
were: the US, ROK, ROV, the Philippines, Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand. ROK 
Foreign Minister Choi, Kyu Ha, remarked in September, 1967 that the ASPAC conference 
was "the crowning point of Korea's efforts for positive, multi-dimensional diplomacy 
toward the world" and referred to the war in Vietnam as "our second front". (63)
The ROK believed that its involvement in anti-communist diplomacy and the war in 
Vietnam actually won it lasting prestige in Asia and the world, and enhanced its national
143
security. However, the Tet offensive in 1968, the simultaneous North Korean attacks on the 
South, and the seizure of the USS Pueblo, reminded South Korea of the dangers that 
accompanied the policy. The ROK considered these events in Korea and Vietnam to be 
"intimately related with one another". (64)
In the aftermath of Tet, the ROK's regional anti-communist policy brought ever 
diminishing returns. For instance, at the third ASPAC ministerial conference in Canberra, 
the ROK was forced to admit that the other nations were reluctant to go further down the 
path of an overt anti-communist alliance. The Joint Communique of 1 August, 1968 stated 
unequivocally that "ASPAC was not intended to be a body directed against any state or 
group of states." (65) Furthermore, with the demise of SEATO and the founding of 
ASEAN, the pan-Asian initiative passed from the ROK to other leadership.
The period after the Tet offensive produced other shock waves for the ROK. For example: 
the Paris Peace talks on the Vietnam war; President Nixon's Eight Point Peace Proposal'of 
14 May, 1969; the coming rapprochement between the US and communist China; and plans 
for unilateral withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam; all of which alarmed the ROK. These 
events constituted a turning point which produced a sharp change in ROK policy, discussed 
below.
Nevertheless, anti-communism was not easily relinquished as the cornerstone of foreign 
policy. For instance, when President Nguyen Van Thieu of the ROV paid a state visit to 
Seoul in spring 1969, following the Seven Nation Summit in Bangkok, President Park 
introduced him as "the great leader of our closest ally". (66) They agreed in a joint 
communique that any unilateral withdrawal of Allied forces from Vietnam would do "great 
prejudice to the security of the Allied forces." They rejected any coalition government with 
communists in Vietnam. The ROK pledged close economic cooperation with the ROV. (67)
The full extent of the changes occurring in the international arena was brought home to 
President Park when he met President Nixon in San Francisco in August, 1969. Nixon 
explained his policy of "Asia for the Asians" to Park, who then had 50,000 troops in 
Vietnam. US allies would be expected to rely more on their own capabilities as the US 
gradually reduced its Asian commitments. President Park reacted by publicly appealing to 
the US not to "abandon Asia", and he warned of the "communist threat in Asia." He 
predicted that if the US reneged on its commitments in the region, then "new disturbances 
and threats will inevitably recur in this region." (68)
The announcement of the Nixon Doctrine brought the realisation in the ROK that a period 
of profound changes in international relations was beginning. One of the first
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manifestations of the ROK response was the decision to recognise the new radical 
governments of the Libyan Arab Republic on 13 September, 1969, and of Bolivia in 
October, 1969. These decisions represent further acceleration of the retreat from strict anti­
communism in ROK Third World Diplomacy.
V. South Korea's Turn to Nationalistic Policies
The period between 1968 and 1972 was a watershed for South Korea, during which it made 
profound changes in its domestic and foreign policies in order to adapt to a rapidly 
changing international situation. The certainties of the 1960s were breaking down as US 
leadership seemed to falter. Not only was the US retreating from Vietnam and reducing its 
forward deployment in Asia, but it was increasingly challenged by the rising Third World 
bloc and perceived to be losing the ability to effectively manage world affairs and the world 
economy.
The Pueblo incident in 1968, and especially the secret US-DPRK talks on the release of the 
Pueblo's crew, was particularly catalytic in terms of the ROK's reassessment of its 
alliances. The National Assembly passed a special resolution on 6 February, 1968, which 
stated unequivocally: "The National Assembly urges the Government to reconsider treaties 
and agreements concluded between the Republic of Korea and other nations so as to protect 
national security permanently as well as to take automatic action in case of future 
emergencies". (69)
The decision by the US to seek detente with both China and the Soviet Union confused the 
ROK as to the ideological consistency of US policy. Under the guidance of US Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger, a period dominated by the dictates of realpolitik, rather than 
ideology, was commencing. (70) However, the US certainly did not abandon commitments 
to the ROK.
The ROK decided to follow somewhat contradictory policies, i.e. greater flexibility and 
openness in foreign affairs, particularly vis a vis the Third World; while simultaneously 
pursuing a domestic program of increasing repressiveness. This solution had a diplomatic 
cost. The legitimacy of the Park regime was increasingly undermined, as its repressive 
policies were criticised even by its friends.
The "Nixon shocks" of 1971, i.e. the announcement of the withdrawal of 20,000 US troops 
from South Korea, Nixon's impending state visit to China, the unilateral abrogation of 
dollar-gold convertibility underpinning the Bretton Woods system, and the concomitant use 
of protectionist measures in the West, all convinced the ROK that a sea-change in 
international affairs was indeed occurring.
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This was followed by the Shanghai Communique between the US and PRC on 28 February, 
1972, in which an entente was established that implied the Korean Question should be 
decided by the Koreans themselves. Then came Sino-Japanese rapprochement in 
September, 1972, followed by impending US withdrawal from Vietnam as the Paris Peace 
talks progressed. At US behest the ROK reluctantly withdrew most of its troops from 
Vietnam in the course of 1972, as "Vietnamisation" of that conflict proceeded.
In tandem with these dramatic international changes, the ROK underwent drastic political 
change. This process began in 1969 with the adoption by the ROK National Assembly of a 
controversial bill on constitutional amendments and another on national referendums. 
These were passed by the ruling party without the participation of the official opposition 
New Democratic Party. A national referendum was then held on 17 October, 1969, on a new 
constitution, allowing the President to serve three consecutive terms. It was approved by 
65.09% of the vote, with 31.34 %  opposed.
President Park set the new foreign policy tone in 1969 by stating that, in order to "pursue 
our national interest in the changing world situation, the Government will develop and 
implement flexible diplomacy towards foreign countries" including "the possibility of 
establishing trade relations with some of the East European Communist countries in view 
of our capability and international trends." (71) On 31 December, 1969, the ROK Foreign 
Minister announced that the government would "expand its diplomatic ties with non- 
aligned nations and, in particular, among the developing countries."
The "regime crisis" of the Third Republic came to a head in the Presidential election of 
1971, when President Park narrowly defeated Kim Dae Jung, the charismatic leader of the 
New Democratic Party. (72) In the National Assembly elections of May, 1971 the ruling 
party retained its overall majority with 113 seats, but the opposition New Democratic Party 
won 89 seats, carrying the main cities. These results alerted the ruling party to the 
increased difficulty of maintaining power by electoral means under the existing 
constitution.
The closure of the political system began with a proclamation of a national "state of 
emergency" on 6 December, 1971. On 26 December, 1971, the National Assembly granted 
President Park special Emergency Powers, despite a parliamentary opposition boycott. On 
17 October, 1972 Park declared martial law and the period of the so-called "October 
revitalising reforms", otherwise known as "Yushin", began.
President Park declared that Yushin was necessary to adapt to the new conditions of North-
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South dialogue, and to changes in the international situation that threatened the existing 
security order in Asia. In his Special Declaration of 17 October, 1972, he began his remarks 
by saying, "There is now taking place a significant change in the balance of power among 
the big powers around the Korean peninsula" and he invoked the spectre that "the interests 
of the third or smaller countries might be sacrificed for the relaxation of tension between 
big powers." (73) The "Special Declaration" announced the dissolution of parliament, the 
suspension of all political activities, and the suspension of the Constitution pending its 
revision and re-approval by national referendum.
The new constitution was put to a referendum on 21 November, 1972 and received 91.4% 
approval. It allowed the President an indefinite number of terms in office, i.e. a "President 
for Life". There was no Vice-President, and the President was not to be chosen by direct 
popular election, but through a new electoral college, the National Conference for 
Unification, chaired by the President himself. No debate was allowed in its chamber. The 
President gained wide new emergency powers over internal and external affairs, including 
the unimpeded power to suspend constitutional rights and to dissolve the National 
Assembly, already weakened by the strengthening of unchecked Presidential powers and 
the abolition of the right of parliamentary inspection. There followed a period of rule by 
Presidential decree. Emergency Measure No. 1, on 9 January, 1974, made all opposition to 
the Yushin constitution illegal, offenders subject to arrest without warrant and to trial by 
Court Martial.
It is somewhat of a paradox that one feature of this transition period was the strong desire 
by South Korea to reaffirm its bilateral security arrangements with the US, as well as to 
win American support for increased military self-reliance. The ROK succeeded in winning 
US support for building a new national defense industry in South Korea. This was 
conditional on the guarantee, given to UNCURK on 11 May, 1970, that the ROK would 
"never resort to the use of arms in order to achieve unification" (74).
The new world view of the ROK is perhaps most clearly expressed in President Park’s 
annual Liberation Day address on 15 August, 1971. President Park warned that if "the 
major world powers attempt to bargain over our destiny as they once did, we will take a 
firm stand based on national self-reliance, and resolutely reject such maneuvers." 
Furthermore, he declared that the ROK would "guard against any unwarranted 
assumption that outside powers or international trends will bring about solutions to 
problems relating to the future of the Korean peninsula...Under these circumstances, we 
must preserve and strengthen our national self-reliance at all costs, and adjust ourselves 
actively and flexibly to changing international trends." (75)
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In the same speech, President Park announced a new step in the retreat from anti­
communism in foreign policy. He offered to encourage relations of cooperation with "any 
nation that respects our national integrity and does not engage in acts of hostility against 
us, irrespective of political system or ideology". (76)
This opened the door to relations with non-hostile communist governments, including 
direct talks with North Korea. On 23 June, 1971, the ROK Foreign Minister announced 
that South Korea was lifting the ban in Korean ports on shipping from communist Eastern 
European countries. However, the shipping ban was retained with the DPRK, PRC, DRV 
and Cuba.
VI. North-South Dialogue
To break the ice with the DPRK, President Park personally endorsed a call by the Red 
Cross for an inter-Korea meeting on humanitarian problems, i.e. on the issue of separated 
families. In exchange for DPRK pledges to desist from armed provocations; make an 
"unequivocal expression" of its non-belligerent attitude; renounce the goal >of 
communization of all Korea or the overthrow of the ROK government through violent 
revolution; and the unequivocal acceptance of the competence and authority of the UN and 
its efforts for Korean reunification; the ROK "would not be opposed to the north Korean 
communists' presence in the United Nations deliberation of the Korean Question at the 
UN." (77)
The "dialogue", however, did not begin well or easily. On 12 April, 1971, the DPRK 
rejected President Park's proposals of 15 August, 1970. In response, the ROK rejected 
Northern prerequisite for reunification: e.g. abrogation of the US-ROK Mutual Defense 
Treaty; abrogation of the treaty on basic relations with Japan; and withdrawal of all 
foreign troops; saying these demands were "utterly impractical and unreasonable." (78)
On 12 February, 1972, the ROK announced a Four Point Plan for peace in Korea, including 
a renunciation of force by both sides, peaceful use of the DMZ, cessation of armed 
infiltration into the ROK, and return of a high-jacked ROK airliner then being held in the 
North, along with its crew and passengers. Through these proposals the ROK was engaging 
in a new effort to satisfy the international community that it was serious about peace and 
wanted negotiation with the North. This was also necessary to counteract the increasing 
effectiveness of DPRK diplomacy and propaganda, depicting the ROK as intransigent and 
essentially uninterested in peaceful solutions.
The ROK and DPRK eventually began a series of direct discussions. Secret talks between 
Lee, Hu Rak, chief of the KC1A, and Kim, Young Joo, the younger brother of Kim II Sung, 
prepared the way for a visit to Seoul by DPRK Vice Premier Park, Sung Chul (29 May -1
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June, 1972). On 4 July, 1972 the two Korean governments announced their agreement to a 
common set of principles for peaceful reunification discussed in the previous chapter.
At the same time, a statement was issued to the UN by the ROK that made it clear the ROK 
continued to support a very significant role by the UN in the resolution of the Korean 
Question, and that it did not expect to see the North-South Dialogue yield instant results. 
(79)
Despite the accommodation by the ROK to the new international attitude on the Korean 
Question, South Korea's performance in the international competition to establish 
diplomatic partnerships faltered badly in the early 1970s. As detailed above, in 1970, 1971, 
and 1972 the ROK established new diplomatic relationships only with the micro-island 
states of Tonga, Fiji, Mauritius and Western Samoa. It was with this disappointing result in 
mind that the decision to allow even greater flexibility in diplomatic relations was taken.
On 23 June, 1973, South Korea formally renounced the Hallstein Doctrine. This 
represented the beginning of a new phase of extremely active diplomacy, especially in the 
Third World. This new phase of foreign policy was explicitly aimed at capitalising on the 
opportunities to increase the ROK's support in the UNGA, discussed in the section below. 
Paradoxically, just as the ROK adopted this more flexible foreign policy stance, the North- 
South Dialogue entered an impasse. North Korea unilaterally suspended the North-South 
Dialogue on 24 August, 1973.
After the 23 June, 1973 statement, and confirmation of a cease-fire in Vietnam, US 
Secretary of State William Rogers visited Seoul in mid-July. Rogers publicly announced 
new initiatives on the settlement of the Korean Question, including simultaneous 
membership by both Korean governments in the United nations. He defended this policy as 
"an acceptance of reality...there are two governments in being, and there are countries that 
have diplomatic relations with North Korea and South Korea." (80) Rogers alluded to the 
German solution, whereby both German governments entered the UN and recognised each 
other, as being "a very logical step", and he acknowledged the trend for northern European 
governments to recognise the DPRK. He advocated "cross recognition" by expressing the 
hope that Eastern European and other socialist governments would reciprocate by 
establishing diplomatic relations with the ROK. (81) US policy on the Korean Question was 
undergoing an important shift. This change was illustrated in the decision by the US to 
agree to the dissolution of UNCURK.
To regain the initiative in the North-South Dialogue, President Park proposed a non­
aggression treaty with the DPRK on 18 January, 1974. Both sides were to pledge not to 
attack the other, not to meddle in internal affairs, and to respect the Armistice Agreement.
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(82) Thereafter, the ROK and US were careful to continue to invoke the need for progress 
in the North-South Dialogue. However, the centre of activity on the Korean Question 
shifted back to the UNGA in 1973-75, despite US and ROK objections.
The resignation of President Richard Nixon in August, 1974, did not bring a significant 
change in US policy toward Korea. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and President 
Gerald Ford continued to emphasise US strategic commitment to the ROK. Indeed, Ford 
chose the ROK as his first Presidential trip abroad, in November, 1974. In the Joint 
Communique between Presidents Park and Ford, the US denied any intention of 
withdrawing additional US forces from South Korea and promised further support for the 
modernisation of the ROK's armed forces and for development of Korean defense 
industries. (83)
After the US debacle in Indochina in the spring of 1975, the ROK needed further 
reassurances. US Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, in Seoul during annual bilateral 
defense consultations, reaffirmed President Ford's security pledges. After reviewing the 
strategic situation in Korea in the wake of events in Indochina, the US and ROK concluded 
that the "military capabilities of North Korea continue to pose a serious threat to the 
security of the Republic of Korea." (84) Moreover, the US unequivocally pledged its 
"readiness and determination...to render prompt and effective assistance to the Republic of 
Korea in accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 in the event of an armed 
attack against the Republic of Korea." (85) With this security relationship in view, it is not 
difficult to understand why the majority of the NAM membership continued to perceive 
South Korea as ineligible for membership. South Korea remained incapable of completely 
breaking out of its dependent security relationship with the United States, and this fact 
clearly hampered the progress of ROK foreign policy in the Third World.
VH. The Debate in the UN
In 1961 the composition of the UNGA began to change with the entry of numerous newly 
independent countries. Indonesia's proposal in 1961 to invite the DPRK to UNGA 
discussions on Korea prompted US Ambassador Adlai Stephenson to propose an 
amendment requiring the DPRK to first recognise UN competence to deal with the Korean 
Question. The Stephenson amendment passed by a vote of 59 to 14, with 23 abstentions. (86) 
However, the ROK actually refused to accept the Stephenson amendment.
The ROK was immediately aware of the significance of the entry of 17 new members to the 
UNGA in 1961. The ROK Foreign Minister's speech to the First Committee, on 21 April, 
1961 specifically congratulated these 17 states, and noted that immediately upon coming to 
power, the new democratic government sent a goodwill mission to Africa and declared a
150
policy of friendly relations, "particularly (with) the Afro-Asian countries with whom Korea 
shares many social and economic similarities." (87) The ROK's position on its international 
status remained the same as previously, i.e. that there was "no doubt that there is, and can 
be, no other government in Korea save that of the Republic of Korea". (88)
Prior to the 15th session in 1960 there were 21 non-communist European member states, 20 
Latin American, 22 Asian, 9 African, and 10 communist members of the UNGA. According 
to one South Korean scholar, this meant that until the 15th Session "the United States could 
muster a simple majority almost automatically by securing the votes of European and Latin 
American countries, and could easily muster a two-thirds majority by securing additional 
votes from Asian countries." (89) However, from 1961 onward it became difficult for the 
US to muster even a simple majority "because the US was no longer assured of African 
votes." (90)
The ROK was therefore compelled by circumstances to cultivate African support. Indeed, 
in the 1960s the ROK established diplomatic relations with 25 African states. Nevertheless, 
ROK support was still weakest in Africa of all the regions of the Third World. (91) This 
weakness can be explained partly as the result of the alliance with the US and involvement 
in Vietnam. In one specialist's view, "the closer Korea moved to the United States to 
achieve its security goal, the more difficult it was to gain the support of African states in the 
international arena." (92)
The non-aligned members of the UNGA increasingly took initiative on the Korean 
Question, as well as often abstaining on resolutions submitted by the US or USSR. For 
instance, they proposed reconstituting the membership of UNCURK in a manner 
acceptable to both sides, which would facilitate a change in attitude to the role of the UN by 
North Korea. They suggested convening a special conference on Korea to be attended by 
both Korean regimes, the great powers, and selected non-aligned members. It was even 
desirable, from the nonaligned perspective, to withdraw UN forces from Korea, but 
preferably as part of a larger political settlement, not merely a prerequisite to one. The 
non-aligned members supported strengthening the armistice, perhaps even with nonaligned 
troops stationed on the territory of both Koreas.
UNCURK continued to be primarily pro-ROK, and as such eventually came under 
increasing Third World criticism. UNCURK monitored South Korea's transition from 
civilian to military rule and back again from 1961-1963, including the national referendum 
on constitutional amendments in December, 1962, and the National Assembly and 
Presidential elections of 1963. UNCURK concluded that these elections were conducted, on 
the whole, "in a free atmosphere, in an orderly manner, and in accordance with the law."
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(93)
To outside critics UNCURK appeared to be an instrument for the international 
legitimisation of the ROK. UNCURK seemed to be partisan. For instance, one UNCURK 
report contrasted the competitive character of the ROK elections in 1963, to elections in the 
DPRK in 1962 and 1963, in which only a single slate of approved candidates stood, 
reportedly receiving 100% approval from the electorate. This contrast was meant to 
increase the credibility of the ROK's commitment to UN supervised elections in North and 
South Korea as a viable method of reunification. North Korea's refusal to accept UN 
supervised elections was made more suspect in light of its own electoral practices. (94)
The Third Republic National Assembly approved a resolution on 29 November, 1964, 
unanimously endorsing UN resolutions on the Korean Question and UN supervised 
elections throughout Korea on the basis of population proportion. (95) By contrast, the 
DPRK announced in January, 1965 that it continued to reject UN supervised elections and 
demanded withdrawal of all foreign forces as a basic prerequisite to progress.
Throughout the 1960s the UNGA overwhelmingly approved of resolutions inviting the ROK 
to participate in UNGA discussions on the Korean Question, as reviewed in the previous 
chapter. (Table 1) In 1965, pro-Western Saudi Arabia submitted a proposal to invite the 
DPRK, based on the principle of non-alignment, whereby "both parties would be treated 
equally and without recrimination" and that was "compatible with its (DPRK) dignity." 
(96) Guinea submitted a similar resolution. The vote to reject the Guinean resolution was 
much closer than previous contests. (97)
The annual pro-ROK resolution passed in 1966 noted that free elections were the proper 
solution to national division, and that as the majority of UN forces had already been 
withdrawn from Korea, the remaining forces should not leave until conditions for a lasting 
settlement, as formulated by the UNGA, had been fulfilled. It also called for the role of 
UNCURK to be "intensified". (98)
In his State of the Union Address to the ROK National Assembly in January, 1967, Park 
Chung Hee revealed his concern over the trend in the UN debate on the Korean Question, 
i.e. the rising level of support for North Korean proposals. President Park stated that "the 
fluid situation within the United Nations surrounding the Korean issue and any future 
contingencies that may arise in this regard" would be met by the ROK with "flexibility". 
(99) In response, the ROK established the Ministry of National Reunification.
President Park's concern was not unfounded. The debate on the Korean Question at the
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22nd UNGA session in autumn 1967 was even more hotly contested than previous sessions, 
as the supporters of the DPRK's position grew in strength. A ten-power resolution to invite 
both Koreas without any preconditions was rather narrowly defeated by 50 to 37, with 24 
abstentions. (100)
The problem for the ROK was not securing passage of pro-ROK resolutions, but rather 
how to stave off passage of pro-DPRK resolutions, especially those that would lead to a 
diminished UN role in Korea.
The military incidents of 1968 in Korea, such as the Pueblo affair, the North's raid on the 
Presidential Palace in Seoul, and infiltration by other special northern commando units, 
were much discussed throughout the subsequent UNGA debate that year. (101) The 
speeches on the Korean Question in this session were more polarised than ever before, 
reflecting deep Cold War divisions and divisions over the Vietnam war, as well as on the 
division of Korea. Allies of the US and ROK argued that the DPRK was an aggressor and in 
violation of the Armistice. The Philippines, for instance, interpreted the commando raids.as 
an "attempt to start Viet-Cong style guerrilla warfare in the south", whereas Cambodia, a 
friend of the DPRK, denounced UN resolutions on Korea as an attempt to "perpetuate the 
division of Korea and to set the seal of United Nations approval on the imperialistic policy 
of the United States Government." (102) ROK Foreign Minister Choi, Kyu-Ha, and US 
Ambassador Symington stressed the recent attacks on the South by northern commandos 
as being the "most massive and serious military provocation...since the Armistice of 1953" 
and designed to promote revolution in the South. (103)
The Soviet delegate, J. Malik, made a direct appeal to the non-aligned Third World to 
intensify support for DPRK participation, arguing that those who abstained seemed to 
"condone this injustice", and therefore should "decide to take a new line on this question." 
(104) Malik called upon those "which only recently themselves experienced all the burdens 
and miseries of colonial and imperialist domination and attained their independence" as 
well as those who "so far followed the line set in this matter by the United States and its 
closest military partners" to support DPRK participation in the UN debate. (105)
The USSR's appeal was partially effective. The seventeen-power resolution to invite both 
Koreas simultaneously was only narrowly defeated by 55 to 40 with 28 abstentions. Among 
the Third World states voting in favour were some having diplomatic relations with the 
ROK, such as Kenya, or friendly to it, including Indonesia, Jordan, Ceylon, Nigeria, and 
Pakistan. (106)
The General Assembly was sharply divided over the character of the military situation in 
Korea and Vietnam. The Soviet Union and its allies attacked the ROK's role in Vietnam
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and ASP AC, along with recent US moves to send warships and more troops to Korea. (107) 
DPRK supporters argued that without withdrawal of US forces and dissolution of 
UNCURK, war might erupt in Korea. Supporters of the ROK argued that in light of recent 
aggressive acts by the DPRK, if US forces were withdrawn - war might result. The pro- 
DPRK side condemned the ROK's role in Vietnam as aggressive, the pro-ROK side 
defended it as an indication of the ROK's commitments to the international community! 
(108)
The voting results on the substantive issues in the 1968 UNGA session did not produce the 
breakthrough the USSR and pro-DPRK forces hoped for, but definitely convinced the US 
and ROK of the growing strength of the opposition. (109) The same held true for the 
outcome of voting in 1969, in a context still marked by extreme tension on the Korean 
peninsula. (110) Pro-DPRK governments described the US troop presence in Korea as a 
military occupation in violation of the UN principle of non-intervention, and which 
increased the threat of war. Pro-ROK governments argued that dissolution of UNCURK 
and withdrawal of UN/US forces could result in "disastrous consequences" including 
the overthrow of the ROK government. Some non-aligned countries argued for 
transforming the UN into a non-partisan mediator acceptable to both sides, and relying 
more on direct North-South Korean negotiations. ( I l l )
The international system underwent important changes in the early 1970s that had direct 
bearing on the UN and its role in resolving the Korean Question. In particular, the entry of 
the PRC into the Security Council, and the entry of two German states into the General 
Assembly, changed the tone in the UN debate on Korea. China's entry represented a zero- 
sum type victory in the competition for international legitimacy, while the German 
precedent provided an example of "cross-recognition" and simultaneous UN entry.
In this new atmosphere, an international consensus emerged on the Korean Question, 
calling for the two Korean governments to solve the problem of reunification peacefully and 
without foreign interference. There was in fact a recognition that the role of the great 
powers should be changed as well as the role of the UN. It implicitly recognised that Korea 
was sovereign and had the right to self-determination, i.e. to determine its own future.
In formal terms, up to the end of the 1960s South Korea retained clear advantages over 
North Korea in the international competition for legitimacy. The majority of governments 
in the UN would still support South Korea's claims to be the "only lawful government" on 
the Korean peninsula, and also support resolutions in the UNGA that perpetuated a UN 
supervisory role. However, the "partisan" role of the UN came increasingly under attack 
by the DPRK's supporters throughout the 1960s and especially in the early 1970s.
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The early 1970s can be described as a period in which the ROK was constantly on the 
defensive in the UN. South Korea relied, as a result, more openly and unambiguously on its 
bilateral strategic ties with the United States. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the 
fate of the UNC after 1975, and South Korea's response to its effective dissolution, 
discussed in the next chapter.
In the 1970 UNGA debate was again closely fought, even on the procedural, invitation 
motion. (112) Those who supported the ROK argued that no action should be taken to 
weaken the effect of past UN resolutions on Korea, since this would undermine the prestige 
of the UN and increase DPRK belligerency. If both parties were to be heard, both should 
assume equal rights and equal obligations. This meant the DPRK must first acknowledge 
the competence and authority of the UN on the Korean reunification issue. DPRK 
supporters suggested that the appropriate way to deal with the Korean Question was via 
direct North-South negotiations, since it was strictly a domestic issue. The usual pro-DPRK 
resolution calling for the dropping of the Korean Question from the UN agenda was not 
submitted. The DPRK reiterated its respect for the UN Charter, thus differentiating this 
broader issue from the more specific one of recognising UN competence over the Korean 
Question. The ROK stressed that it totally accepted UN competence and authority to deal 
with the Korean Question, whereas the DPRK refused to do so.
UNCURK was becoming distinctly vulnerable. Chile decided to withdraw from the 
organisation and informed the UN of this on 14 November, 1970. The reason, as Chile 
stated it, was that Chile desired to explore other possibilities of worthwhile and 
disinterested action that would contribute to peace in that region. Chile's decision implied 
that the legitimacy and the worth of UNCURK was questionable. It should be noted that a 
few non-aligned governments called for a genuinely non-partisan approach to the Korean 
issue, on the part of the UN, to be facilitated by the great powers and inter-Korean 
conciliation. (113)
Extraordinary changes in the UN debate took place in 1971, indeed there was no debate at 
all! It was agreed to postpone debate until the 26th UNGA session. This was brought about 
by consent on both sides. It was time to advocate inter-Korean talks. In these 
circumstances, an acrimonious debate in the UN would spoil the atmosphere for progress in 
North-South talks. It could be argued, however, that the ROK and the US preferred to 
avoid another head-on confrontation in the UN in 1971 in response to the previous years of 
increasing support for the pro-DPRK coalition.
The initiative on the Korean Question therefore temporarily moved outside the UN to the
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inter-Korean dialogue. The DPRK issued an 8 point proposal in April, 1971, including the 
demand for complete freedom of all political parties to operate in either North or South. On 
12 February, 1972 the ROK responded with a 4 point proposal, primarily designed to ease 
military tensions. Secret, and then open North-South talks, produced the 4 July Joint 
Communique, discussed previously.
With the imposition of the Yushin dictatorship in 1972, the DPRK and its supporters 
decided to flush the ROK back out into the open - in the UN. Algeria, on behalf of the 
NAM, led an effort in late 1972 to re-instate the Korean issue on the UN agenda. ROK 
Foreign Minister Kim, Yong Shik, issued a statement on 24 July, 1972, to reject this 
suggestion, arguing that although some UN members were supporting this proposal in 
order to create favourable conditions for the success of the inter-Korean dialogue, the 
"hidden intention" of the proposal was to weaken the ROK's defense. He argued that a 
renewed debate would "revive the Cold War polemics of the past, poisoning the 
atmosphere, and hamper a smooth and successful progress of the South-North dialogue". 
(114)
The ROK campaigned vigorously for further deferral of the UN debate. On 6 September, 
1972, the ROK issued a memorandum to the UN calling for postponement of the debate on 
the grounds that the South-North Dialogue was making progress and a debate would revive 
Cold War confrontational polemics and spoil the atmosphere for dialogue. (115)
The North-South Dialogue had an inevitable influence on the course of the Korean 
Question in the UN. The commencement of meetings of the South-North Coordinating 
Committee from 30 November, 1972, led UNCURK to review its role, and subsequently to 
recommend its own dissolution. This was suggested in UNCURK's annual report, submitted 
on 30 August, 1973. (116) UNCURK concluded unequivocally that its presence in Korea 
was "no longer required". (117)
South Korea was unsuccessful in resisting mounting international pressure to resume the 
debate on Korea in the UNGA or to block the DPRK's participation at the 28th UNGA 
session in 1973.
However, a remarkable spirit of compromise prevailed in the 28th session, beginning in the 
First Committee's deliberations. Both sides seemed eager to draft compromise proposals 
that would be acceptable to the other side. Both sides agreed that UNCURK should be 
dissolved and even agreed not to put the matter to a formal vote. Instead, a consensus 
statement was agreed with the Chairman of the First Committee and was subsequently 
recommended to the General Assembly. (118)
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This remarkable consensus document was unanimously approved by the General Assembly 
on 28 November, 1973. Noting the 4 July, 1972 Joint Communique between North and 
South Korea and its three principles of peaceful reunification, the UNGA consensus was the 
following: "It is the general hope that the South and the North of Korea will be urged to 
continue their dialogue and widen their many-sided exchanges and cooperation in the above 
spirit so as to expedite the independent peaceful reunification of the country." (119) 
Paradoxically, North Korea had already unilaterally suspended the dialogue on 28 August, 
1973.
Ostensibly, the lack of progress in the North-South dialogue was due to fundamental 
differences in approach. The ROK favoured cautious gradualism, beginning with limited 
steps such as relaxation of the state of military tension, cultural and non-political 
exchanges. In contrast, the DPRK viewed the talks as negotiations on substantive strategic 
and political issues leading directly to reunification.
The acrimony between the two Korean governments was quite visible in the 28th UNGA 
session. For instance, ROK Foreign Minister Kim, Yong Shik, attacked the DPRK by 
claiming that its appeals to remove foreign interference, dissolve the UNC, withdraw all 
foreign forces, and replace the Armistice with a peace treaty, were merely deceptions. The 
DPRK's "ulterior motive" was to "rattle the security framework of the Republic of Korea." 
(120) While the ROK accepted the dissolution of UNCURK, it categorically rejected the 
call for dissolution of the UNC, claiming this would in effect nullify the Armistice.
The ROK adroitly identified the contradiction in North Korea's position on UN 
membership, pointing out that in practice the DPRK had in fact been pursuing a "two 
Koreas policy". North Korea had established full diplomatic relations with governments 
that had previously had such relations only with the ROK, and it had joined important 
IGO's such as WHO, UNCTAD and the IPU, in which the ROK had long been the sole 
government for Korea. The DPRK had itself applied for UN membership in 1949 and 1952 
and had not opposed the proposal before the Security Council in 1957 to admit both Koreas 
into the UN.
President Park went on the diplomatic offensive in January, 1974, by proposing a non­
aggression treaty. This proposal was designed to counter DPRK propaganda depicting the 
ROK as being opposed to reducing military tension. However, ROK strategic reliance on 
the US and the policy of expanding ROK defense industries continued unchanged. (121) In 
August, 1974, even lower level meetings of the South-North Coordinating Committee were 
suspended. In the same month President Park proposed peace via the non-aggression 
treaty, rapid progress in the Dialogue, many-sided exchanges and cooperation, and free
157
general elections under fair management and supervision in direct proportion to the 
population.
In late 1974, Algeria and 36 other states submitted a draft resolution to the UNGA arguing 
that the elimination of foreign interference was imperative in order to successfully promote 
the Dialogue and reunification according to the three principles of the 4 July, 1972 Joint 
Communique. (122). The ROK's response was to re-emphasise the belligerence of the 
DPRK and the threat of war should UN forces be removed.
On the 29th anniversary of the founding of the UN, in October, 1974, President Park called 
upon the DPRK immediately to accept his proposal for a non-aggression treaty. He said 
that "it is only too clear that any disturbance of the balance of power between the South 
and the North will...invite a north Korean invasion of the South." At the same time he 
pledged to normalise the Dialogue and accept DPRK admission into the UN. (123)
Receiving no reply from the DPRK, the ROK went over to the offensive in the UN to call 
for resumption of the suspended Dialogue, blaming the DPRK for all lack of progress. The 
spectre of communist revolution and violent overthrow of the ROK government was 
deployed as a device to discredit the DPRK. In a detailed memorandum to the UN on 1 
November, 1974, the ROK claimed that the DPRK's principal reason for suspending the 
Dialogue was the fact that it "realized that the dialogue would be unlikely to contribute to a 
creation of favourable conditions for the achievement of a violent revolution in South Korea 
or the unification of the country under communist leadership." (124)
The ROK struck an alarmist note by accusing the DPRK of constructing tunnels into the 
southern zone of the DMZ. (125) A stern warning was issued to the DPRK on 16 
November, 1974, accusing it of constructing the tunnel "for the purpose of despatching 
armed agents en masse and to stage a full-scale armed aggression when acute social unrest 
occurs in the South." (126) According to South Korea this proved that the DPRK, "while 
outwardly engaged in peace offensives is actually in the midst of a meticulous planning to 
overthrow the Government of the Republic of Korea under their sinister scheme of unifying 
through violent means." (127)
This crisis reflected the mood in South Korea in the wake of the assassination attempt on 
President Park on 15 August, 1974, in which his wife was killed by a gunman the ROK 
connected to the pro-DPRK Korean Residents Association in Japan (Chochongryun). In a 
similar vein, therefore, Kim U Sung's call for foreign troop withdrawal was depicted as a 
"calculated scheme to unify Korea eventually under a communist government, by means of 
violence, whether internally or externally applied, against South Korea." (128)
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The ROK and its supporters in the UNGA called for unconditional resumption of the 
Dialogue, whereas the DPRK and its supporters made resumption contingent on 
withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea. The ROK deployed skilful legal arguments 
against dissolution of the UNC, e.g. that it was a matter for the Security Council, rather 
than the General Assembly, to decide. The ROK argued that "the delicate division of the 
functions and powers between the Security Council and the General Assembly for the 
maintenance of peace and security" should not be jeopardised "by calling on the General 
Assembly to alter a Security Council decision." (129)
The ROK's view was almost perfectly expressed in the draft resolution submitted by Bolivia 
and 23 other states on 4 December, 1974. This draft reaffirmed the consensus decision of 
the 28th UNGA on the need to continue the Dialogue and called upon the Security Council, 
rather than the General Assembly, to deliberate the future of the UNC and alternative 
arrangements to assure the maintenance of the Armistice. (130) Saudi Arabia led an effort 
to refine the wording of this resolution so that the precise nature of such deliberations by 
the UNC and the status of the Armistice would become clearer. (131) This amended version 
was approved by the First Committee on 9 December, 1974.
However, the pro-DPRK resolution, calling for dissolution of the UNC and withdrawal of 
all foreign forces, received an equal number of votes for and against, an unprecedentedly 
close vote on a pro-DPRK proposal. The PRC delegate to the UNGA, Huang Hua, accused 
the US of having "resorted to such despicable means as the exertion of pressure" in order 
to salvage the situation with a tie vote. (132) China said the resolution was designed solely to 
provide the US "with an excuse for usurping the name of the United Nations to continue its 
interference in the internal affairs of Korea... Its purpose is to delay a settlement of the 
Korean Question, perpetuate the division of Korea and obstruct the independent and 
peaceful reunification of Korea." (133)
The USSR criticised those Third World governments, such as the Philippines and Colombia 
(which Malik mentioned by name), which still voted with the Western powers on the 
Korean Question and against the coalition of socialist and non-aligned states supporting 
North Korea. (134)
Despite these great power protests, the pro-ROK resolution was approved by the UNGA on 
17 December, 1974. (135) The resolution directed the Security Council to take measures to 
assure that the Armistice was maintained, while deliberating on the possible dissolution of 
the UNC as well.
The debate on the Korean Question in the UN culminated in the 30th session in 1975, at
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which time the ROK and the US felt it was finally "politic" to make a timely concession on 
the dissolution of the UNC, as they had previously done on UNCURK. This concession can 
be interpreted as a recognition of the unfavourable trend in the General Assembly and the 
possibility that a majority might vote for North Korean proposals, thus lending these 
proposals international legitimacy.
Therefore, on 27 June, 1975 the US government wrote to the President of the UN Security 
Council to affirm US and ROK preparedness to terminate the UNC as of 1 January, 1976. 
This affirmation of intent was timed to support the application of the ROK to join the 
NAM. Under its conditions, the Armistice would be maintained while the US and ROK 
designated officers to take over the functions formerly performed by the UNC. In this 
manner, the US and ROK would together implement UNGA resolution 3333 adopted on 17 
December, 1974. This arrangement would be subject to the prior agreement of the Korean 
Peoples Army (DPRK) and the Chinese People's Volunteers (PRC), as signatories to the 
Armistice Agreement. (136) The US submitted a draft resolution to the 30th UNGA session 
containing this proposal, and the ROK re-applied for membership to the UN on 29 July, 
1975, requesting consideration of its application by the Security Council.
The rejection of the ROK's application for full NAM membership and the acceptance of the 
DPRK's application directly preceded the final UN debate on the Korean Question in 1975. 
This defeat for the ROK contributed to a greater sense of urgency in the US that further 
concessions on the UNC would have to be forthcoming soon. The Permanent Representative 
of the US to the UN, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, wrote to the President of the Security 
Council on 22 September, 1975, to further clarify US willingness to take measures to 
"reduce manifestations" of the UNC in Korea. Moynihan unilaterally announced that as of 
25 August, 1975 the flag of the UN no longer flew over military installations in South Korea. 
The only exception to this was at certain UNC facilities in Panmunjom, directly associated 
with implementation of the Armistice Agreement, and involving only some 300 non-Korean 
personnel. All other armed forces in South Korea, whether ROK or US, would no longer fly 
the UN flag. Ambassador Moynihan reiterated the willingness of the US and ROK to sit 
down with other concerned parties to discuss the question of terminating the UNC 
altogether, subject to the continuation of the Armistice in the absence of other agreements 
between North and South Korea. (137)
To buttress this proposal, the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs simultaneously issued a 
statement supporting the proposals of US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to the 30th 
UNGA. Kissinger's proposal included a reiteration of US willingness to convene an 
international conference at any time and place to discuss with the parties directly 
concerned the proposed termination of the UNC, in accordance with UNGA resolution 3333
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of 1974, and to convene a conference to discuss ways and means of preserving the 
Armistice, pending new arrangements. Kissinger likewise called for simultaneous entry into 
the UN by both Korean governments. (138)
The Chair of the Security Council at this time was Sweden, a member of the Neutral 
Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea. Sweden took the position, as it made very clear 
to the ROK, that it would work for a consensus similar to that of 1973. It regretted the 
situation whereby two irreconcilable draft resolutions could both conceivably be approved 
in the 30th UNGA session, which would of course render the situation unclear in terms of 
international legality. Sweden's position was to support the North-South Dialogue and 
support the ROK's application for UN membership, on the grounds of the principle of 
universal membership. (139)
Two "irreconcilable drafts" were indeed submitted to the 30th UNGA, one by Algeria and 
41 other socialist and non-aligned states on 8 August, and one by Bolivia and 27 other states 
on 13 October, 1975. The pro-ROK draft resolution took note of the letter from the US to 
the UN of 27 June and ROK acceptance of this policy. It reaffirmed the UN consensus of 28 
November, 1973 and urged continuation of the Dialogue. Most importantly, it called upon 
all the parties directly concerned to enter into negotiations on new arrangements to replace 
the Armistice. This was accompanied by an appeal to hold talks as soon as possible so that 
the UNC could be dissolved concurrently with arrangements for maintaining the Armistice, 
pending other arrangements. The stroke of brilliance in this strategy was that by pre­
emptively having taken the UN flag away from US forces in Korea, the issue of termination 
of the UNC was effectively neutralised.
The pro-DPRK resolution was likewise framed within a context of promoting the Dialogue, 
but it called for the complete dissolution of the UNC and withdrawal of all foreign forces in 
Korea under the UN flag. It called upon the "real parties" to the Armistice to replace it 
with a peace agreement.
The First Committee approved both of these "irreconcilable" draft resolutions on 30 
October, 1975. This reflected the situation of parity between the two Koreas and their 
respective supporters in the General Assembly. It was in fact the culminating event in the 
period of defensive diplomacy by the ROK in the UN. South Korea was forced to recognise 
that it no longer had a clear majority support for an exclusive claim to international 
legitimacy. (140)
The ROK responded to this watershed by flatly rejecting the UN's approval of a pro-DPRK 
resolution. The ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately issued a statement declaring 
that the ROK "will never accept such a Communist draft resolution." (emphasis added)
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(141) In the ROK's view, the call for immediate dissolution of the UNC without prior 
arrangements to preserve the Armistice was a threat to peace, "fraught with the danger of 
a recurrence of war." The ROK therefore called upon the DPRK to "desist from 
unnecessary confrontation and political propaganda at the United Nations and to return to 
the table of dialogue". (142) South Korea also called upon all the parties to the Armistice 
Agreement to accept the its proposal for an international conference to discuss maintenance 
of the Armistice, and specifically thanked members of NAM that had shown support for the 
South Korean position in the UN debate on the Korean Question. (143)
Despite such protests the General Assembly again approved both contending draft 
resolutions on 18 November, 1975. The ROK responded with an official protest statement. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the ROK was "deeply regretful that an 
anomalous situation was created" by the simultaneous adoption of two opposed resolutions. 
The ROK characterised the pro-DPRK resolution as having been "adopted by the 
maneuvers of North Korea and its allies, who scheme to unify the Korean peninsula by 
force under Communism, and to exploit the forum of the United Nations for their political 
propaganda." The ROK repeated that it would never accept this "Communist resolution", 
which carried with it the danger of invalidating the Armistice and destroying peace in 
Korea. (144)
The passage of two irreconcilable resolutions in the same UNGA session did indeed create a 
situation of legal ambiguity. Moreover, it contributed to a heightening of tension between 
the two Korean governments, rather than to resumption of the Dialogue. Finally, it exposed 
the ultimate limitations of UN diplomacy as a means to alter international status in the 
Korean case.
VIII. Conclusion
South Korea's exclusive claim to international legitimacy was buttressed for many years by 
its special relationship with the US and the UN, both denied to North Korea. This special 
international status was a product of the formative period of the Cold War system. South 
Korea's international status was therefore closely tied to the power and influence of the 
United States in the international system. Therefore, as the international system underwent 
profound changes in the 1960s and early 1970s, and the US hegemonic position was 
challenged, these undercurrents inevitably had an impact on South Korea's position.
The most influential forces working to reduce US hegemonic influence in the international 
system were the growth of Soviet and communist power, the recovery and growth of 
Western Europe and Japan, decolonisation accompanied by national liberation or 
revolution, and the rise of Third World solidarity as a challenge to the international status
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quo. As North Korea benefited by all the above trends in its effort to win international 
support, so South Korea was placed on the defensive by these same trends.
South Korea was by no means powerless to respond to these trends. The most significant 
responses made by the Park regime were the vigorous pursuit of an export oriented 
strategy of rapid industrialisation on the one hand, and a concomitant pragmatism in 
foreign policy, especially the emphasis on "economic diplomacy" and the gradual retreat 
from anti-communism on the other. These policies established the basis not only for long­
term economic strength, but also long term diplomatic success in the period that followed, 
discussed in the next chapter.
Nevertheless, in the short to medium term i.e. 1960-1975, these policies were not capable of 
reversing the effects on South Korean standing of the main trends in the international 
system. Most significantly, South Korea's residual anti-communism constituted a persistent 
regime rigidity and this rigidity directly hampered the full success of its foreign polity, 
particularly in the Third World.
Therefore, the parity achieved by the DPRK in the UNGA by 1975 was a deceptive and only 
temporary "victory". It is true that South Korea's exclusive claim to international 
legitimacy was essentially destroyed, the result of its own diplomatic failures and the 
strength of the DPRK's successes. However, the real international "consensus" was simply 
for a recognition of the status quo, i.e. the existence of two Koreas, and their right to 
determine their own future without foreign interference. The "dissolution" of the UNC was 
a tempest in a teapot. The ROK simply fell back on the bilateral strategic tie to the US. A 
Mexican stand-off was the result.
UN diplomacy had run its course. The future of the Korean Question would be determined 
by the long-term strengths of economic and diplomatic policy and their appropriateness to 
prevailing international conditions. In this situation, regime rigidities would play a fairly 
decisive role in determining the ultimate outcome of inter-Korean competition.
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Chapter Six: Diplomatic Reversal: The Triumph of "Economic Diplomacy"
I. Introduction
With diplomatic parity in the UNGA, North Korea tried unsuccessfully to mobilise its 
support, then rapidly lost ground in the 1980s. South Korean diplomacy, however, revived 
spectacularly. This "diplomatic reversal" is best understood as a consequence of the 
interaction of domestic and international circumstances. The changing international 
situation provided new opportunities for South Korean "economic diplomacy". South 
Korea's foreign policy pragmatism and economic dynamism demonstrated its greater 
adaptability to international change. In contrast, North Korea's dogged commitment to 
established policies, ideology, and leadership resulted in a great increase in regime 
rigidities, a loss of international support, and damage to its international standing, 
culminating in isolation and crisis in the early 1990s. This chapter analyses the factors that 
produced this dramatic diplomatic reversal of fortunes.
II. The Great Powers and the Transition Period
During the era from the late 1960s to the early 1990s, the political and strategic rigidities of 
the former bipolar order inexorably gave way to a new period. The hegemonic stability 
theorists analyze it as a period of the decline or weakening of US hegemony. (1) The 
concentration of capabilities under US control decreased, resulting in a more diffuse 
distribution of power. The "complex interdependence" perspective (2) characterises the 
profound underlying change in international relations as a process of transnationalisation 
and the growing functional interdependence of states and economies. The world-system 
theorists view the period as a Kondratief B phase, or downswing in the long economic cycle 
of the capitalist world-economy, accompanied by the decline of US hegemony. (3) The 
Gramscian theorists of international relations see the period as one characterised by 
transnationalisation of class relations and the hegemony of internationally mobile capital.
(4)
There is little doubt that a profound shift was taking place in the international political 
economy from the late 1970s onward, as the US attempted to reorganise its global 
hegemony. The "Second Cold War" was launched to check the growth of Soviet power and 
reverse revolutionary Third World trends. (5) The NIEO was declared dead as the US 
suspended the North-South Dialogue,' and hopes of a "Global Round" therefore 
disappeared. (6) The debt crisis dominated the early 1980s and crippled many Third World 
governments. (7)
The new global economic and political agenda of the 1980s was dominated by liberalisation, 
marketisation, privatisation, and above all -political pragmatism, calling for new strategies
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by the two Koreas. The ability of the ROK to successfully adapt to these trends was given 
greater impetus by a regime change in 1979-80. In contrast, North Korea's "succession" 
politics in 1980 had the opposite effect, i.e. of deepening its regime rigidities.
In strategic terms, the ROK-US-Japan triangle and the DPRK-USSR-PRC triangle roughly 
balanced one another. Changes in relations between the great powers brought about a new 
quadripolar power configuration in Asia, among the US, USSR, China, and Japan. This 
transition in East Asia forced both Koreas to re-examine their foreign policy.
The Shanghai Communique of 27 February, 1972, contained a tacit understanding that the 
US needed a negotiated peace in Asia and China needed Western capital and technology. 
This led to a re-entry of China into mainstream international relations. China and Japan 
established diplomatic relations on 29 September, 1972. Japan's role in the region was 
already being expanded, since the Nixon-Sato Communique on 21 November, 1969, 
pledging Japan to assume more strategic responsibilities. Japanese economic power in the 
region rapidly increased, as Japanese trade and investment overtook that of the US or any 
other power. (8) The superpowers opened a new era of detente and arms control 
negotiations, intended to radically reduce global and regional tensions.
In this new situation, it was in the interests of all the major powers to reduce tensions on the 
Korean peninsula and seek a long term formula of peaceful coexistence. American 
hegemonic influence in Asia certainly underwent transformation after the defeat in 
Indochina in 1975.
III. The Aftermath of the 30th UNGA Decision
The decision by the UNGA in 1975 to approve two contradictory resolutions left the central 
question of the UNC's future undecided. The impasse surrounded the issue of which of the 
two contradictory resolutions should be implemented. Was the UNC to be immediately 
abolished, or "renegotiated"? Without consensus among the permanent members of the 
Security Council, the UN lacked enforcement capabilities.
The transition period was therefore a tug of war between the two Koreas and their allies 
over implementation of the disputed UN resolutions. The DPRK launched a diplomatic 
campaign for implementation of the pro-DPRK resolution, i.e. dissolution of the UNC and 
withdrawal of all foreign troops. The ROK and the US fell back to the line on reunification 
developed in the Moynihan letter to the UN Secretary General, discussed earlier.
The result was that the role of the UN in Korea was minimised, including the UNC. 
However, US forces remained in South Korea under the conditions of the Mutual Defense 
Treaty of 1954, at the invitation of the ROK government. US policy stressed the bilateral
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strategic tie to the ROK. This commitment was symbolised in the new annual military 
exercises known as "Team Spirit". In the wake of the American debacle in Indochina, 
Team Spirit demonstrated US resolve to prevent the reunification of Korea by force.
President Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger reaffirmed their trust in President 
Park as a "stable element". The US clearly opted for legitimising the status quo. The 
Vietnamese and Chinese models of reunification were rejected, while the German precedent 
was accepted as a model for the Korean situation.
The US policy of "cross recognition" would confer full UN membership on both Koreas.
In contrast, the DPRK argued that legitimising the status quo and accepting the existence of 
two sovereign states in Korea would obstruct reunification indefinitely. Nevertheless, in 
practice the DPRK tried to expand relations with Western states or friends of the ROK. 
Indeed, as discussed earlier, the DPRK had previously been much more successful in this 
regard than the ROK.
In pressing for implementation of the pro-DPRK resolution, the DPRK continued to rely on 
NAM's support, and joined its sister organisation, the Group of 77, in 1976. North Korea 
assumed the pose of standard bearer of the NIEO in both organisations, though South 
Korea had already been a member of the G-77 and an advocate of better trade terms for 
developing countries.
Kim II Sung renewed the emphasis on the NAM in DPRK foreign policy. He published a 
treatise in December, 1975, entitled "The Non-Aligned Movement Is A Mighty Anti- 
Imperialist Revolutionary Force of Our Times." Kim II Sung still viewed the NAM’s 
importance in the context of "world revolution". Kim argued that "The emergence of the 
NAM has decisively strengthened the revolutionary forces of the world and greatly 
weakened the reactionary forces of imperialism." (9)
Kissinger, however, launched a counter-offensive against the Third World NIEO coalition. 
On 29 January, 1976, Kissinger told the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the 
US would use aid to influence Third World political choice, increasing it to those who 
abandoned "bloc voting". In future, the US relationship with the Third World would be 
determined by the attitude of each Third World government to the US in international 
meetings. Kissinger intended to drive wedges into the Third World coalition, splitting the 
pro-Western "moderates" from the anti-Western "radicals".
Thus, the DPRK’s call for NAM governments to lend support pitted them against the new 
US policy. On 4 March, 1976, the SPA addressed an open letter to the Parliaments and
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Governments of the world calling for the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea. This 
followed a statement from the DPRK Foreign Ministry on 27 February demanding that the 
US comply with the decision of the 30th UNGA. In this campaign, the DPRK portrayed the 
US as a potential aggressor and played upon fears of a new war in Korea.
Bouteflika, Algeria's Foreign Minister, sent a letter to all NAM governments early in 1976, 
informing them of the "gravest situation" in Korea "due to acts of provocation committed 
by US aggressive forces after their defeat in Indochina" and warned of the imminent 
danger of a showdown in Korea. Boumedienne, NAM chairman, also sent a letter on 22 
May, 1976, warning of the build up of military forces near the DMZ. The DPRK heightened 
the atmosphere of alarm by announcing on 5 August, 1976 that the US and ROK were 
preparing to invade North Korea.
North Korea's appeal had an impact on Third World governments. On 16 August, 1976, 31 
co-sponsors submitted a new draft resolution to the 31st UNGA, entitled "On Removing 
Danger of War and Maintaining and Consolidating Peace in Korea and Accelerating 
Independent and Peaceful Reunification of Korea." It expressed concern over the "critical 
situation", explicitly depicted as a threat of aggression against the DPRK. They demanded 
the immediate cessation of foreign military involvement in Korea and any aggression 
against Korea, and withdrawal of new (especially nuclear) weapons. It reaffirmed that the 
UNC should be dissolved, UN forces withdrawn, and the Armistice be replaced by a peace 
treaty. (10)
DPRK diplomatic momentum was virtually undiminished at this time. The NAM summit in 
Colombo, Sri Lanka, 16-19 August, 1976, adopted a statement on Korea clearly supporting 
the DPRK's line on reunification. In response, the ROK Foreign Ministry accused the 
DPRK of deliberately instigating "pro-communist countries", especially Algeria and Cuba, 
to get the Fifth NAM Summit in Colombo to adopt a "one-sided pro-North Korea 
declaration on the delicate Korean Question." The ROK worked with moderates within 
NAM to block any unanimous passage of such one-sided declarations.
The "axe murder incident" in August, 1976, coincided with NAM's deliberations on the 
Korean Question. Two UNC personnel were killed in a clash along the military 
demarcation line. Both sides claimed the other provoked the incident. By so directly 
exposing the acute danger of war in Korea, the incident precipitated a dramatic shift in 
events. On 6 September, 1976, Kim II Sung expressed personal regret for the incident. The 
US and DPRK agreed to "partition" the UNC site at Panmunjom in order to prevent any 
such incident in the future. Through intensive behind-the-scenes discussions, an 
understanding was reached whereby both sides would withdraw their draft resolutions
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from the 31st UNGA session. The UNGA debate was dead. North Korea did not publicly 
address the UNGA on the Korean Question again between 1975 and October, 1988.
Thereafter, the character of competition for international support underwent an important 
change. In the previous period this primarily took the form of attempts to win new 
diplomatic partners in the Third World and deploy this support in the UNGA. In the 
following period most of the governments in the world had already been "canvassed". 
Therefore, relations with the major powers, and economic diplomacy, became the keys to 
the new phase of competition.
The competition for partners did continue, however, into the 1980s, however, even in the 
absence of a UNGA debate. In 1980 the ROK had 112 full diplomatic partners, compared to 
100 for the DPRK. By late 1985, the figure was 118 for the ROK and 101 for the DPRK. 
The most significant figure is that for governments having diplomatic relations with both 
Koreas. In 1980, this was 61, increasing to 67 by late 1985. (11)
A similar rough parity continued in terms of membership in IGOs. Between 1973 and 1979, 
the DPRK joined WHO, FAO, IAEA, ICAO, ITU, UNCTAD, UPU, and UNESCO. By 1984 
the DPRK belonged to 9 UN affiliated international organisation, compared to 14 for the 
ROK. In 1986 the DPRK total increased to 10, after joining the IMO. In April, 1986, both 
Koreas were admitted as members of the UN Asia Group. (12)
Given this situation, the key area for manoeuvrability lay in making inroads into the rival's 
"core" support. South Korea did this most effectively by progressively eliminating anti­
communism as a principle of its foreign policy and energetically pursuing economic 
relations. North Korea's increasing regime rigidities, by contrast, reduced its appeal. The 
already existing trend toward a "non-partisan" stance toward the Korean Question was 
thus intensified, which in practice, this time, worked more in favour of South Korea.
Nevertheless, NAM support for the DPRK remained high for a few years. The NAM 
Coordinating Bureau, meeting in New Delhi in April, 1977, endorsed DPRK demands, 
including dismantling of all foreign bases, withdrawal of all foreign troops, dissolution of 
the UNC, and a new peace treaty. Tito made an official visit to the DPRK in August, 1977, 
lending his personal endorsement to the demand that all foreign troops withdraw from 
Korea. He condemned the "two Koreas plot", i.e. cross recognition and simultaneous UN 
entry. Kim U Sung reciprocated by reiterating his full support for the NAM and the 
indispensability of the NIEO.
Nevertheless, there were cross currents in the international system that worked against the
168
long-term strength of the DPRK's diplomacy. Though the DPRK reaped the benefit in the 
late 1970s of its previous diplomacy in Africa, as national liberation movements came to 
power, the rise of economic and political pragmatism in Africa began to undermine the 
DPRK's advantages. For instance, on 7 June, 1977, Mauritania broke off all diplomatic 
relations with the DPRK. The immediate cause was the DPRK's support for the Saharan 
Arab Democratic Republic (Polisario). Thus, DPRK militancy in support of Third World 
liberation movements could conflict with its interests in maintaining good relations with 
established friendly governments. The ROK offered a constant temptation through the 
alternative of attractive economic relations. Mauritania had gradually improved ties with 
the ROK prior to this abrupt severance with the DPRK. The return to military 
authoritarianism in several Latin American countries also undermined DPRK progress. 
For example, when a new anti-communist military regime in Argentina came to power it 
broke off relations with North Korea on 14 June, 1977.
The later part of the 1970s saw important leadership changes in both the US and China. 
Jimmy Carter was inaugurated President in January, 1977. Mao died in September, 1976 
and was succeeded by Hua Guo Feng. Carter introduced new policy initiatives toward 
South Korea, including public pressure on its human rights record and a call for further 
withdrawal of US forces, announced in July, 1977. These policy shifts, and the ROK 
reaction, led to extremely poor political relations between the US and the ROK for several 
years to follow. North Korea, however, failed to take full advantage of the strain in US- 
ROK relations.
On 18 November, 1977, the DPRK's Permanent Observer at the UN issued an assessment of 
the two year interval since the 30th UNGA decision. A special Memorandum was issued on 
1 February, 1978, categorically rejecting the "two Koreas" approach and cross recognition. 
This was followed by a worldwide campaign to garner denunciations of the "Two Koreas 
Plot". DPRK Foreign Minister Ho Dam requested the NAM summit host, Sri Lanka, to 
issue a letter to all NAM Foreign Ministers on the "danger of war" in Korea resulting from 
the Team Spirit exercises.
The Carter administration, however, sent signals to the DPRK indicating an interest in a 
new approach. Unfortunately, the DPRK met these overtures with suspicion. The DPRK 
Foreign Ministry issued a memorandum on 1 July, 1978 attacking President Carter's 
proposed US troop withdrawal as a "deceptive scheme." The DPRK also rejected President 
Park's offer in June, 1978 for a new North-South Economic Cooperation Plan, potentially a 
way of re-opening the deadlocked North-South Dialogue. These responses mark the 
beginning of a new intransigence in the DPRK, intimating its increasing regime rigidities.
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Premier Hua Guo Feng visited the DPRK in May, 1978, following the defeat of the Gang of 
Four, and reaffirmed China's rejection of the "Two Koreas Plot." Vice Premier Deng 
Xiaoping visited Pyongyang on 8 September, 1978. Kim II Sung used this occasion to 
denounce "dominationism" and to announce a new DPRK reunification policy based on the 
formula of "one state-two systems." He renounced any intention to "impose our socialist 
system and communist ideology on south Korea."
Kim II Sung's call for a "broad united front" by emerging countries to resist all forms of 
"dominationism" should be understood within the context of a key debate within the NAM, 
concerning a proposal championed by Cuba to differentiate among members according to 
their ideological and political orientation. It was an attempt to reassert the importance of 
the radical/ socialist orientation of the NAM, as it was originally constituted in 1961. (13) 
The DPRK's position in this debate was consistent, i.e. support for the broadest basis of 
solidarity. But the debate was symptomatic of increasing disunity inside the NAM as it 
entered the new era.
Kim II Sung personally sent a letter to the NAM Foreign Ministers' Conference in Belgrade 
on 25 July, 1978, arguing that "imperialist and dominationist forces are initiating 
artificially antagonism and enmity and causing conflicts and disputes among the non- 
aligned countries." Kim saw this as a strategy designed to draw Third World countries into 
spheres of influence and wreck their solidarity. Kim II Sung's position was that "The Non- 
aligned countries should not classify the member countries into opposing groups. Arguing 
which nation is progressive and which is not." In his speech before the NAM Foreign 
Ministers, Ho Dam blamed imperialists for deliberately "driving wedges" into the NAM to 
exploit the differences in social system, religion, etc. (14)
The Belgrade NAM Foreign Ministers meeting unanimously approved a declaration 
including a paragraph on the Korean Question. It gave support to the Three Principles of 4 
July, 1972, called for withdrawal of all foreign troops, dissolution of the UNC, dismantling 
of all foreign bases, and replacement of the Armistice with a peace treaty. Havana was 
chosen as the cite of the Sixth NAM summit, placing the DPRK in an advantageous 
position. However, there was a clear divergence between the position of Cuba and that of 
the DPRK on the political future of the NAM.
The Sixth NAM summit in Havana was a critical turning point in the movement's history. 
The attempt by Cuba to re-introduce ideological and political criteria into internal NAM 
affairs was perceived as a step that would undermine non-alignment and introduce Cold 
War categories of confrontation. Cuba's attempt to identify the Soviet Union as the 
"natural ally" of the Third World in its struggle against imperialism was met with strong
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resistance.
Tito led the moderates, including India, in the counter-attack against the Cuban bid for 
leadership. The result was a victory for the moderates. Leadership passed to India. This 
moderate leadership had stewardship of the NAM during the critical period of the next 
global recession, oil crisis, the debt crisis, and the Second Cold War. This proved to be 
disadvantageous to North Korean diplomacy.
North Korea did however make some progress at the Havana Summit, despite its 
disagreements with the host country. For instance, the DPRK was elected to serve on the 35 
nation Coordinating Bureau of the NAM. In the summit's final documents, the NAM called 
for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, dismantling of foreign bases, and the 
replacement of the Armistice with a peace treaty.
The Havana summit revealed a growing sense of frustration over the "negligible progress" 
that had been made to date on the NIEO. Statements called for continued struggle for the 
NIEO in the context of the "peoples struggle against colonialism and imperialism." The 
divisions that had been opened during the Havana summit were indicative of the 
underlying weakness of the Third World coalition. North Korea's reliance on NAM's 
international support meant a parallel decline in North Korea's international standing as 
the NAM's global influence waned.
Parallel to the debates inside NAM, the US-ROK relationship improved. The US-ROK 
Combined Forces Command was established in November, 1978 and the US Congress 
approved $1.2 billion for the Military Assistance Program. President Carter retracted his 
proposal for US troop withdrawal from Korea, responding to intense lobbying pressure. 
Carter paid an official visit to Seoul on 30 June, 1979. President Park's greeting remarks 
reflected his awareness of international flux. He referred to new directions in Sino- 
American, Sino-Japanese and Sino-Soviet relations, and the regional repercussions of the 
recent war in Indochina. However, Park reaffirmed that the alliance with the US remained 
the bedrock of ROK foreign policy. Carter proposed tri-partite talks between the US, ROK, 
and DPRK. The DPRK unwisely chose to reject this proposal, preferring bilateral talks 
with the US, thus excluding the ROK.
The establishment of full diplomatic relations between the US and China in 1979, however, 
and the concomitant US de-recognition of Taiwan, was a step of much greater significance. 
It could not be wholeheartedly welcomed in Seoul, since it set a precedent of delegitimising 
an anti-communist regime and embracing a communist one. Nevertheless, it did open an 
avenue for ROK rapprochement with China. In 1979, Park Chung Hee approached Deng
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Xiaoping's government for the improvement of economic, cultural and athletic ties.
ROK rapprochement with the USSR progressed even faster than that with China, having 
begun earlier. From the opening of the North-South Dialogue in 1972 the USSR ceased to 
refer to the DPRK as the sole sovereign government in Korea. From 1973, the USSR 
granted visas to ROK citizens for sport and educational purposes and in 1974 indirect trade 
began. Relations improved again when in 1978 the USSR returned a KAL airliner that had 
strayed off course and landed in Nurmansk. (15) Indeed, the improvement in USSR-ROK 
relations was so marked that it led the PRC to accuse the Soviets of collusion with the West 
in support of the Two Koreas Plot! Officially, however, the USSR was as opposed to cross 
recognition as was China.
However, the ROK was not alone in improving its relations with the USSR. The DPRK 
likewise improved relations with the USSR during the late 1970s, following an earlier 
period of strain. The improvement in DPRK-Soviet relations took place particularly in the 
sphere of military cooperation. Soviet aid was provided in 1978 for improvements in the 
North Korean naval port of Najin.
Along with increasing disarray in the NAM, however, increasing disarray among socialist 
states also undermined DPRK diplomacy. The problem of conflict between socialist states 
emerged as an acute problem, and placed the DPRK in a very difficult position. For 
example, the DPRK condemned Vietnam for its use of force against the Pol Pot regime in 
Kampuchea. However, Pol Pot had been feted in Pyongyang in October, 1977 as a "Hero of 
the DPRK." In contrast, North Korea remained silent concerning the subsequent punitive 
use of force by China against Vietnam, after the overthrow of Pol Pot. Similarly, when the 
USSR intervened in Afghanistan in late 1979, the DPRK criticism was muted, but it refused 
to sign a pro-Soviet statement by communist parties in Sofia, in February, 1980.
These incidents illustrate that the DPRK was in a state of indecision. These conflicts were 
symptomatic of a crisis of ideology in the communist world. The DPRK had consistently 
been anti-reformist and anti-revisionist since the early 1950s. It supported the USSR's 
interventions in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, and sided with the Maoists 
anti-revisionist stance during 1956-64. The fall of Khrushchev, an arch revisionist, had 
restored close relations with the USSR, while relations with China became strained during 
the Cultural Revolution. As the 1980s dawned, North Korean ideology was threatened by 
Chinese "revisionism," i.e de-Maoisation, the peace treaty with Japan, and the "separation 
of economics from politics".
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IV. Regime Rigidities and Adjustment to International Change 
In the emergent quadripolar power configuration in East Asia
the two Koreas diverged on very separate paths. In North Korea, Kim II Sung opted for a 
conservative succession strategy that put his own son, Kim Jong II, in positions of 
prominence. This was accompanied by increasing ideological, political, economic, and 
diplomatic inflexibility. The resulting ossification of the regime contributed significantly to 
the loss of previous diplomatic momentum.
In contrast, South Korea underwent a regime change that eliminated some elements of the 
Yushin dictatorship and introduced economic liberalisation policies under a successor 
authoritarian government led by Chun Doo Hwan. Regime rigidities were reduced through 
internationalisation of the economy, extensive industrial restructuring, greater tolerance of 
the political opposition, and most of all- greatly expanding economic diplomacy through 
contacts with as many regimes as possible, including communist countries.
A. South Korea: The Fifth Republic
The second oil crisis of 1978, world recession, the preceding years of over-investment in 
heavy industry, over-concentration by the giant business combines, the "chaebol", (16) and 
harsh and systematic domestic repression, all combined in 1979 to bring Park's undoing. 
On 27 October, 1979 President Park was assassinated by the Chief of the KCIA. Due to the 
brittle nature of the political system he had created, his fall threatened to destabilise South 
Korea.
A new military coup, led by Chun Doo Hwan, closed the democratic option, imposing a new 
authoritarian regime. The coup took place in two stages, first on 12 December, 1979, and 
the second stage on 17 May, 1980, when the popular uprising in the city of Kwangju was 
put down in blood. Under Martial Law a new junta, the Military-Civilian Standing 
Committee, was established. Though a new ruling party, the Democratic Justice Party, was 
created,
the so-called "T-K clique" remained at the centre of political power. (17)
One of the central political aims of the Fifth Republic was to rehabilitate the international 
image of South Korea, which had reached a nadir toward the end of Park's tenure. Newly 
inaugurated US President Ronald Reagan lent the ROK his assistance in this undertaking. 
The Fifth Republic's most important reforms, however, concerned the economy, i.e. 
regaining international competitiveness and growth. In 1980 the GNP of the ROK declined 
by 5 percent. Chun Doo Hwan set out to correct structural imbalances in the economy 
(essentially over-capacity in heavy industries), restore export growth, diversify production 
and markets, and to reduce inflation and the acute debt service burden. The Fifth Five Year
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Plan, launched in 1982, was assisted by massive new injections of capital from Japan 
(negotiated at some $4 billion). Prime Minister Nakasone visited Seoul in 1983 and Chun 
visited Japan in 1984. These "historic" reconciliation visits cemented a new relationship of 
cooperation between South Korea and Japan, though under Yushin investment by Japan 
had already been increasing. (18)
The general strategy included reducing the interventionist role of the state, allowing market 
forces more scope. The privatisation of state industries was accelerated and industrial 
policy changed, reducing statutory controls by government. The trade regime was 
liberalised, while laying plans for gradual liberalisation of the financial sector. Conditions 
for foreign investors were also liberalised. Industrial restructuring was undertaken with a 
heavy hand, including forced bankruptcies, mergers and acquisitions, at government 
direction. New industrial sectors were targeted for growth, especially automobiles, 
electronics, and the already established steel, shipbuilding, petrochemical, and construction 
and heavy engineering industries. Labour was disciplined with new laws to control union 
formation and collective bargaining. (19) Ambitious new export promotion policies were 
put in place to diversify markets around the globe and win new contracts assuring cheap 
and reliable raw materials, particularly in Southeast Asia and the Middle East.
The net effect of the restructuring policies was a dramatic economic turnaround. This 
recovery placed the ROK in an excellent position to take advantage of the new international 
climate in the second half of the 1980s. The economic diplomacy and diplomatic 
pragmatism launched in the preceding period became the defining characteristics of ROK 
foreign policy in the late 1980s.
B. North Korea: Consolidating the Succession of Kim Jong II
North Korea's transition into the 1980s was marked by a regime change that obstructed 
innovation and flexibility, resulting in stagnation and isolation. Thereafter, the DPRK was 
affected by three key weaknesses: (A) The nature of the political system, and succession 
based on the hereditary principle (B) structural imbalances in the economy and lack of 
capital, technology, export capacity, and foreign exchange (C) ideological rigidity and an 
antiquated foreign policy.
The failures of North Korea in the 1980s are largely the result of the nature of Kim II 
Sung's power. Kim II Sung's ascendance took place over a period of some fifteen years, 
from 1945-1960. (20) However, in the 1980s ossification of the regime turned strengths into 
weaknesses. The root cause was the inseparability of the political, economic, and foreign 
policy aspects of the Juche system as embodied in the Kim "dynasty". Therefore, 
preservation of the regime required strict adherence to established dogma in all areas of
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policy. Fundamental change in any element might undermine the stability of the regime.
In foreign policy terms, the new "Kim Jong II regime" (21) was thrown immediately onto 
the defensive by new reunification initiatives from the Chun Doo Hwan government; was 
weakened by the trend toward moderation in the NAM; and was out-flanked by the greater 
interest of its communist allies in expanding economic relations with South Korea.
As the 1980s opened, a different political atmosphere began to grip the Third World 
movement. New political currents of "moderation" surfaced strongly at the NAM Foreign 
Ministers Conference in New Delhi in 1981, where the Korean Question was removed from 
the NAM agenda. At the NAM summit in New Delhi, in 1983, the conference adopted a 
strictly non-partisan position on the Korean Question, simply calling for withdrawal of all 
foreign forces from Korea. The new trend in the NAM was reluctantly acknowledged by the 
DPRK, at the Harare Summit in 1986, in a statement delivered by DPRK Vice President 
Park, Sung Chul.
As relations with the Third World entered a period of coolness,
the DPRK turned to its communist allies for succour. An accommodation was reached with 
the new leadership of the PRC in 1981-82 in a series of meetings with Premier Zhao Ziyang, 
Deng Xiaoping, and Hu Yaobang, with both Kim II Sung and Kim Jong II. The DPRK 
offered China use of the east coast port of Chongjin.
After the disastrous Rangoon incident in 1983, discussed below, Kim II Sung made a series 
of visits to China seeking support for North Korea's foreign policy. This situation revealed 
the limits of Chinese support. While the DPRK still held a "veto" on the normalisation of 
China's relations with the ROK, the DPRK was unsuccessful in getting China to make the 
Korean Question a question of principle in China's relations with the United States. The 
PRC likewise no longer advocated total US withdrawal from Korea. China, however, was 
equally unsuccessful in persuading the Kim U Sung/Kim Jong II regime to emulate China's 
modernisation and liberalisation policies.
Soviet military support for the DPRK increased in the early 1980s. In the wake of the 
Rangoon incident, Kim U Sung held talks with Chernenko, seeking advice on North Korea's 
new proposal for "tripartite" talks between the DPRK, ROK, and the US (actually two sets 
of bilateral talks running simultaneously). The USSR did not in fact fully endorse this idea. 
In the event, North-South Korea talks resumed in 1984-86, but with little concrete result.
The rise of Gorbachev from 1985 did not at first adversely affect Soviet-North Korean 
relations. On the contrary, relations initially improved. For instance, in 1985 an agreement
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was reached to supply the DPRK with the Soviet MIG-23 and to allow the USSR access to 
North Korea's air space. Joint naval exercises were conducted and the Soviet navy enjoyed 
rights of port of call at several DPRK ports. Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze visited 
Pyongyang in January, 1986.
The increasingly unfavourable international atmosphere was grossly compounded by the 
Rangoon bombing in late 1983. This bombing attack, while ROK President Chun Doo 
Hwan was on the first leg of a tour of Asian capitals, killed several members of the South 
Korean cabinet. In response, the US reversed its policy of considering a lessening of 
restrictions on contacts with the DPRK. Japan imposed economic sanctions, which were not 
lifted until 1 January, 1985. The timing of the incident was extremely unfavourable, coming 
as it did just before a meeting of the Interparliamentary Union in Seoul. The global image 
of the DPRK was severely damaged. For the first several months after this incident 
Pyongyang was in near total diplomatic isolation. (22) North Korea was in danger of 
becoming an international pariah.
The mis-management of DPRK foreign policy was further compounded by later errors such 
as intransigence over negotiations for sports cooperation with South Korea, which had won 
the right to host the Asian Games for 1986 and the 24th Olmypiad in 1988. Unreasonable 
demands were made as prerequisites for normalisation with Japan, such as nullification of 
Japan's basic treaty (1965) with the ROK. These incidents illustrate the degree to which the 
Kim Jong U regime misjudged international reality and made a bad situation even worse, 
setting off a self-defeating spiral.
V. Diplomatic Reversal: The Triumph of Economic Diplomacy
This section is based primarily on extensive interviews conducted in the Foreign Ministry of 
the Republic of Korea in 1985-1986. The information presented concerns the South Korean 
strategy of economic diplomacy in the 1980s, as a means of diplomatic competition with the 
DPRK.
The interviews reveal a very consistent theme: i.e. that the ROK's greatest asset was its 
economic capabilities, compared to the DPRK's perceived economic weakness. The ROK 
Foreign Ministry had developed a new elan of self-confidence. The DPRK was perceived to 
be on the defensive and the ROK felt sure of eventual victory. Thus, economic diplomacy 
played a decisive role in the diplomatic reversal of the 1980s, reflecting the congruence of 
ROK domestic and foreign policy with key trends in the international political economy.
A: Latin America
Latin America was traditionally the ROK's stronghold, as previously discussed. According
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to the then Director of the South American Division of the ROK Foreign Ministry, the 
DPRK was "expelled" from Latin America by the mid-1980s. (23) DPRK isolation in Latin 
America was explained partly by continental political trends, e.g. the militarisation of 
civilian regimes. For instance, in Argentina in 1974, with the overthrow of civilian 
government by a military regime, the DPRK embassy was burned down and its diplomatic 
staff fled. Similarly, DPRK embassy personnel fled Uruguay after the military came to 
power.
These diplomatic "routes" are rather extraordinary. Nevertheless, the general political 
climate in Latin America confined the DPRK's contacts to cultural, economic, or academic 
missions, as the only visa categories available. These missions were therefore used to 
attempt contact with the host Foreign Ministry, in the hopes of establishing a relationship.
In 1986, following the tide of re-democratisation, the DPRK sent a number of delegations to 
such destinations as Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Colombia. Anti­
communist regimes such as Paraguay and Chile were avoided. According to the then 
Director of the South American Division, North Korea targeted re-democratised regimes. 
He said that, in general, North Korea did "not have contact with the ruling party, but with 
the opposition party(s)." (24) That is, during the period of military rule, the DPRK 
concentrated on cultivating party to party relations with opposition forces in Latin 
America. Therefore, the return to democracy should have been very much to North Korea's 
advantage.
The prototype of this strategy was the DPRK’s relationship with APRA, in Peru. The 
DPRK cultivated party to party ties with APRA, and party leader Alan Garcia visited the 
DPRK several times. When Alan Garcia became President of Peru the DPRK succeeded in 
establishing full diplomatic relations. However, the Peruvian case also illuminates the 
reasons that the DPRK could not automatically capitalise on Latin America's re- 
democratisation. North Korea made various economic promises, particularly to purchase 
Peruvian goods (e.g. one million tons of ore) but could not honour these promises. 
According to the ROK Foreign Ministry, although some Latin American governments had 
taken this sort of promise seriously, the DPRK lacked the foreign exchange to meet its 
obligations, and was therefore forced to fall back on attempting to negotiate a barter deal, 
or a sale of military equipment. (25)
The intensifying trend toward "dual recognition" reflected the perceived interest of Third 
World governments to seek economic advantage at the least political cost. South Korea was 
increasingly attractive as an economic partner, even to radical or socialist regimes. In 
contrast, North Korea was increasingly unattractive as an economic partner. Any limited
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economic benefit of relations with North Korea was not usually sufficient compensation for 
the political costs of association with it. Major arms purchasers, like Iran, were an 
exception to this rule.
According to the then Director of the South America Division, (formerly First Secretary for 
Economic Affairs in the ROK embassy in Mexico), the case of Mexico is an interesting 
illustration of this point. Mexico opted for a policy of "equidistance" between the two 
Korean governments. However, it had no resident embassy in Pyongyang, for fear of 
breaking the diplomatic equilibrium. Nevertheless, the ROK assumed that Mexico accepted 
its cross-recognition formula.
The Director of the South American Division maintained that South Korea's relationship 
with Mexico was typical of ROK relations with Latin America in the 1980s. According to 
this view, the main reason for DPRK weakness in Latin America during this period was not 
political, but economic, i.e. the DPRK's lack of external economic capabilities. Therefore, 
"If their economy was stronger, perhaps the DPRK would make progress in Latin 
America." (26)
The ROK played upon North Korea's economic weakness to win advantage in the 
diplomatic competition. For example, the ROK provided Latin American governments with 
statistics on DPRK economic promises and the lack of actual purchases. These statistics 
were "very persuasive." (27) Their effect is illustrated by the fact that between 1982 and 
1985 the DPRK refrained from sending delegations into the region. However, in 1986 they 
again despatched a wave of delegations, as noted above. Nevertheless, in the same year, the 
DPRK was refused visas to enter Ecuador. Ecuador annually sold the ROK some 54,000 
barrels of oil per day, almost half of Ecuador's export and one quarter of its total 
production. (28)
The Ecuadorean case illustrates the ROK's policy of "bilateral compensation". The ROK 
purchased goods from a country as a "reward" or compensation for voting in favour of the 
ROK position in international fora. (29) Mexico's support for the ROK in such fora, for 
example, was an expression, not of its friendship for the ROK or opposition to the DPRK, 
but rather of its own self-interest. On the other hand, Mexico did not immediately support 
the ROK's position "right away" after the Rangoon and KAL 007 incidents in 1983, being 
wary of the attitude of other states. (30)
All this not withstanding, the ROK government continued to "take for granted" that Latin 
America was its stronghold. However, the fear was expressed that Latin American 
governments might attempt to use the "North Korea card" in future to manipulate the
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ROK's weak spot. That is, because of the diplomatic competition between the two Korean 
regimes, Latin American governments might be tempted to try to "get more out of the 
ROK" (in economic terms) by manipulating the competition. A case cited was Peru, where 
the ROK was outwardly tolerant of Peru's relations with North Korea, but actually quite 
unhappy. Peru reportedly said to the ROK "North Korea gave us this - how much will you 
give us?" (31)
Latin America constituted something of a special case, given traditional US influence in 
that region. Political factors remained very prominent in determining relations, though 
economic factors were increasingly important. In the mid-1980s the ROK was primarily 
worried that Cuban influence on guerrilla movements in the region was expanding. One 
case cited was Colombia. Similarly, Seoul's view was that the DPRK had "very great" 
influence in the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. (32) It is certainly true that President 
Daniel Ortega made several official visits to Pyongyang in the 1980s and discussed requests 
for aid with North Korea.
The ROK's political approach in Latin America contrasted sharply with that of the DPRK. 
Officially, the ROK supported the Contadora peace process in Central America, but 
privately was probably sympathetic to the Contras in the Nicaraguan conflict and 
unsympathetic to the FMLN in El Salvador, whereas the DPRK was a supporter of both the 
Sandinista and the FMLN cause. In short, "Rather than match the DPRK's policy of 
involvement in conflicts in the Third World in the same manner, the ROK tries to maintain 
neutrality in accord with the policy of peaceful reunification and dialogue." (33) Two 
examples cited were the Malvinas (Falklands) conflict and the Nicaraguan conflict.
However, mindful of its "world image", the ROK did not want any Presidential visit to 
Seoul by either President Pinochet of Chile or President Stroesner of Paraguay, and 
certainly not ahead of other Latin American leaders. This was despite the fact that both 
regimes were "anti-communist states" and that relations with them were considered to be 
good. (34) This last point illustrates the extent to which the ROK toned down its anti­
communism in the 1980s, eschewing too close an identification with such regimes.
B: Africa
Traditionally, Africa was the region in which the ROK's position was weakest. In contrast 
to its confidence in Latin America, the ROK Foreign Ministry was very mindful of its 
continuing weaknesses in Africa. In Africa most of the regimes were newly independent, not 
as stable, and required more aid. However, the economic needs of Africa provided the ROK 
with a perceived opportunity to improve its diplomatic position.
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The then Director of the East African Affairs Division stressed the ROK's emphasis on 
economic cooperation with Africa, whereas the DPRK emphasised political and military 
cooperation. The ROK strategy was gradually having an effect. According to the Director, 
the "DPRK has seen the success of the ROK aid policy (in Africa) and is now emulating it." 
(35) For example, as of March, 1986, the DPRK had supplied some 200 technicians to 
Ethiopia, 8 to Uganda, 13 to the Central African Republic, 10 to Nigeria, and 12 to Burkina 
Faso. Furthermore, "The main purpose of the DPRK providing technicians to those 
countries is to counter ROK aid to those countries." (36) South Korea had a financial 
advantage, however, in the quest to win influence in Africa. For instance, the ROK was a 
member of the African Development Bank, with a subscription of $40 million in 1986, 
whereas the DPRK was not even a member.
The new ROK strategy in Africa was a focus on "people to people diplomacy." (37) In 
addition, the ROK followed a policy of never supplying arms to any party in Africa. This 
policy is similar to the approach in Latin America, i.e. avoiding involvement in local 
conflicts. By contrast, the DPRK's strategy focused on cultivating ties between heads of 
state, and providing military assistance. The strength of the ROK's people to people 
diplomacy was believed to lie in the strength of the ROK as an "economic model" that 
attracted African interest. Zimbabwe was cited as an example of a case where, even at the 
grassroots level, the ROK was popularly perceived as an economic model.
Nevertheless, the ROK Foreign Ministry was acutely aware of the considerable strength of 
the political ties between the DPRK and many African governments, and the real obstacles 
these ties presented to ROK diplomacy. For example, Tanzania's President Julius Nyerere 
and President Kim II Sung shared a "common ideology", i.e. Juche, or "ujamaa" in 
Tanzania, and socialism. (38) The DPRK's ties to African liberation movements also 
remained strong. For instance, even while Zimbabwe was still in the midst of its war of 
national liberation, Kim II Sung hosted Robert Mugabe in the DPRK - as a head of state. 
Thus, when Mugabe became Prime Minister he remained a supporter of North Korea. A 
similar close relationship existed with the head of state of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda, an 
advocate of "African socialism".
Although "African socialism" created a favourable political climate for the DPRK, 
capitalist states, such as Kenya, were pro-Western and friendly to the ROK. After twenty 
years of socialism in Africa, however, many African leaders were beginning to realise that 
African socialism was "not working." (39) The economic performance of Kenya was 
contrasted to the failures of Tanzania and Uganda from 1982-1986. This supports the view 
that the change in economic orientation, from the 1970s' militancy to the "free market" 
orthodoxy of the 1980s, was an international trend favourable to ROK diplomacy and
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deleterious to that of the DPRK.
Interestingly, the ROK Foreign Ministry identified a potential political weakness of the 
DPRK in Africa, i.e. "the Kim II Sung dynasty". DPRK diplomats in Africa "hate to 
discuss that" and "pretended not to hear" when they were questioned about the succession 
to Kim Jong II in North Korea. (40) This reveals that the DPRK was vulnerable, even in the 
region of its greatest traditional strength, to the negative image created by the political 
ossification of the Kim II Sung/Kim Jong II regime.
The ROK's "Open Door Policy" in Africa was designed to avoid conflict and enhance 
peace. (41) The ROK was very proud of its transition from recipient to donor of aid, albeit 
it was not yet a large donor. The ROK's relationship with the Third World was 
characterised by complementarity or "compatibility" between the ROK's intermediate, 
labour-intensive technology and the needs of most Third World economies. The ROK also 
stressed assistance to the Third World in the form of loans, consultancy, and voluntary 
service.
The central focus of ROK aid policy was assisting the private sector. Though "handing out 
automobiles, medical equipment, etc. may have a short-term effect", the emphasis was on 
aid to small scale enterprises and on technology transfe, to speed up technical capabilities, 
create employment, and to some extent support import substitution. (42) This aid policy 
was in broad alignment with similar emphases by such major aid donors as the US, IMF 
and World Bank.
The ROK's approach, i.e. giving free assistance to African countries, contrasted to the 
political strings attached to DPRK aid. The ROK made "no direct linkage in its aid to 
support for the ROK on the unification issue", whereas the DPRK was "very mindful of 
keeping continuous influence by providing economic assistance." (43) In the 1980s, African 
states were realising that they needed economic assistance more than they needed military 
assistance. (44) This trend was therefore favourable to the ROK, possessing as it did 
superior economic capabilities.
After the Rangoon incident more Third World states began moving toward a better 
understanding of the ROK's position on reunification. (45) Furthermore, the DPRK’s 
traditional policy of inviting Third World leaders to Pyongyang was becoming counter­
productive, as most of these leaders could directly compare the economic development of 
the North with that of the South. It was predicted that the 24th Olympiad in Seoul would 
allow leaders from all over the world to see South Korea's achievements for themselves. 
Therefore, DPRK influence would decline, and even communist states would reconsider the
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need for economic relations with the ROK. The DPRK's dis-information about the ROK 
would thereby lose its effectiveness. (46) This prediction turned out to be fairly accurate.
Even in Southern Africa, where the socialist orientation of the Frontline States was an 
obstacle to better relations with the ROK, "economic reality moves them toward the West 
for economic aid." (47) This was certainly true of Mozambique and Zimbabwe, which 
despite their marxist ideology, were pragmatic about approaching the West for assistance. 
Though these regimes held to the principle of "the friend of your enemy is your enemy", 
nevertheless it was believed that "now perhaps their image of the ROK will change because 
of the economic development success of the ROK...If they give first priority to economic 
development they may open up to the ROK..." (48) The ROK was "keeping the door open 
to socialist Africa." The ROK viewed relations with "moderate" Zambia as the key to 
future improved relations with the Frontline States.
The Director of the Maghreb Division, responsible for Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, 
Mauritania, and Sudan, explained the basic policy view of the ROK as being that 
"substantial economic relations are much more important than formal aid." (49) In his 
view, the DPRK's influence in the Maghreb region had been weakening. The DPRK had 
achieved influence in the region before the ROK, but in the 1980s the region was much 
more favourably inclined toward the ROK than before. The reason for ROK progress was 
its economic relations with countries in the region and the weakness of the DPRK's 
economic capabilities in comparison. (50)
One example cited was the case of Libya, where the ROK had established economic 
relations in the 1980s, despite Libya's radical political policies. Libya established diplomatic 
relations with the ROK in tandem with its economic relationship. So strong were these 
ROK-Libya economic ties, most spectacularly in the field of construction industries, that 
the DPRK was powerless to obstruct their diplomatic relationship. (51)
By the mid-1980s, only Algeria still refused to establish diplomatic relations with the ROK. 
This was explained as being due to Algeria being a "rigid socialist regime" with long 
standing historical ties with the DPRK. (52) However, even Algeria had begun to change 
direction toward being "more pragmatic." Algeria's position on the Korean Question 
changed from being extremely supportive of the DPRK, to adopting a position of "silence."
In contrast, Morocco, a pro-Western regime, had never established relations with the 
DPRK. It was the ROK's policy to avoid involvement in conflicts in Africa, and this was 
carefully applied to the situation between Morocco and Polisario, so as not to alienate this 
important supporter. In contrast, the DPRK openly supported Polisario. Therefore if
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Polisario came to power it would almost certainly become a supporter of North Korea.
In the case of Tunisia and Sudan, these countries had diplomatic relations with the DPRK 
but maintained important economic ties to the ROK, and became more supportive of the 
ROK politically. In the case of Tunisia, it initially maintained a neutral stance on the 
Korean Question. However, by 1986, Tunisia "understood our (ROK) position much more 
than the DPRK's." (53)
The most dramatic case of diplomatic reversal in favour of the ROK was Mauritania, 
discussed earlier. Mauritania's sudden switch to having diplomatic relations exclusively 
with the ROK was explained as due to a domestic change of regime, disappointment with 
mere "verbal assistance" from the DPRK, and the expectation of economic assistance from 
the ROK. (54) Many African countries were becoming disappointed with the lack of "real 
DPRK assistance" and were therefore becoming more friendly to the ROK.
In summation, the ROK's position of strict non-interference in regional or domestic 
conflicts, providing aid without political strings attached, and its ability to be an important 
economic partner, combined to enhance its influence in the region. These policies indicate 
much greater flexibility and sophistication, as well as capabilities, on the part of the ROK, 
than in the previous decades.
Nevertheless, ROK economic diplomacy did suffer from at least two weaknesses. Firstly, it 
was becoming increasingly difficult for the ROK government to intervene in the private 
economic sphere inside Korea itself. Therefore, if Korean companies decided that they did 
not want to invest in a particular country there was "very little the ROK government can 
do about it." (55) In the past, state control over ROK companies and their investment 
decisions was an important aspect of economic diplomacy. Secondly, the size of the ROK 
aid budget was small, therefore such promises had to be selective.
The Director of the West Africa Division had responsibility for fifteen countries in the 
region, including Nigeria and the Ivory Coast. (56) In 1986 the pattern of ROK relations in 
this region was rather mixed. Several states had no diplomatic relations at all with the 
ROK, among them Togo, Mali, Benin, Cape Verde, and Guinea, due to the fact that they 
were close to the "communist bloc", particularly to the USSR and DPRK, and had "similar 
political systems." Nevertheless, the ROK hoped to establish diplomatic relations with all 
five.
Several countries in the region had already established diplomatic relations with both 
Koreas, including Nigeria, Liberia, Burkina Faso, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Senegal, Ivory 
Coast, and Niger. Among these, the ROK placed the greatest importance on relations with
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Nigeria, Ivory Coast, and Senegal, mainly on the basis of their economic and political 
importance. (57)
The Ivory Coast is particularly indicative of the situation the ROK faced. The Ivory Coast 
had considerable interest in economic relations with the ROK. However, in January, 1985, 
the Ivory Coast opened diplomatic relations with the DPRK. This policy shift actually 
began as early as 1979, when the Ivory Coast decided to adopt an "even-handed" policy on 
the Korean Question, as advocated by the NAM. The non-radical states were taking the 
view that reunification should be solved by direct dialogue between the two Koreas.
Nigeria was also important and was "interested in economic relations with the ROK." (58) 
Relations with Senegal, however, were improved by emphasising ties between leaders, a 
North Korean method. Chun Doo Hwan visited Senegal in 1982, and President Diouf of 
Senegal returned the visit to Seoul in 1983. The strongest political relationship in the 
region, however, was with President Samuel Doe of Liberia, a country with a special 
relationship with the US, something rather rare in Africa.
C. Asia
In South East Asia the ROK clearly stressed the importance of economic relations, 
especially with ASEAN countries. (59) President Chun made this a priority from the outset 
of his term of office. In 1981 Chun conducted a personal tour of the region and was quite 
successful in cementing new relationships with heads of governments, including Prime 
Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, the Sultan of Brunei, President Suharto of Indonesia, 
and Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia. These leaders all made return visits to Seoul 
following Chun's 1981 tour.
The main theme in this ASEAN diplomacy was the strengthening of mutual economic 
relations. The ROK needed the natural resources of ASEAN countries, for instance oil, 
rubber, and palm oil, and hoped to make this relationship a "model for South-South 
cooperation." (60) The ROK had already established regular bilateral consultative 
mechanisms with countries in the region, including annual trade meetings. The main aim of 
the new economic diplomacy was to secure long term supply contracts on favourable terms, 
and to explore new markets in the region for South Korean companies, through both trade 
and investment.
On the other hand, the DPRK had also made diplomatic progress within ASEAN, having 
established diplomatic relations with all the ASEAN member countries except Brunei and 
the Philippines by 1986. In addition, the USSR had improved relations with Pacific island 
states, such as Vanuatu (June, 1986) and Kiribati, thus raising fears in Seoul that the DPRK
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would be able to take advantage of this trend. The ROK placed confidence in Australia as 
the regional power best placed to deter the further expansion of communists in the South 
Pacific. By 1985 the ROK was already Australia's fourth largest export market.
As in other regions of the Third World already discussed above, the policy of the ROK in 
South East Asia was to avoid involvement in political and other conflicts. For example, the 
ROK made no official statements on the New Caledonia, Kanak liberation, or the various 
independence movements in Micronesia, Palau, etc. On the issue of Kampuchea the ROK 
lent its "moral support" to ASEAN's position, supporting the call for Vietnamese 
withdrawal. Nevertheless, the ROK made no effort to prevent Indochinese communist 
countries from attending international events in the ROK, and kept the door open to 
establishing diplomatic relations. It is therefore apparent how far the policy of the 1980s 
had departed from that of the Vietnam war era. The ROK had abandoned anti-communist 
criteria in its relations with Indochina in favour of pragmatism and openness.
This ROK policy of "silence" was essentially a cautious damage limitation. The ROK's 
previous policy of taking sides in various Third World conflicts had been politically 
disastrous, especially its identification with South Vietnam, Israel, and South Africa. The 
ROK did not jeopardise good relations with an established partner by supporting a 
national liberation movement. In contrast, the DPRK's policy on national liberation 
movements remained unchanged, i.e. general endorsement of most liberation struggles, 
despite the possible political or diplomatic cost such a position might entail. (61)
As elsewhere, the same trends toward interest in economic relations and a non-partisan 
position on the Korean Question were happening in South West Asia (India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Burma, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives). The DPRK enjoyed a 
stronger position than the ROK from the 1950s through to the 1970s. (62) However, after 
the Rangoon bombing the trend was reversed. Individual countries in the region were eager 
to improve relations with the ROK "especially in economic terms." (63)
In the mid-1980s the ROK succeeded in South West Asia using high level diplomacy 
methods. Between 1984-85, President Jawardene of Sri Lanka, the President of the 
Maldives, President Zia ul Haq of Pakistan, and President Ershad of Bangladesh visited 
Seoul. All four heads of state were supporters of the moderate position on Korean 
reunification. None of them made any clear mention of the presence of US troops in the 
South or even of the issue of outside interference. Nevertheless, none of these governments 
downgraded relations with the DPRK. Despite this, the ROK had the impression that all 
four were more sympathetic to the ROK's position. (64)
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ROK success can be explained as a consequence of those countries' desire for economic 
cooperation. In particular, it was the desire to acquire technology from the ROK that was 
of central interest to these governments. Therefore, they began to "recognise the ROK's 
position in international society." (65) This relationship was politically beneficial to the 
ROK as a means to strengthen relations with NAM and counter-balance the influence of the 
DPRK. The ROK also desired "economic advance into South West Asia's market", and was 
attracted by the region's large population and economic potential. (66)
In summation, the respondents articulated a very consistent view, across all the regional 
bureaus, of the efficacy of economic diplomacy and the weaknesses of DPRK policy during 
the 1980s. Therefore, the diplomatic reversal was already in motion well before the end of 
the Cold War and the fall of European communism. South Korea's domestic and foreign 
policies were very congruent with main trends in the international political economy. This 
was translated into increasing international support. The retreat from anti-communism 
and the adoption of neutrality on political conflicts proved to be extremely effective.
VI. Juche in Crisis: The Decline of DPRK Diplomacy
North Korea's regime rigidities greatly increased in the late 1970s and throughout the 
1980s, bringing a concomitant decline in its diplomacy. The origins of North Korea's crisis 
are embedded in "Juche" itself, which led to resisting fundamental economic and political 
reform. The regime justified such resistance by arguing that "If ideological liberalisation is 
permitted in socialist society...it will entail grave consequences of destroying the ideological 
and political unity of the masses and disrupting the socialist society itself." (67)
The roots of the crisis in the 1980s go back to the "second revolution" in North Korea, 
discussed earlier. The failure of national reunification and the rise of the Kim II Sung 
faction reinforced the logic of "separate development" of North Korean socialism. (68) Kim 
II Sung himself is credited with having invented the two most characteristic management 
systems of Juche, both of which emerged in the early 1960s. These are the "Taean" work 
system, applied to industry, and the "Chongsanri" method, applied in agriculture.
These same methods remain unchanged and at the centre of economic management. When 
North Korean celebrated the 30th anniversary of the Chongsanri method on 8 February, 
1990, Vice President Pak, Sung Chul praised it as "the best way to effectively administer 
society and successfully accelerate socialist construction." (69) Prime Minister Yon, Hyong 
Muk described the Taean work system as "the most superior socialist economic 
management system of our own way which was created by President Kim II Sung." (70) Its 
essence is identical to the Chongsanri method, i.e. party officials (committees) at every 
factory and workplace help solve problems at the "lower" level in "direct contact with the
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masses", i.e. consulting the workers.
The Juche management system, stripped to bare essentials, is nothing more nor less than 
ubiquitous party management of production, even at the lowest levels. Thus, bureaucratism 
is its hallmark, despite its credo of anti-bureaucratism. Accompanying this style of 
management, Stakhanovite methods of "heroic" mass mobilisation have been used to 
promote increases in production. This began with the Chollima campaign in the late 1950s, 
whose icon was Pegasus - Speed incarnate! North Korean workers have perpetually been 
cajoled to over-fulfil production quotas ahead of schedule. Even the 1990s began with a 
"Speed of the 1990s" campaign.
The techniques that rapidly transformed North Korea into a Third World industrial 
"miracle" (71) later turned out to be one-off gains followed by mounting structural 
difficulties. They were accompanied by a political system described as "monolithic". (72) 
Kim 11 Sung's "Dual line" of economic construction in parallel with National Defedse 
adopted in October, 1966, hampered economic development. The seven year plan (1961-67) 
had to be extended by three years. Structural imbalances resulting from dual line policy 
were openly admitted at the Fifth Congress of the KWP in November, 1970. A new six year 
plan was approved for 1971-76, in which the "Three Technical Revolutions" were 
promoted in order to redress imbalances between heavy and light industry and between 
industry and agriculture.
From about 1969 North Korea accepted the necessity of opening economic links with the 
wider capitalist world economy. The reintegration of the socialist economies into the 
capitalist world economy generally began in the early 1970s. (73) North Korea decided to 
establish limited economic ties with Japan and West Europe in particular, since the US 
continued to impose an embargo on trade and investment. North Korea needed to import 
capital, and especially technology, from the capitalist countries in order to increase its 
lagging productivity and keep up with technological advances in South Korea. These 
increased imports were to be paid for by the revenue earned from the export of raw 
materials and manufactured goods; a familiar strategy.
This opening had a short-term positive effect on the North Korean economy. The six year 
plan was completed sixteen months early in September, 1975. The rate of industrial growth 
during the six year plan for 1971-76 was 16.3%. However, what began as a mere search for 
technology through trade led rapidly to financial difficulties. (74)
Ironically, just as North Korea and other the socialist economies re-integrated with the 
world economy, it went into a severe recession in 1973-75. The prices on the world market
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for North Korea's exports, mainly primary products such as minerals, fell considerably, as 
the terms of trade for less advanced economies deteriorated. By 1976, the DPRK, like many 
other socialist economies and Third World countries, experienced great difficulty servicing 
its mounting foreign debt. (75) Thereafter, North Korea temporarily recoiled from 
involvement in the capitalist world economy.
An even more severe world recession in 1979-82 intensified the problems. The DPRK was 
unable to obtain credit and continued to suffer from the US trade embargo and high 
defense spending. Kim, Jong U led mobilisation campaigns to increase production, such as 
the "Three Revolution Teams" and various "Speed Battle" programmes. The general aim 
was to overcome the technology gap by increasing the technical proficiency of cadres, 
workers, and the economy as a whole. The economic plan for 1978-84 called for increased 
production, but in the established sectors, such as steel, electricity, cement, coal, fertilisers, 
grain, minerals and ores, and marine and fisheries products. In 1980, ambitious ten year 
production targets were set in these sectors. Industrial production still grew at an officially 
estimated annual rate of 12.2% during the Second Seven Year Plan of 1978-84. (76)
Under Kim Jong U, renewed emphasis has been placed on ideological work, (77) but there 
have been no political reforms that enhanced worker self-management, nor economic 
reforms that encouraged decentralisation. On the contrary, Kim, Jong II consolidated his 
power through a new purge, which reportedly required the establishment of a new tier in 
the prison system, built for opponents of Kim Jong Il's succession. (78)
The DPRK had little choice but to again attempt to re-integrate with the world economy. In 
1984, North Korea enacted a new law on foreign investment allowing joint ventures on 
favourable terms. However, given the lack of internal reform, there were very few takers. 
At the completion of the 2nd Seven Year Plan in 1984, there followed a very difficult period 
of adjustment in 1985-6, without a formal economic plan. This difficulty is officially 
explained as due to "dispersion in the level and speed of economic growth...relative delays 
in the development of some economic fields... and...the heavy burden of military spending." 
(79) The ambitious ten year targets set in 1980 were revised downward by Kim II Sung 
himself in April, 1987, in the new Seven Year Plan for 1987-93, to reflect more modest, and 
realistic goals.
In the post 1989 period, Kim, Jong II led a drive towards so-called "flexible production 
systems" and "flexible production cells". Despite the sophisticated "post-fordist" title, this 
programme seemed to consist of little more than the introduction of rather primitive 
computerisation and robotisation. The general goal was to upgrade machine tool industries, 
a key element in North Korea's economy, as well as electronics, while enhancing
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automation and the application of science and technology to industry.
The government aimed to fulfil the 3rd Seven Year Plan ahead of schedule, under the 
slogan "Let us increase production and make economies and make the existing economic 
foundations pay off!" Kim, Jong II advocated a "powerful drive" to "quickly introduce 
automation devices, gauges, appliances, electronic goods", as well as computerisation and 
robotisation. Yet with all this technical emphasis, the economy as a whole was essentially 
unreformed.
North Korea's structural problems deepened considerably following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the communist regimes of Eastern Europe. In 1990, GNP declined nearly 
4 % and per capita GNP by 5.25 %. External trade declined by 4%, while the trade deficit 
stood at some $600 million, and external debt grew to $7.86 billion. Significant reductions in 
aid from the USSR and Eastern Europe began to hurt the economy.
The demand for payment in hard currency, at world market prices, for energy imports 
from the USSR, made in November, 1990, hit North Korea particularly hard. North Korea 
has no oil of its own, though it is rich in coal and hydroelectricity. Coal production has not 
been able to adequately fill the gap, and the economy reportedly suffers from a shortage of 
coal due to decreased domestic output, (80) contributing to an increase in idle industrial 
capacity to as high as 30-50 per cent.
Official North Korean statements on the economy spoke of plans being fulfilled ahead of 
schedule, with production increases over the previous year. (81) In 1993 however, there was 
a conspicuous silence over fulfilment of plan objectives and the government did not release 
figures for industrial and agricultural production growth. This was widely interpreted as a 
sign that North Korea's economy was performing far below the planned targets for the 
Third Seven Year Plan (1987-93). (82)
1991 was apparently a disastrous year for the North Korean economy, in which industrial 
and agricultural production declined, state revenues were stagnant, and shortages of energy 
sources and raw materials exacerbated bottlenecks already inherent in the inefficient 
transport and supply infrastructure, all combining to produce falling capacity throughout 
industry. (83) Trade volume fell catastrophically from the US $5.42 billion of 1988 to US 
$2.72 billion in 1991. (84)
By some estimates North Korea's economy experienced negative growth of 5 % in 1992 - 
the fourth consecutive year of contraction. Income in North Korea fell by 7.6 per cent in 
1992, the third successive annual decrease. Manufacturing output also fell, more
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catastrophically, by 17.8 per cent, mining production by 6.1 per cent and agricultural 
output by 2.7 per cent. There were further reports of declining coal production and energy 
shortages. Factories were operating far below capacity. (85) Other reports spoke of a 
breakdown in infrastructure, and basic amenities such as water and sewage, and electricity. 
Overall trade fell from an estimated US $1.85 billion in 1990 to approximately US $1 billion 
in 1992.
Whereas North Korea was formerly self-sufficient in grain production, by 1991 it was in 
chronic deficit in July, 1991, imported rice from South Korea, in the first-ever official 
bilateral trade. (86) In 1992 the food ration was reportedly reduced from 700 grams per day 
to 550 grams per day. By mid 1993 there were unconfirmed reports of "food riots", 
following a very diminished 1992 harvest. The pro-North Korean residents community in 
Japan was reportedly pressured by Pyongyang to increase the transfer of wealth to the 
DPRK, even by selling off assets. (87)
As North Korea's crisis unfolded, South Korean trade and investment emerged as perhaps 
the best hope of rapidly increasing its supply of foreign exchange. The South Korean 
chaebol are eager to invest in North Korea, taking advantage of cheap raw materials and 
labour. Total two-way trade was only $1 million in 1988, but reached $190 million by 1991. 
Seoul bought zinc, fishery products, steel, coal, and gold. (88) The North was able to run a 
modest surplus on this bilateral trade account. Further economic progress depended on 
progress in the North-South Dialogue, and to general improvement in relations with the 
West, to which we now turn.
VII. North Korea's Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era
As in the period 1969-74, North Korea responded to dramatic changes in the international 
system by attempting to make a limited opening to the capitalist world, enter dialogue with 
the South, but simultaneously reinforce Juche. As in the past, North Korea experienced 
great difficulty in squaring this circle, and progress has been very slow.
After a decade on the economic and diplomatic defensive, North Korea finally found itself 
outflanked on two accounts. First, South Korea's successful economic diplomacy had made 
it a more important partner than North Korea for most governments. Secondly, South 
Korea's "Nordpolitik" (89), a policy of expanding economic and diplomatic relations with 
communist states, was spectacularly successful in the wake of the revolutions in Eastern 
Europe and the demise of the Soviet Union.
Thus, North Korea was placed in a position that compelled it either to accept isolation, or to 
make the best of the situation by demonstrating some flexibility. This situation led, most
190
importantly, to the complete reversal of North Korean policy on UN membership, after 
North Korea's allies decided not to block South Korean membership in the UN. North 
Korea therefore had little choice but to enter the UN or allow the South to enjoy sole 
representation, which would have meant the de-legitimisation of the DPRK.
Thus, after two decades of opposing "two Koreas", North Korea capitulated and both 
Korean governments were admitted into the UN in the autumn of 1991. Joint UN entry 
implied a de facto recognition of the status quo, i.e. two Korean governments existed and 
were recognised by most countries in the world. Both attained international legitimacy, and 
their respective claims to represent ail the Korean people were quietly dropped. In formal, 
international legal terms, both achieved the same international status. Only reunification 
could now alter this status.
However, UN membership proved to be an anti-climax. The continuing crisis in North 
Korea undermines its international standing and blocks progress towards full international 
rehabilitation, or peaceful coexistence, much less reunification, with South Korea. North 
Korea's use of the "nuclear card" between 1992-95, discussed briefly below, was a clear 
sign of its desperation.
Above all, it was the loss of support from key communist allies that determined North 
Korea would make capitulations. Here too, the logic of economic self-interest prevailed. 
China informed North Korea in the summer of 1991 that it would not veto a South Korean 
decision to enter the UN. Then China dealt North Korea a further stunning blow by 
normalising diplomatic relations with South Korea during August-September, 1992, to 
facilitate the enormous increase in their bilateral trade.
In the case of the USSR, the Gorbachev administration had no particular love for the 
conservative Kim II Sung regime. From as early as Gorbachev's landmark policy address in 
Vladivostok in July, 1986, it was apparent the USSR would place emphasis on economic 
development in the East, to be accompanied by new diplomatic initiatives for normalisation 
with the ROK, PRC and Japan.
Gorbachev dealt North Korea a heavy blow when he met ROK President Noh Tae Woo in 
San Francisco in June, 1990. Full diplomatic relations between South Korea and the USSR 
were agreed in September, 1990. In the Moscow Declaration on 14 December, 1990, 
Gorbachev announced his support for the South's "step by step" approach to reunification, 
and for a nuclear free zone in Korea. Noh assured Gorbachev that he did not want an 
isolated North Korea and supported continued close relations between the USSR and the 
DPRK. The USSR would use its influence in Pyongyang to push North Korea along the
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desired road of "opening up". South Korea was willing to offer the USSR $3 billion in 
assistance to cement the new relationship. This opened the way to extensive joint ventures 
and South Korean investments inside the USSR, and later its successor Russia, particularly 
in Siberia.
The Soviet rapprochement with South Korea confirmed that it would not veto a South 
Korean application to join the UN, and that its very real economic interest in the South 
would over-ride its weakening political ties to North Korea. The USSR cut aid given to the 
DPRK, as did the Eastern European governments. China, however, continued a modest aid 
programme to North Korea of some $150 million, stretched over a five year period. Russia, 
under President Yeltsin's leadership, further distanced itself from the alliance with the 
DPRK. Russia decided to reconsider the terms of the Soviet Union's 1961 security treaty 
with the DPRK, which requires automatic response should the DPRK be attacked.
These sudden changes in relations led some commentators to predict that North Korea 
would react by retreating to isolationism and playing on the impression that it could 
develop nuclear weapons capability. (90) However, the US and South Korean governments 
believed that enhancing South Korea's relationship with China would force North Korea 
into more flexible policies, including more economic openness, if only to prevent North 
Korea being bypassed by South Korean investors otherwise headed for China. Indeed, 
DPRK Deputy Premier Kim, Dal Hyon, visiting Seoul in July, 1992, pointedly appealed to 
South Korean companies to invest in North Korea rather than go "abroad".
China remained North Korea's ally, but also acted as a liaison for the West. President Noh, 
Tae Woo held a summit meeting in China in October, 1992 with Premier Li Peng and 
President Yang Shangkun, the focus of which was an agreement by China to use its good 
offices to persuade the DPRK to agree to IAEA and South Korean inspection of the North's 
nuclear facilities. (91) Washington and Tokyo also backed the ROK's demand for such 
inspections, making this a precondition for normalisation of relations with North Korea. 
President Kim Young Sam sought much the same commitment from China in early 1994 
while in Beijing.
There was, however, a new willingness by Western powers to initiate contacts with North 
Korea. There was a danger that too rapid an improvement in relations between South 
Korea and its communist neighbours would isolate North Korea and increase its 
desperation. The US and Japan initiated contact with the DPRK to balance the equation, 
while all the powers encouraged direct North-South Korean contacts.
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The US began meeting North Korean diplomats in Beijing from December, 1988, to discuss 
the conditions for an improvement in relations. The first high level meeting between North 
Korea and the US, since the Geneva Conference in 1954, was held in New York in January, 
However, the US made the issue of nuclear safeguards the key to all progress, while also 
requiring progress in North-South talks and improvements in human rights in North 
Korea.
Though beyond the scope of the present discussion, the nuclear crisis overshadowed all 
other issues in Korea during 1992-94.
The US strongly suspected that North Korea was buying time to clandestinely develop its 
own nuclear weapons capability. (92)
North Korea opted for a strategy of nuclear brinkmanship, threatening to withdraw from 
the NPT and refuse sensitive IAEA inspections of the suspect nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. 
The US responded with a campaign to approve UN sanctions against North Korea. The 
crisis intensified and fears were kindled of a possible war. Former US President Jimmy 
Carter interceded in mid June, 1994 and achieved a breakthrough with Kim II Sung, 
leading rapidly to new negotiations and a settlement, despite Kim II Sung's untimely death 
on 8 July, 1994. (93)
The evidence seems to support the thesis that the DPRK played the nuclear card as a 
bargaining device in order to wrest more concessions from the West, i.e. to raise the 
"price" for its pledge to forfeit nuclear weapons capability and to "open" its economy to 
the world. (94) North Korea used crucial talks in mid 1993, for instance, to press a series of 
demands on the US, including a guarantee against nuclear attack, suspending Team Spirit, 
allowing Northern inspection of the US and ROK military installations, removing the US 
nuclear umbrella from South Korea, and recognising the North's socialist system. (95) On 
the other hand, the US, Japan, and the ROK coordinated their approach to the DPRK in 
such a way as to extract concessions from North Korea as well, such as the nuclear 
safeguards agreement. In the final settlement of the nuclear crisis agreed 21 October, 1994, 
the DPRK received a $3-4 billion dollar nuclear assistance programme, to replace its old 
reactors with new technology, and the US agreed to establish a liaison office in Pyongyang, 
the first step toward normalisation.
Japan also played a role in coaxing North Korea out of isolation.
Preliminary meetings between Japan and North Korea started in Beijing in November, 
1990, following LDP godfather Shin Kanemaru's visit to North Korea in September, 1990. 
By the end of 1992 North Korea and Japan had sat through eight rounds of normalisation 
talks, before North Korea walked out.
Japanese trade, aid, and investment could be the life-line the DPRK needs to survive. North
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Korea initially demanded some $10 billion from Japan in compensation for past harm, a 
very unrealistic figure.
As the Cold War ended, North and South Korea renewed their dialogue, accompanied this 
time by great fanfare and media hype. The first Prime Ministerial level talks were held in 
Seoul in September, 1990, followed soon by a meeting in Pyongyang in mid-October, 1990. 
These meetings were primarily an occasion to express general goodwill. (96) At the third 
meeting in December, 1990, the discussion degenerated into antagonistic posturing.
DPRK Premier Yon Hyong Muk attacked the ROK's Nordpolitik as a policy designed to 
isolate the DPRK.
The fourth round of talks, initially scheduled for 25-28 February, 1991, in Pyongyang, 
would have addressed the issue of UN membership, but were cancelled due to the Gulf War 
and Team Spirit. They were finally rescheduled for late October, 1991, with the issue of a 
non-aggression treaty high on the agenda.
In the fifth round, 11-13 December, 1991, North and South Korea signed an historic basic 
accord on political reconciliation, military non-aggression, exchange of persons, and 
economic cooperation, which came into effect in February, 1992. High level talks continued 
and further agreements were reached on areas of cooperation in September, 1992, at the 
eighth round. Progress was sharply halted in early 1993, as the nuclear inspections crisis 
developed. With final resolution of the nuclear crisis in the autumn of 1994, resumption of 
the North-South Dialogue was being encouraged by the major powers. North Korea's 
position was somewhat unclear, being pre-occupied with consolidating Kim Jong Il's 
succession to full power.
VIII. South Korean "Victory" in the Diplomatic Competition
South Korea was well placed to reap benefits from the end of the Cold War; being on a 
trajectory of rapid economic growth and enjoying increasing international support, 
following its extraordinarily successful "Olympic diplomacy" in the run up to the 24th 
Olympiad in 1988. President Noh, Tae Woo then launched an ambitious policy of 
"Nordpolitik". He issued a Special Declaration on 7 July, 1988, indicating renewed interest 
in dialogue and exchanges with the North, and an offer of full diplomatic relations with 
communist states. Noh offered North Korea the chance to trade with the South, promote 
free exchanges, and called for a summit with Kim U Sung.
When President Noh spoke to the UN General Assembly on 19 October, 1988, he became 
the first President of the ROK ever to do so. South Korea was basking in the afterglow of 
the 24th Olympiad, at which many communist states participated despite North Korea's 
protests. Noh told the UN that he desired economic and diplomatic exchanges with North
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Korea and hoped for eventual UN membership.
He used the occasion to call for a six nation consultative conference on the Korean 
Question, with the ROK, DPRK, US, USSR, PRC and Japan participating. He called for the 
good offices of the UN to be employed to promote peace in Korea, but pointedly stopped 
short of requesting direct UN mediation. He offered to sign a non-aggression treaty with the 
DPRK and pledged before the world community that the ROK would never use force first 
in Korea. All this, in retrospect, amounted to a brilliant diplomatic coup for South Korean 
diplomacy, leaving North Korea looking recalcitrant.
Immediately following Noh's debut at the UN, the US agreed to take the initiative to prod 
North Korea into new talks. President Noh urged the US to take "meaningful steps to end 
Pyongyang's isolation and draw it into the international mainstream." The US complied by 
easing trade and travel restrictions on the DPRK later in October, 1988. Nevertheless, 
general US commercial trade with North Korea remained illegal and the DPRK remained 
on the State Department's official list of "terrorist" states. A false start was made in 1989 
on the North-South Dialogue, which North Korea again unilaterally suspended in March, 
on the pretext of Team Spirit.
It was South Korea's spectacular breakthroughs with communist and post-communist 
governments, however, that totally altered the diplomatic situation, eventually forcing 
North Korea back to the negotiating table, and into the UN. South Korea's first and key 
breakthrough in the communist circle was the establishment of full diplomatic relations 
with Hungary early in 1989. Hungary's 1989 diplomatic accord with the ROK was 
scathingly denounced by North Korea. North Korea angrily degraded relations with 
Hungary, on 2 February, 1989, to the level of charge d'affaires, and excoriated Hungary for 
"betrayal of socialism". This did not prevent first Yugoslavia, and eventually all of Eastern 
Europe from soon following Hungary's lead.
South Korea's breakthrough in Eastern Europe was more of an unexpected windfall than 
the result of a particular effort. It is important to note that prior to the revolutions that 
swept communists out of power from late 1989 onward, South Korea's diplomatic inroads 
in Eastern Europe were quite limited, usually to a trade office. The sudden change in 
political atmosphere allowed the successor post-communist regimes to eagerly seek out 
ROK economic cooperation via normalisation of diplomatic relations.
This interpretation was confirmed in personal interviews conducted in the ROK Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs in the summer of 1990. (97) The Eastern European precedent had a 
knock-on effect elsewhere, for instance in Mongolia. According to an official in the division
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of Northeast Asian Affairs, Mongolia was stimulated to seek diplomatic relations with the 
ROK after the revolutions of 1989, since it needed new diplomatic partners and wanted to 
join the "Northeast Asian Economic Bloc", instead of the European bloc controlled by the 
USSR. Thus, the initiative to open diplomatic relations with the ROK was taken by the 
Mongolian side, not the ROK, on 16 March, 1990, and diplomatic relations were established 
with Mongolia on 26 March, 1990. Mongolia requested ROK economic missions be 
despatched as soon as possible. (98) This evidence supports the view that economic interests 
were the determining factor in the diplomatic reversal, even among communist states.
An official in the ROK Foreign Ministry cited three factors that accounted for the 
breakthroughs in 1989-90: (A) the Seoul Olympics, (B) Nordpolitik, from 7 July, 1988, and 
(C) the East European reform, opening, and democratisation process. The ROK wanted 
diplomatic relations, and the East Europeans "eagerly wanted cooperation with the ROK." 
(99) Full relations were established with Poland on 1 November, 1989; with Yugoslavia on 
27 December, 1989; with Bulgaria on 23 March, 1990; with Rumania on 30 March, 1990. 
with Czechoslovakia on 22 March, 1990.
The process of opening with Hungary is a parable for the rest. Immediately after opening 
diplomatic relations, economic cooperation meetings were held with Hungarian officials, 
and several Korean companies opened offices in Budapest, while Hungarian trade 
companies set up headquarters in Seoul. In general, "Economic relations have been 
expedited and are a model to other East European countries, and they rushed to open 
diplomatic relations with the ROK." (100) This model included mutual investment 
guarantees, trade and economic cooperation, scientific and technical cooperation, and 
conventions on avoidance of double taxation: all keys to enhancing the incentives for the 
ROK to invest in the new Eastern Europe.
The opening to Hungary set the tone for ROK political relations with the new regimes of 
Eastern Europe as well. President Noh visited Hungary in November, 1989. The ROK 
expected East Europe to support the ROK position on UN membership and the North- 
South dialogue, expecting that other East Europeans would follow Hungary's lead and 
support ROK membership in the UN, on the principle of universality. (101) This 
expectation proved to be generally correct.
Nevertheless, an official of the East European Division (I) of the ROK Foreign Ministry, in 
a personal interview, maintained that the formal achievement of the breakthrough in 
Eastern Europe was in fact the result of "long-standing policy" dating from the 23 June, 
1973 special declaration by President Park. (102) The early 1980s had been characterised 
by a convergence of policy between the Chun Doo Hwan, Ronald Reagan, and Nakasone.
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These "conservative anti-communist regimes dampened the whole mood of relations with 
the socialist states" (103), which reached their nadir in 1983 at the time of the shooting 
down of KAL 007. The Olympic games, however, were the "decisive turning point" for 
improvement of relations with communist governments. (104) The central breakthrough 
was Park Chul-On's (Political adviser to the Blue House) secret visit to Hungary in 1988 
which led to agreement to open a "permanent mission" in October, 1988. Then followed the 
rush of other Eastern European governments to the ROK, with the exceptions of East 
Germany and Albania. (105)
This "Olympic diplomacy" included the USSR, which began informal discussions on 
opening a "trade office" in December, 1988. After a "tug of war" over the issue of consular 
functions, a "consular department" was set up in Moscow in February, 1990. Thereafter 
the momentum increased and moved to high level talks, including between Kim Young Sam 
and Gorbachev in March, 1990, followed by the Roh-Gorbachev summit in San Francisco 
on 4 June, 1990. In August, 1990 the ROK and USSR conducted high level discussions on 
economic cooperation between the Chairman of GOSPLAN and the Senior Secretary to the 
President for Economic Affairs, Kim, Jong-in. The ROK despatched "survey teams" to 
tour the USSR in search of economic opportunities, including exploitation of natural 
resources. In August 1990, when this interview was conducted, the ROK anticipated that 
full diplomatic relations with the USSR would be forthcoming "in a matter of months", 
with the anticipation that the ROK would soon expand the agenda to include North Korea 
and the security environment around the Korean peninsula. (106)
The US also played a role in facilitating the success of Nordpolitik with the East Europeans 
and the USSR. According to an official in the ROK Foreign Ministry, the US communicated 
to the USSR the ROK's desire to improve relations and gave support in Eastern Europe as 
well. However, given the very changed international situation, the cross-recognition 
formula was "quietly dropped." (107)
The ROK also anticipated that good relations with the USSR would "create a favourable 
environment for unification and also for Beijing-Seoul relations - because the PRC does not 
like to lag too far behind the USSR in relations with the ROK." (108) Finally, given full 
relations with China and the USSR, the "full external conditions will be prepared" for 
reunification. (109)
Rapprochement with China began very early, but progressed slowly. From the first official 
contact in 1978, by 1983 the PRC was referring to the ROK by its proper name, and the 
ROK Foreign Ministry openly called for normalisation of relations with China. The PRC 
allowed indirect trade with the ROK in 1979, via Hong Kong. (110) Direct talks were again
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held in March, 1985. In September, 1986, China participated in the Asian Games in Seoul, 
and informed the North Koreans that not to attend the Games would have been too much to 
ask of China's position. ( I l l )
Then China attended the 24th Olympic Games in Seoul in 1988. President Noh Tae Woo 
prepared for a major expansion in Sino-Korean trade, already standing at a two-way figure 
of some S3 billion. ROK investment went into infrastructure on the west coast of South 
Korea and direct investment increased in China, e.g. in Shandong and especially in 
Guandong in south China. From November, 1988, direct trade became possible. The 
provincial governments of China played a key role in pioneering diplomatic relations. For 
instance, economic delegations were exchanged with Shandong and Liaoning provinces in 
August-November, 1988, and trade offices were established at provincial level. A special 
body was set up by the ROK to discuss economic relations with the PRC and other 
northern socialist countries - the International Private Economic Council (IPEC). (112) 
This was accompanied by talks between the Chinese Council of Promoting International 
Trade, and KOTRA to establish a national trade office, which the ROK wanted to handle 
consular matters as well.
Sino-Korean relations underwent a temporary setback following the Tienanmen massacre 
in 1989, but South Korea was keen to improve relations as soon as possible. China's policy 
of "separating economics from politics" allowed it to increase trade with South Korea 
tremendously. General Secretary Ziang Zemin announced in August, 1990 that China was 
interested in re-opening the trade office matter, reflecting the persistence of PRC economic 
interests in relations with South Korea. At this point, the ROK suggested that the PRC use 
its influence to persuade North Korea to join the UN alongside the ROK and be "more 
sincere in the South-North Dialogue." (113)
South Korea realised that the international system had changed and was very favourable to 
new relations with China and the USSR as "sovereign equals". One official in the Foreign 
Ministry explained that the post Cold War situation was the best situation that had ever 
existed for the ROK's relations with China and Russia. Indeed, he argued that "The norms 
of the present international system favour the ROK." (114)
Given all the spectacular progress with the communist governments and post-communist 
governments reviewed above, the ROK was extremely well placed to fulfil its agenda of 
improving its international status via the UN. ROK membership in the UN emerged in 1990 
as the "top priority" of ROK foreign policy. (115) The lack of full UN membership was 
regarded as being "harmful to the ROK's international status", since the ROK was always 
in the position of asking other governments for their support without being able to
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reciprocate in the UN. (116)
The ROK decided to employ diplomacy with the USSR and PRC to support joint entry into 
the UN by both the DPRK and ROK, thus to get round DPRK objections. Most 
importantly, direct diplomacy was employed to get the USSR and PRC not to use their veto 
in the Security Council to bloc ROK membership. The ROK was aware of the fact that the 
DPRK's argument on joint UN membership as an obstacle to reunification had "collapsed 
with German and Yemen unification." (117) The ROK was anxious to counter Kim II 
Sung's suggestion for UN membership via a single seat, proposed on 24 May, 1990. The 
previous policy of cross-recognition had been "set aside", after several years of hard effort, 
precisely because "there was very little chance of implementation without the support of 
the USSR and PRC." (118) Likewise, it would be up to the DPRK whether it wanted to 
establish diplomatic relations with the US and Japan, which the ROK had no power to push 
through. The ROK correctly anticipated that the DPRK would be unable to oppose ROK 
normalisation of relations with the USSR and PRC, and thus would be compelled .to 
reconsider its position altogether. The Foreign Ministry was very confident that the DPRK 
would return to the table "to get US and Japanese technology". This was simply "a matter 
of time." (119)
Already, in 1989, 48 countries had made a formal statement endorsing Korean membership 
in the UN, on the principle of universality, including socialist Hungary. The ROK 
anticipated that other Eastern European governments would make similar statements on 
the Korean Question at the UN in 1990.
It was therefore the ROK that renewed the practice of making a formal statement to the 
UNGA on the Korean Question, in October, 1988, after its Olympics success. The ROK was 
fully confident of victory in the UNGA, given that as of June, 1990, a total of 141 countries 
had diplomatic relations with South Korea, compared to 104 (excluding Ukraine and 
Byelorussia) with the DPRK. This represented an increase from February 1988, when the 
ROK had 128 diplomatic partners, compared to 101-2 for the DPRK. Of these, 66 countries 
had relations with both Korean governments. Since February, 1988, the ROK had 
established diplomatic relations with: Bhutan, Mongolia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Algeria, Iraq, Cape Verde, Congo, and Namibia. Only a 
handful of countries had, during the same period, established diplomatic relations with the 
DPRK, including Peru and Colombia. The way was cleared for ROK victory in the UN, and 
the final achievement of a new international status.
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IX. Conclusion
The rival Korean regimes entered this period in a state of diplomatic parity. Profound 
change in the international system challenged both regimes to adapt their domestic and 
foreign policies. South Korea adapted very successfully through a combination of economic 
diplomacy, political and military neutrality, and the final abandonment of anti-communist 
ideology in foreign affairs, accompanied by a spectacular windfall at the end of the Cold 
War and the fall of communist regimes in Europe.
Economic interests played a decisive role in the diplomatic reversal. The basic economic 
strategy pursued by South Korea of export oriented industrialisation facilitated its 
successful adaptation to the new international conditions of the 1980s and 1990s. The 
requirements of economic success pressured the regime into pragmatic policies which were 
broadly in congruence with main trends in the international political economy. When even 
the communist regimes accepted the need to adjust to these same trends, South Korea 
reaped a huge diplomatic harvest at the expense of North Korea. This process culminated 
in entry into the UN as a sovereign state, alongside the North, thus establishing a new 
international status.
In contrast, North Korea was unable to successfully adapt to the new international 
situation. North Korea's close association with the NAM, which was of such benefit to its 
international legitimacy in the 1970s, became increasingly ineffectual as a tool of diplomacy 
in the 1980s, as the NAM experienced internal disarray and declining political importance 
in world politics. Likewise, new ideological conflicts and disarray in the "socialist 
community" of states left North Korea increasingly isolated and uncertain. The essential 
reason for the failure of DPRK economic policy was that it never went far enough in 
embracing necessary reforms, although the US embargo was certainly another important 
factor. Finally, the ossification of the political regime led to serious foreign policy mistakes 
and mismanagement, leading to a steady loss of international support throughout this 
period. The final consequence was a retreat and then "defeat" for North Korea, abandoned 
by most of its allies and forced to sue for terms with the ROK and the West.
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CONCLUSIONS
I. International Change and Domestic Responses: The Framework of Analysis
In chapter one a selective review of the relevant literature on hegemony and international 
change was undertaken to establish a framework of analysis. Then was then applied to the 
two Koreas' development and competition. Before discussing the findings of the substantive 
analysis, let us first summarise the key points of the theoretical framework.
International change can be analysed as a series of "hegemonic transitions". These entail 
significant change in international order, including the global industrial structure. The 
rhythm of hegemonic transitions establishes the systemic framework within which 
peripheral states seek to enhance their international standing by pursuing industrialisation.
The world economy experiences a general pattern of cyclical expansion and contraction, 
with a relationship to hegemonic order. Hegemonic moments of order are usually 
associated with economic expansion periods, while non-hegemonic interregnums are often 
associated with economic difficulties, increasing competition, and even war. Within this 
context, the industrialisation process, at its core a process of technological development, 
profoundly affects the distribution of power in the international system.
The most powerful states, and those that therefore may become hegemonic, are those that 
have achieved advanced technological development relative to others, and this is often 
associated with a prior or concomitant revolutionary transformation of the socio-political 
and economic order. "Backward" or peripheral states must attempt to "catch up" or suffer 
various penalties due to their weakness. Peripheral states may attempt to ascend to core 
industrial status, but this requires the necessary socio-political and economic 
transformation of state and society demanded by technological modernity. In order to do so 
successfully, a peripheral state must ideally have a high degree of meaningful sovereignty, 
i.e. break or reduce existing dependency ties that may obstruct national industrialisation 
and capital accumulation.
Such "late industrialisation" faces formidable obstacles inherent in the prevailing 
asymmetries of the international system. Some theorists maintain that change in peripheral 
states, as a consequence of such asymmetries, is caused more by external factors than by 
internal, endogenous factors, including ideological currents transmitted from centre to the 
periphery.
Nevertheless, the most widely accepted prerequisite for successful ascendance from the 
periphery seems to be a stronger role for the state in organising the national development
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process. Such a strong state facilitates the acquisition of technology and the mobilisation of 
all available resources toward accelerating industrialisation and capital formation. In this 
sense, there is perhaps a certain type of "advantage of backwardness" whereby a strong 
state in the periphery may succeed in catapulting national development toward higher 
stages of industrialisation by acquiring state-of-the-art technologies. This is often associated 
with nationalistic, or neo-mercantilist economic policies, designed to protect domestic 
industries, and a planned sequential development of industries.
To this general framework I suggested the addition of "emulation", "imposition of forms", 
"regime rigidities", and "the structure of opportunities" (or "structural opportunities"), as 
concepts that could be employed to analyze the process of change by peripheral states. The 
central point is: to the degree to which the state elite can create a congruence between 
domestic and foreign policies and the key trends of transformation in the international 
system, the more the state will be successful both domestically and internationally in 
promoting its development and enhancing its international standing.
This framework of adaptation by the periphery assumes that while no state presides over 
an economy that can be truly autonomous from global economic and political trends, it can 
use its manoeuvrability to either accentuate or ameliorate the effects of the general world 
economic conditions in which it operates. The policies pursued by peripheral states are 
therefore crucial, and themselves form part of the periodic restructuring of the world 
economy. As peripheral states industrialise, and thus global over-capacity emerges in some 
industrial sectors, this competition is a challenge to the existing industrial powers.
A cyclical pattern of industrial restructuring takes place, which brings with it profound 
socio-economic and political changes in both peripheral and core states, and affects the 
character of international order. Some scholars have identified the late 19th century, the 
1920s and the 1980s as such periods of structural crisis involving global industrial 
restructuring.
The rhythm of this general pattern of change in the international system poses 
opportunities and constraints for peripheral states. Since peripheral state elites are often 
part of a global coalition of elites in the transnational hegemonic structure, then different 
phases of international change, as outlined above, imply the possibility of change in the 
nature of the transnational linkages between peripheral and core elites, and thus of a 
change in status. Global hegemony may be characterised by the promulgation of certain 
"universal" values to which peripheral elites subscribe either through emulation or as a 
result of imposition. However, as hegemonic influence wanes or undergoes transition due to 
the re-assertion of multi-core structure, peripheral elites may be able to alter their position 
in the international system.
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Finally, it is important to emphasise both the limitations of hegemonic influence over 
peripheral states and the constraints on successful adaptation and development by any 
state, peripheral or otherwise. It should never be taken for granted that any elite or any 
state is capable of being so self-conscious of the "objective" situation that it can or will be 
able to take the "correct" course of action, or that it can overcome formidable obstacles to 
reform or restructuring.
II. The Two Korea's Responses to International Change
This thesis examines the case of Korea in modern international relations using the general 
framework outlined above. The themes of development and international standing are 
directly intertwined throughout the analysis. Beginning with late Yi dynasty Korea, the 
framework has been applied with a view to capturing the interaction of domestic and 
international factors to explain changes in international standing and status.
The analysis of Yi dynasty Korea's responses to international change focuses on the 
consequences of the failure to successfully modernise. The socio-economic and political 
order in Yi dynasty Korea proved to be incapable of self-reform, the result of a 
combination of entrenched oligarchic interests and the influence of foreign powers, 
particularly China.
In contrast, Japan, successfully met the new challenges posed by Western industrial 
modernity and ascended from the periphery to the core of the international system, thus 
altering the nature of the regional system. In the face of Japanese expansionism, Korea's 
failure to reform, industrialise, and create a centralised state during the late 19th century 
led to complete loss of sovereignty between 1910-1945. Korea became an integral part of the 
Japanese imperium.
Korea's international status changed again with liberation and partition in 1945. The 
emergence of a new international order and Soviet-American rivalry brought frustrated 
hopes for immediate independence by a unified sovereign state. Occupation policy led to the 
emergence of the "Korean Question" in post-war international affairs. The international 
legality of the two rival Korean regimes was contested, though the US used its hegemonic 
influence to facilitate UN endorsement of the ROK.
To overcome the legacy of colonialism and partition, both Korean regime's attempted 
strategies of ascent through industrial development. Both were quite successful in 
eventually establishing strong states and industrial bases. In tandem with this national 
development, each regime pursued a foreign policy strategy it considered to be compatible
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with its domestic economic policies and its ideological and political preferences. Their 
diplomatic rivalry primarily took the form of competition for international support, 
especially in the Third World.
The domestic and foreign policies of each Korean regime were analyzed in relation to the 
main trends of change in the international system, in the search to assess the degree of 
correspondence, and to interpret the outcome of the competition. The expectation that 
different periods or phases of hegemonic order would have a direct bearing on the nature of 
the constraints and opportunities for manouerability has generally been upheld with a 
reasonable degree of isomorphism.
The Korean regimes' development was initially constrained within the bipolar Cold War 
system. The occupation period was one in which great power rivalry overwhelmed Korean 
aspirations for immediate independence. As a consequence of this period of international 
rivalry, Korea was permanently partitioned. International consensus broke down and tfvo 
rival claims to international legitimacy were put forward.
Each regime was heavily influenced by ideological currents emanating from its superpower 
patron, and by the imposition of forms by the occupying power. Only with the return of 
sovereignty in 1948 did each regime gain a meaningful opportunity for greater 
independence, marred however by the Korean War, which resulted initially in even deeper 
dependence upon external support by both regimes.
During the reconstruction period that followed the Korean War, North Korea made the 
most progress in reducing its dependency on the Cold War international structure, in 
advancing national industrialisation, and in achieving a higher level of political autonomy. 
North Korea achieved this through a revolutionary transformation, combining the 
consolidation of a highly nationalistic version of socialist policies with the receipt of 
industrial and technical assistance on a very large scale from other socialist countries. In 
effect, the socialist community of states agreed to industrialise North Korea virtually "over 
night" by transferring to it the then state-of-the-art industrial plant prevalent in their 
economies. However, North Korea manipulated this external assistance in order to establish 
an autonomous industrial base, including heavy industries. The point of this strategy was to 
establish economic independence and thus consolidate political independence. The effect of 
this policy on North Korea's international standing was mainly positive. In effect, North 
Korea rejected both US and Soviet hegemony.
South Korea, in contrast, failed to achieve rapid industrialisation and remained in extreme 
unilateral dependence on the United States during the reconstruction period. The
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particular domestic coalition that governed South Korea in this period constituted a block 
on revolutionary transformation, while its extreme anti-communism reduced its capacity to 
increase its international support. Its political autonomy suffered as a result of the extreme 
aid-dependence on a single power, i.e. the United States. The economy was characterised by 
import-dependence rather than import substitution, and exports were nil.
In summation, the policies chosen by South Korea and partly imposed through the bilateral 
relationship with the United States, led to increased dependency, an absence of 
technological innovation, poor economic development performance, and were more 
detrimental than beneficial in terms of enhancing international support, despite the fact 
that South Korea enjoyed initial advantages due to the global hegemonic influence of the 
United States.
In the next period the two Koreas' trajectories again sharply diverged. This was a 
consequence of important regime change in the South and new conditions in the 
international system, e.g. the gradual erosion of Cold War structures, the momentum of 
decolonisation and non-alignment as new factors in world politics, and new opportunities in 
the international division of labour.
In this new environment North Korea remained consistent in its domestic and foreign 
policies. The correspondence between its domestic and foreign policies was enhanced by an 
assertion of the "independent line" and increasingly proactive policy toward the emerging 
nations and liberation movements of the Third World.
Therefore, throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s, while the trend toward decolonisation 
and national revolution was strongest, North Korea's international support increased, until 
it achieved diplomatic parity with South Korea in 1975. The analysis of the content of 
DPRK foreign policy shows how North Korea successfully expanded its circle of diplomatic 
partners by emphasising shared interests in promoting national independence and national 
development vis a vis the advanced countries, and the principles of non-alignment vis a vis 
all great powers.
South Korean diplomacy, by contrast, was largely ineffective, particularly in stemming the 
advance of the DPRK in the Third World. South Korea's involvement in the Vietnam War 
and its unfavourable attitude toward national liberation movements and socialism was 
quite damaging in terms of its prospects of acceptance in the Third World solidarity 
movement. This situation reflected South Korea's bilateral dependence on the United 
States. This weakness was reflected in annual increases in support for North Korea in 
UNGA votes on the Korean Question. In the 1960s, the competition for international 
support was largely a zero sum game, with gains by one regime being made at the expense
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of the other. South Korea's Hallstein Doctrine embodied such zero sum game principles.
Though South Korea lacked sufficient diplomatic flexibility, it possessed other capacity for 
successful adjustment to new conditions. South Korea underwent a belated domestic 
revolutionary transformation, under military government, that transformed it into a 
dynamic, industrialising, export oriented economy. This transition was a result of the 
convergence of interests between the South Korean elite and the interests of Japan and the 
United States toward developing a new regional political economy. Foreign policy was 
adjusted to be more compatible with the new economic strategy and to reduce the damage 
to international standing that resulted from rigid anti-communism.
Thus, South Korea reduced its level of regime rigidities that had previously obstructed 
successful development while simultaneously developing a highly successful long term 
economic policy. However, this economic adaptability was not initially sufficient to offset 
North Korean political advantages, especially in the Third World. Nevertheless, it laid an 
extremely good foundation for long term economic, political, and diplomatic success in the 
period that followed.
In the period of flux in international relations in the late 1960s to early 1970s the 
international community reached a consensus that the Korean Question was a matter for 
the Koreans themselves to decide: free from foreign interference. This new international 
situation can be interpreted, through our analytical framework, as reflecting the gradual 
decline of US hegemonic influence and the re-assertion of a multi-core structure. In this 
environment the Korean regimes gained greater autonomy, including South Korea, which 
used the opportunity to further consolidate state power and to accelerate industrialisation 
through an ambitious programme of heavy and chemical industrialisation.
Domestic regime rigidities increased in both Koreas in the later part of the 1970s, but 
particularly in North Korea, which was increasingly unable to innovate and unsuccessfully 
attempted to open to the world economy. The deepening political rigidity of both regimes 
became the primary obstacle to progress toward reunification or even peaceful co­
existence. Since parity had been achieved in the UNGA in 1975, at least in terms of formal 
international support, the situation drifted toward impasse.
South Korea’s domestic repression alienated many international supporters during the 
draconian "Yushin" period, though its heavy and chemical industrialisation policies laid 
the basis for long term industrial deepening and continued growth. North Korea not only 
failed in its attempt to make a limited opening to the international economy, but more 
importantly, began to suffer from structural problems that reduced the growth potential of
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its economy. Politically, North Korea began to ossify, leaving it far less capable of adjusting 
its foreign policy to new trends in the international system. In sum, North Korea had 
reached a point at which the early advantages of its industrial and political policies had 
reached their limits and restructuring was required to achieve continued success. Instead of 
reform, however, there was a great increase in regime rigidities in North Korea, as the Kim 
II Sung regime sought to perpetuate itself indefinitely.
It is in the intersection of these divergent domestic trajectories and the new trends in the 
international system in the 1980s that we can arrive at conclusions concerning the outcome 
of their diplomatic competition. The 1980s were characterised by increasing economic 
competition, industrial restructuring, efforts to further liberalise world trade, and a general 
trend toward economic liberalisation by capitalist and socialist economies alike.
South Korea underwent another regime change from 1979-81 that resulted in successful 
adjustment of both domestic and foreign policy, bringing an increased correspondence with 
the new trends in the international system. South Korea's economic adjustment proved to 
be highly successful in restoring economic efficiency and enhancing international 
competitiveness. Its foreign policy, based on ever increasing pragmatism and emphasis on 
expanding economic diplomacy, at last began to pay real dividends in terms of increased 
international support and enhanced international standing.
This took place in an international context in which Third World militancy and solidarity 
declined and were increasingly replaced by pragmatism and acceptance of the new trends 
of liberalisation, marketisation, and privatisation. The interviews undertaken in the ROK 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1985-86 tend to confirm that South Korea very consciously 
exploited the new international trends through promotion of economic diplomacy, and 
understood that this strategy should enhance its international standing.
South Korea's final abandonment of anti-communist criteria in foreign policy was a key 
element in the ultimate success of the adjustment. Once South Korea opened the prospect of 
economic relations with communist states, the economic diplomacy strategy was so 
successful that South Korea was eventually able to win over all the principle communist 
supporters of North Korea, leaving North Korea relatively isolated. South Korea also 
successfully improved relations with the United States and other Western powers, as well as 
Japan, during the "Second Cold War", while it greatly enhanced its international prestige 
by successfully hosting the Olympics in Seoul in 1988.
As a result, a new consensus emerged that South Korea's international status should be 
confirmed through full membership in the United Nations. South Korea had emerged as a
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middle income, newly industrialised country, and one of the most significant trading states 
in the world economy. Its legitimacy was greatly enhanced, both domestically and 
internationally, by undertaking a transition to democracy from 1987 onward. Therefore, by 
the end of the 1980s, South Korea's level of international support had been significantly 
improved with the West, the Third World, and even with "Second World" communist 
countries.
North Korea, in contrast, continued to fail to make internal reforms that were urgently 
necessary for a successful economic adjustment to new international conditions, while its 
foreign policy also remained inflexible and ever more out of tune with the new international 
situation. The decline of Third World militancy and solidarity, the trend in the communist 
states to make a historic compromise with the capitalist world economy, combined with the 
long term detrimental effects of the US economic and diplomatic embargo on North Korea, 
all contributed to a deterioration of North Korea's international standing.
North Korea's domestic and foreign policies, left essentially unchanged, lost 
correspondence with the main trends in the international system. The preservation of the 
ossified industrial structures of Juche socialism, and the equally ossified political structure 
of the Kim II Sung regime, was both a cause and a consequence of the lack of reform. North 
Korea's support declined as a consequence of its resistance to reform, even among 
communist governments.
Therefore, the 1980s were a decade of crisis for North Korea, which was ever more beset 
with the negative consequences of mounting regime rigidities. This situation culminated in a 
position of extreme weakness and vulnerability, forcing the regime to make concessions, 
under duress, to foreign demands. These "capitulations" came in the form of an acceptance 
of "two Koreas", i.e. dual membership in the United Nations, and the necessity of a gradual 
opening to the world economy and economic investment from capitalist South Korea.
The "final" outcome of the competition between the rival regimes of divided Korea is a 
somewhat paradoxical one. Though both regimes joined the United Nations, actually on the 
basis of South Korea's clear diplomatic superiority over North Korea, this did not 
fundamentally transform the situation on the Korean peninsula itself. The regime rigidities 
of North Korea continue to threaten instability in Korea and have made reunification a 
more unlikely short-term prospect than may otherwise have been the case.
Indeed, North Korea's isolation has become a matter of international concern given its 
nuclear development policies, for instance. North Korea's nuclear policies may be 
interpreted as a sign of desperation in which it attempted to compensate for its loss of
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capability in diplomacy and its declining international support.
South Korea clearly emerged the "victor" in the long international competition, but has 
been unable to force North Korea to change, thus marring and limiting the realisation of its 
victory. The key to South Korea's long term success was a combination of its greater 
adaptability to the main trends of international change in the 1980s and early 1990s, and its 
pragmatic abandonment of dogmatic ideological positions in foreign policy, combined with 
much more favourable international trends during this period than in the previous period.
The final conclusion to be drawn from this case study is that ideology itself was not the 
determining factor of change or of the outcome of competition. Rather, it was in fact the 
ability to transcend ideology in pursuit of more objective and pragmatic goals that created 
greater flexibility and thus adaptability to international change. The competition was not 
therefore, simply "capitalism" versus "communism". Secondly, the case illustrates, once 
again, the fluidity of the international system, and the opportunities for upward 
ascendance, as well as downward descent, depending on how well a state manoeuvres. It 
also confirms the underlying salience of economic policy in determining change in 
international standing, and eventually even in status.
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